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WHO CARES ABOUT SCHOOL QUALITY?  
 
THE ROLE OF SCHOOL QUALITY IN HOUSEHOLD PREFERENCE,  
SCHOOL DISTRICT CHOICE, AND WILLINGNESS TO PAY 
 
YOUNGME SEO 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
School quality is considered a key factor affecting homebuyers‘ location choices 
and willingness to pay. Previously, many studies found that school quality plays a 
critical role in determining housing prices and location choice. School quality is 
positively capitalized into housing prices. Households are willing to pay for school 
quality, in particular, school outcomes such as test scores and performance index. 
However, there is a view that willingness to pay for school quality is different based on 
household demographics and socioeconomic status (SES).  
The purpose of this dissertation is to investigate heterogeneous preference for 
school quality, school district choice, and willingness to pay for school quality according 
to a household‘s demographic background and SES, including the presence of school-
age children, marital status, income, education, race/ethnicity, and occupation. This 
dissertation takes occupational variables into account in the model as a proxy for human 
capital. This dissertation was also developed to find whether or not a household‘s 
preference for school quality leads to their school quality consumption regarding school 
district choice and willingness to pay.  
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Two datasets were used: the 2006 homebuyer‘s survey and the 2006 transacted 
housing sales in Cuyahoga County, Ohio. With the aggregated dataset, the national 
model also analyzes household demographics and school quality data aggregated by 
school district in 2,531 school districts in 14 states. Three models were used to test the 
groups of hypotheses for preference, school district choice, and willingness to pay: 
ANOTA, ordered logit, and the hedonic price model.  
The findings of this dissertation indicate household heterogeneous preferences 
for school district choices and willingness to pay for school quality. It also found a gap 
between preference for school quality and actual consumption of school quality. In 
particular, larger gaps appear in low-income, low-educated, and single-head households 
than in other households. These findings help policy makers understand residents‘ 
preferences, school district choice, and willingness to pay for specific public goods and 
services according to their demographics and SES. They also call for policies to reduce 
the gaps.  
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
Studies of consumer behavior in the housing market have evolved and diverged 
in two directions. A sizable literature, on the one hand, has focused on factors 
affecting housing prices, including attributes of dwellings, public services, and 
location-specific amenities. Desired attributes have a positive externality on housing 
prices and vice versa. On the other hand, studies have examined the impact of these 
attributes on consumers‘ housing choices and their location choices.  
These approaches are closely related to each other because specific attributes of 
public services and amenities are preferable to consumers, thus leading to their 
location choice and willingness to pay. A consumer‘s decision on purchasing a house 
is made based on not only where to live but also how much to pay for public services.  
It is important to identify household preference for the attributes of public services in 
the housing market because their preferences lead to choices and to willingness to 
pay for public services that are capitalized into housing prices.  
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The initial study that focused on the impact of household location decisions 
based on the quality of public services was Tiebout‘s (1956) work, which 
demonstrated that consumer-voters reveal their preferences for public services by 
making location decisions, voting with their feet. His hypothesis has been tested in 
many studies, which have found empirical evidence that favorable public goods have 
positive effects and are capitalized into housing prices.  
Households‘ location choices and willingness to pay for public services have 
considerable influence on housing prices in a region:  Differences in housing prices 
in a region will also reflect the individual attributes of the properties or changes in 
characteristics, including amenities in the neighborhood in which they are located. 
Different levels of public service and amenities implicitly reflect a homebuyer‘s 
preference, choice, and willingness to pay for favorable amenities, and scale of 
preference for public goods and services, such as school quality.  
It is widely believed that public school quality has long been considered a key 
factor for homebuyers making location decisions within a region (Haurin & 
Brasington, 1996). School quality provides the basis for developing human capital, 
and technological developments that grow as a result of human capital can make the 
region grow (Wobmann, 2003). Primary and secondary education are known not 
only as the foundation of future academic achievement and future human capital, but 
also as a favorable amenity for current human capital (Weiss, 2004).  
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Currently, there is a view that household preference, school district choice 
(Barrow, 2002), and willingness to pay (Bayer, Ferreira, & McMillan, 2004) is 
heterogeneous; household behavior is not deterministic but stochastic (McFadden, 
1977). The current findings consistently indicate that household location choices and 
willingness to pay are different according to household demographics and socio-
economic status (SES). 
The purpose of this dissertation is to investigate household heterogeneous 
preferences regarding school quality, school district choices, and willingness to pay 
for school quality. It also examines whether household preference for school quality 
can lead to school district choice and willingness to pay for school quality as Tiebout 
(1956) hypothesized. This pertains to school districts with better school quality as 
well as those of lesser school quality, and to what extent homebuyers are willing to 
pay for public school quality through location decision and housing prices.  
In particular, this study tests the role of school quality
1
 among homebuyers with 
different demographics and SES, and examines their home-buying and school 
district choices and willingness to pay. Although homebuyers are well aware of the 
importance of education (Barrow, 2002), the importance of school quality may have 
different influences on a homebuyer decision regarding purchasing a house, 
depending on a household‘s demographic and SES, including the presence of school-
age children, marital status, income, education, and occupation.  It is particularly 
interesting to observe how households without children or those with children but 
                                                 
1
 In this paper, school quality refers to public school quality. 
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not at school age express their preferences regarding school quality, school district 
choice, and willingness to pay for school quality since those households do not 
directly enjoy school quality.  
This dissertation utilized a survey in order to assess homebuyer location 
preference and school district choices based on school quality. The first approach 
called for the use of a survey instrument to reveal actual preferences of homebuyers 
and choices for school quality when purchasing a home. A listing of homeowners 
who purchased homes in Cuyahoga County in 2006 was obtained from the 
Cuyahoga County Auditor‘s Office.  Participants for the survey were randomly 
selected from names of homeowners on this list. In order to find household 
preference and school district choice, the survey results were analyzed by analysis of 
table (ANOTA) and ordered logit analysis.  
 The second methodological approach called for the use of a hedonic price model 
to estimate not only individual and aggregated willingness to pay for school quality 
but also the amount to which school quality variables capitalized into housing prices. 
A hedonic price model was applied to the Cuyahoga County model with individual 
housing sales data for 2006 and to the national model with aggregation by school 
district in 14 states (Arkansas, California, Colorado, Delaware, Illinois, Indiana, 
Massachusetts, Michigan, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, 
Texas, and Washington). 
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1.2 Definition of School Quality in the Housing Market  
 
 
The impact of school quality on the decision of a homebuyer to purchase a house 
in a particular region potentially can be explained by a series of input and output 
school quality variables and value added. Input variables such as expenditure per 
pupil, teacher characteristics, class size, and teacher-to-student ratio have been 
shown to impact student performance. Conversely, output variables such as student 
test scores and academic performance measurements determine school quality.  
Currently, multiple measurements of student outcome, such as performance 
index and school district report cards, increasingly are in demand. The variable of 
value added, which refers to the differences between previous year and current year 
academic achievement is also considered an important indicator of student 
performance due to the lack of accountability and the lack of validity of test scores 
(Meyer, 1997).  
1.3 Statement of Research Questions  
 
This study was developed to answer the question of who cares about school 
quality, what school quality a homebuyer prefers, and to what extent a homebuyer is 
willing to pay for school quality. Household demographics and SES play a critical 
role in not only choosing communities with varying school quality but also having 
varying willingness to pay for school quality.  
 The research questions being asked in this dissertation include: 
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(1) Which homebuyers care about school quality when purchasing a house?  
(2) Which homebuyers choose school districts with high school quality or low 
school quality? 
(3) How much are homebuyers willing to pay for better school quality? Which 
variables of school quality are most valued?  
(4) Do household preferences regarding school quality influence their school district 
choices and their willingness to pay? 
1.4 Contribution to Literature 
 
 
A great number of studies have attempted to find the factors that influence 
housing prices because the importance of school quality is currently well recognized 
among homebuyers and capitalized into housing prices. In addition, there is 
controversy as to which school measure is the most capitalized into housing prices. 
By analyzing school input factors (expenditure per pupil, teacher salary, and teacher 
experience), and school output factors (test scores, performance index, and value 
added), this dissertation found that the performance index is the best measure of 
school quality. 
These measures of school quality may have varying influence on housing prices, 
because homebuyers have different preferences, choices, and willingness to pay for 
school quality. Although there are studies testing the relationship between school 
quality and homebuyer marital status, the presence of school-age children, income, 
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education, and race, none of the studies test for homebuyers who have different 
occupations. This dissertation includes various occupations as independent 
characteristics of households. Homebuyers, as human capital, are the driving force of 
local economic development. Local governments have attempted to attract human 
capital and to provide public goods and services to meet the demands and desires of 
the residents. 
A survey is the best methodology to learn the demands and desires of the 
residents. This dissertation surveyed homebuyers to determine their preference for 
school quality and school district choice. Comparing homebuyer preference and 
school district choice with one‘s willingness to pay for school quality in this 
dissertation allows analysis of the gap between consumers‘ desires and their 
behavior. 
The methodological approaches of this dissertation will assist future researchers 
with the impact of school quality on homebuyers‘ heterogeneous preferences, school 
district choices, and willingness to pay for school quality, based on household 
composition (e.g., income, race, education, occupation, and the presence of children 
in the household). In particular, this dissertation looks at which homebuyers care 
about school quality, making this study different from other studies related to school 
quality because occupation variables and homebuyers without children are also 
examined. The inclusion of the occupation variable also provides useful policy 
indicators for housing advocates/policymakers by identifying homebuyer preferences, 
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choices, and willingness to pay for homes in particular locations based on school 
quality.  
1.5 Organization of This Dissertation 
 
 
 The rest of this dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 begins by 
introducing theoretical backgrounds. The theories applied to this dissertation focus 
on consumer behavior, such as preference, choice, and utility. Literature review of 
school quality in the housing market follows. The definition of school quality will be 
discussed briefly using a study conducted by the National Center for Education 
Statistics (2000). Although it is difficult to define school quality, the importance of 
school quality is evident, and is capitalized into housing prices which affects location 
decisions. Chapter 2 also includes the utility theory that economic man acts 
rationally. However, bounded rational choice theory asserts that consumers‘ actions 
are based on the limited circumstances to which they are exposed.  
 Chapter 3 presents the conceptual model and states the hypotheses to be tested. 
The conceptual model provides the overall process of decision-making regarding 
willingness to pay for school quality and the school district in which one decides to 
live, as well as preference for school quality.  Hypotheses are grouped into three 
categories:  (1) preference for school quality, (2) school district choice, and (3) 
willingness to pay for school quality. 
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 Chapter 4 describes how the hypotheses were tested and what methodologies 
were used. The methodological approaches to test hypotheses are descriptive 
analysis, ANOTA analysis, the ordered logit model, and the spatial hedonic price 
model. Each model is described showing how it works and how it is applied.  How 
to obtain data and variables is also discussed in this chapter.  
 Chapter 5 presents the statistical findings and data analysis. The results of the 
survey data show heterogeneous homebuyers‘ preferences regarding school quality 
using ANOTA analysis. The result of the ordered logit model indicates that 
homebuyers with school-age children are more likely to live in an ―excellent school 
district.‖ The hedonic models are used for both the Cuyahoga County model and the 
national model; the results are consistent with previous studies which show that 
households with higher income and educational levels are willing to pay more for 
school quality.   
Finally, Chapter 6 discusses the summary of study regarding methodologies 
applied to this dissertation, testing of four hypotheses, and findings for households‘ 
preferences for school quality, in addition to the probabilities of homebuyers 
choosing which school district to live in, and to what extent a household is willing to 
pay for school quality. The limitations of this dissertation, conclusions, and policy 
implications follow.
10 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER II 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND & LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter begins by discussing the theory that explains consumer behavior 
based on consumer preferences and choices, which maximize their utility. In 
economics, economic man acts rationally to maximize his/her utility of consumption. 
Consumer behaviors are explained by utility maximization.  
In the framework of consumer behavior and utility maximization, the role of 
school quality in the housing market is considered a key factor in determining 
consumer preference, school district choice, and willingness to pay. According to the 
theory of bounded rationality, however, consumers will make different choices due 
to imperfect information and the constraints of complex variables at individual levels 
of satisfaction. It is important to know the role of school quality in homebuyer 
location decisions, willingness to pay for better school quality, and school quality 
choice in the housing market. Homebuyers with different socioeconomic 
11 
 
backgrounds and characteristics may have different levels of satisfaction regarding 
school quality.  
 Many studies have attempted to define school quality, but few have received 
universal acceptance. Test scores have long been considered as a proxy for school 
quality in the housing research that focuses on the relationship between school 
quality and housing prices. However, critics note that it is impossible for a simple 
variable to represent school quality, leading to controversy among researchers as 
well as inconsistent empirical results. The multiple criteria employed to measure 
school quality in this study were suggested by research conducted by the National 
Center for Education Statistics. 
 The relationships between student achievement and school-related input 
variables, such as expenditure per pupil (Hanushek, 1986; Hedges, Laine, & Rob, 
1996), teacher characteristics (Hanushek, 1971; Hammond, 1999), peer group effect 
(Winkler, 1978; Rivkin, Hanushek, & Kain, 2001)), class size (Cooper, 1989; 
Hanushek, 1998), and parental influence, including income and education (Perl, 
1973), social status (Chu & Willims, 1996), race and ethnicity (Rosen, 1959), and 
occupation (Pearlin & Kohn, 1966), have been studied. Of these school quality input 
variables, parents have tremendous influence on student academic performance. 
Parents with different levels of income, education, race/ethnicity, and occupation 
also influence their children‘s achievements. In the housing market, academic 
performance, especially output variables such as test scores (Rosen & Fullerton, 
12 
 
1977), are capitalized into housing prices. Input variables, such as class size, teacher 
characteristics, and expenditure per pupil (Oates, 1969, Hayes & Taylor, 1996; 
Brasington, 1999) have relatively little impact on housing prices or are not 
statistically significant.  
2.2 Consumer Behavior  
 
 
 This section begins with the related theory that provides the background for 
introducing preference theory, rational choice theory, and utility theory. The 
consumer is always in a situation where he or she makes a choice among the given 
choice sets. Here, the consumer means an individual or a household that can make a 
decision. The choice set is one of the well-defined preordering preferences or is 
defined as a set of possible (mutually exclusive) alternatives from which the 
consumer must choose (Green, 1995).   
The consumer acts rationally in consumption behavior. The rational behavior 
should occur in accordance with the set of preferences (Green, 1971). To the 
economist, rationality is that the choice to be made from the set of alternatives can 
be determined (Arrow, 1963). The rationality of the consumer is discussed in detail 
in the section on consumer preference and choice.  
2.2.1 Consumer Preference and Choice 
 
In microeconomics, a consumer is rational if a decision is made according to a 
preference ordering. There are two types of preference relationships:  strict 
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preference relation (x is preferred to y but y is not preferred to x) and indifference 
relation (x is as good as y). The assumptions of the preference ordering are 
completeness, transitivity, and convexity. 
The first assumption of completeness is that, if there are x and y, a preference 
ordering is complete and well defined between two possible alternatives. For 
example, we have that x   y or y   x if x, y   X. This assumption enables the 
consumer to rank all possible combinations of goods and services. The completeness 
assumption, however, is criticized by Simon‘s (1955) bounded rationality. This 
assumption cannot always be true because the world is too complex and there are 
many goods we know too little about to be able to evaluate them decisively. 
However, it is a useful simplifying assumption for the analysis of choices among 
bundles of goods with which consumers are familiar.  
The transitivity assumption is that, given three consumption goods, x, y, and z, if 
one prefers x to y and prefers y to z, then one prefers x to z. That is, for x, y, and z   
X, if x   y and y   z, then x   z. The transitivity assumption is of importance in 
rationality. The transitivity assumption can be applied to both strict and indifferent 
preference relations. If x is indifferently preferable to y, and y is as good as z, then x 
is as equally preferred as y.   
A consumer choice theory begins with the consumption choice set. As previously 
mentioned, the consumption set is a bundle of goods and services available in the 
market.  A consumer‘s choice is made under the budget constraint;   
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I =  Px + Py    (2-1)     
where I is the consumer‘s income, P is the price of goods and services, x is non- 
housing consumption, and y is housing consumption.  
2.2.2 Utility Theory 
 
 The utility function is used to measure the consumer‘s preference by assigning 
the utility function. Utility is defined as the satisfaction or benefit the consumer 
receives from the consumption of a bundle of goods and services.  
 Utility can be measured by assigning a numerical value to each bundle. In the 
cardinal sense, these numerical values imply differences and meaning so that rational 
consumers maximize their utility by choosing the highest sum of these numerical 
values.  
 At the beginning of the 19
th
 century, scholars, such as Fisher (1892) and Pareto 
(1896) introduced the ordinal concept. Utility function simply represents the ranking 
of consumer preferences. In other words, if a consumer prefers an apple to an orange 
and the numerical values of these goods are three and one, respectively, it does not 
mean an apple is preferred three times as much as an orange, but that an apple is 
simply more preferable than an orange.  
 According to Hicks and Allen (1934), ―Utility will be maximized when the 
marginal unit of expenditure in each direction brings in the same increment of 
utility.‖  The marginal utility is the ratio of utility gained from consuming a good to 
utility from the other good, or the difference between opportunity costs of goods. 
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They explained marginal utility as ―the marginal rate of substation between any two 
goods, The marginal rate of substation of good X for any other good Y is defined as 
the quantity of Y which would compensate him for the loss of a marginal unit of X. 
Now the gain in utility got by gaining such an amount of Y equals an amount of Y 
gained X marginal utility of Y‖ (p. 55). 
 Lancaster (1966) emphasized consumer utility derived from the characteristics 
possessed by goods rather than from goods that do not directly give utility to 
consumers. Lancaster‘s view was that consumer‘s preference was the same for all is 
criticized by Hendler (1975), who thought that the utility function was subjective.  
2.2.3 Location Preference and Land Value 
 
This section builds a bridge between general economic theory and relatively 
practical household behavior in the housing market by introducing the brief concept 
of land economic studies. In the previous section, a general economic theory was 
introduced to explain consumer behavior in the market. This section starts with the 
households‘ (consumer in the housing market) behavior with respect to location 
choice and price. However, land price in residential locations is different from 
agricultural and industrial land price. That is industrial and agricultural land value 
(Thünen, 1826) is determined by how much profit is generated by the land. Muth 
(1969) and Alonso (1964) devised the model for residential land values.  
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2.2.4 Non-Use Value 
 
The non-use value theory is used to validate the inclusion of households without 
children in the model. Total value from utility consists of use-value and non-use 
value. Non-use value is produced when non-market goods, such as public goods and 
natural resources, are the status of the natural or physical environment. Non-use 
value is defined as the preference of individuals who may not use a resource but can 
be affected by change in its status. There are two concepts of non-use values: 
existence value and bequest value. While existence value is the benefit generated 
today by knowing that a resource exists even if no on-site use is anticipated, bequest 
value is the value individuals gain from the preservation of a resource for use by 
their heirs. 
 Krutilla (1967) introduced the concept of bequest value as a type of non-use 
value by saying, ―Individuals do not have to be active consumers of a resource. 
Consumers might hold values unrelated to their current use of a resource. These 
reasons were related to bequeathing natural resources to one‘s heirs and preserving 
options for future use.‖  
  However, McConnell (1997) had a different point of view in that resources are 
valued by their use in most cases. He states that, ―Non-use value occurs only insofar 
as bequest or altruistic notions prevail. We want resources there because they are 
valued by others of our own generation or by our heirs.‖ 
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 Although homebuyers without children do not directly use school services 
provided by local governments, school quality might affect their preferences 
regarding school district choice and their willingness to pay for school quality 
through housing prices.  
2.2.5 Public Finance 
 
Since Tiebout (1956) introduced his model that consumer-voters reveal their 
preference by voting with their feet, there has been controversy among scholars. 
Some theorists believe that when consumer-voters shop in local communities, fiscal 
differentials among communities will be capitalized into housing prices. This 
capitalization represents a disequilibrium phenomenon and will disappear in the long 
run as housing suppliers respond to price differentials (Edel & Sclas, 1974; Epple, 
Zelenitz, & Visscher, 1978). Others argue that preference revealing is dependent not 
only on location decisions but also voting decisions (Romer & Rosenthal, 1978; 
Tideman, 1983).  
 Yinger (1982) states that ―the capitalization of local public goods into housing 
prices is a central feature of the Tiebout model; capitalization under a wide range of 
circumstance is a characteristic of long-run equilibrium‖ (p. 918). He also states that 
―household mobility by itself cannot generate an efficient pattern of local services, 
but local voting may lead to local services levels that satisfy the standard efficient 
condition relative to non-taxed composite goods‖ (p. 918). 
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2.2.6 Human Capital  
 
The importance of human capital in economic development has been recognized 
in the recent economy, which is characterized by technology and innovation bringing 
competitive advantages into the region. Human capital plays a critical role not only 
in creating high technology and skills required for business, but also in adopting and 
using new ideas in new products, services, or processes.  
Public school quality has not only influenced economic factors such as 
productivity and wages, but also has had non-market effects that contribute to 
communities. Many regions have focused on attracting human capital since human 
capital is shown to promote growth and development through externalities of 
knowledge stock. Human capital increases the productivity of labor and capital, 
provides the pool of entrepreneurs who implement and diffuse invention and 
innovations, promotes agglomeration of mature growth firms and encourages quality. 
Owens (2004) note that the return to education may be either direct or indirect, 
and social. Private non-market effects include personal health, capacity to enjoy 
leisure, and efficiency in making a variety of personal choices, as well as education 
ladder. Moreover, the community-level benefit of education includes the production 
of community wealth, improving social equity, strengthening national cohesiveness, 
reducing environmental stress through its effects on fertility and population growth, 
and lowering crime rates.   
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Measuring school quality on housing price implies not only how school quality 
as an amenity is attractive to human capital, but also how much parents are willing to 
invest in housing for better public school quality, which leads to generating future 
human capital of new children. In this dissertation, occupation variables were used 
as a proxy for human capital.  
2.3  School Quality  
 
 
The purpose of education is to teach students the values and social skills to 
become good citizens and to be economically productive (National Center for 
Education Statistics; NCES, 2000). Defining school quality is of importance in 
evaluating how schools perform. The NCES introduces three elements of school 
quality: teachers, schools, and classrooms.  
School quality can be defined differently in housing markets. It can be 
determined by households, based on their willingness to pay for school quality. This 
dissertation defines school quality as the school quality measure that is the most 
capitalized into housing prices. The detailed school quality definition and importance 
are stated in Sections 2.3.1 and 2.3.2.  
2.3.1  Definition of School Quality 
 
In 2001, the No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB) was enacted to accomplish the 
goals of enhancing student achievement, giving information to parents, and 
expanding opportunities for parental school choice. The major principles of NCLB 
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focused on (1) accountability, (2) scientific research, (3) expansion of parental 
options regarding the school they want their children to attend, and (4) expansion of 
local control and flexibility.  According to the NCLB regulations, (1) school districts 
need to provide more information for parents, (2) states should measure students‘ 
progress in reading and math, and (3) states should provide easy-to-read, detailed 
report cards on schools and districts in their state.   
 The NCES (2000) also proposed comprehensive school quality measurements 
that consider all factors related to school quality, such as teacher characteristics, 
classrooms, and school administration ability. It was suggested that the multiple 
criteria be used to measure school quality. The performance index is used to convey 
information about school quality to parents. The performance index uses multiple 
criteria to provide an overall indication of how well students perform. In Ohio, the 
performance index is calculated based on the level of performance on the 
standardized tests and attendance rates. In California, the academic performance 
index is used to measure the academic performance and growth of schools. The 
performance indices in these states are similar to one another, but they have different 
scales. 
2.3.2  Importance of School Quality 
 
It is a widely accepted notion that school quality and schooling are positively 
related to economic growth, at least indirectly through human capital (Hanushek, 
1971). Schooling makes people more productive, healthy, successful, and able to 
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consume goods and services. According to Weiss (2004), ―Education is the best 
investment we can make for the future because human capital is a vital element of 
any economic growth equation.‖  In the knowledge-based economy, competitive 
advantages are gained from the technology and innovation associated with 
knowledge (Romer, 1994). According to Wobmann (2003), acquiring knowledge 
and skills is an investment in human capital in the sense that people sacrifice current 
consumption for increased future income and future productivity. In other words, 
education increases future labor productivity and future income and can thus be seen 
as an investment in human capital, which is embodied in human beings (Wobmann, 
2003).  
Barro (2001) stated, ―recent researchers have been inspired by the excitement of 
the new growth model, which focuses on growth using cross-country and cross-
regional data.‖ He tested the determinants of economic growth and investment in one 
hundred countries observed between 1960 and 1995. He found that growth was 
positively related to average years of school attainment of adult males at the 
secondary and higher levels; however, growth was insignificantly related to 
schooling at the primary level. He also discovered that the effect of school quality 
represented by test scores was important; the quantity of schooling measured by 
average years of attainment of adult males at secondary and higher levels was still 
positively related to subsequent growth.  
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Another aspect of school quality is its role in attracting a quality workforce that 
can make a region grow (Garmise, 2006). On the other hand, Mathur (1999) stated 
that the stock of knowledge is not a sufficient condition to generate growth and 
development. People with knowledge, ideas, and skills provide the pool from which 
innovators and entrepreneurs emerge. In other words, skilled and educated workers 
are the source of technological progress and knowledge externalities. The clustering 
of human capital will tend to attract venture capital and promote venture investment 
in high-tech growth industries.  
Both school quality and quantity of years attained are related to one‘s future 
wages and income by encouraging creative and innovative ways of thinking. 
Innovation also comes from knowledge that is transmitted from one person to 
another by face-to-face contact. A human capital pool is known as a critical factor in 
making a region grow (Cortright, 2001). School quality is considered a strong 
quality of life variable that affects location decisions.  
 Hanushek and Woessmann (2007) asserted that cognitive skills are a key 
dimension of schooling outcomes, but it is difficult to obtain data on cognitive skills 
along with earnings and the other determinants of wages. They also stated that the 
evidence shows that the values of skills and of school quality have grown in the past 
and will have an influence on future general improvements in productivity.  
 On the other hand, school quality not only has an influence on economic factors, 
such as productivity and wages, but also non-market effects that contribute to 
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communities. Owens (2004) noted that the return to education may be either direct 
and private or indirect and social. Private non-market effects include personal health, 
the capacity to enjoy leisure, and efficiency in making a variety of personal choices, 
as well as an education ladder. Moreover, the community-level benefits of education 
include the production of community wealth, improving social equity, strengthening 
national cohesiveness, reducing environmental stress through its effects on fertility 
and population growth, and lowering crime rates.    
2.4  Literature Review 
 
 The literature review in this dissertation is divided into two categories: consumer 
choices, and capitalization and willingness to pay for school quality. Consumer 
choice is stochastic rather than deterministic, while prices for public services are 
deterministic (price taker). The literature about choice is introduced first followed by 
capitalization of public services, particularly school quality. The literature related to 
methodology is discussed in detail in each chapter.  
2.4.1 Homebuyer’s Location Choice 
 
Although the choice model was originally developed and used for transportation 
choice and brand choice, it is now frequently used in the housing market to 
determine residential location choices. McFadden (1977) modeled consumer choice 
and taste using the random utility model and he criticized the hedonic price model 
that treats heterogeneity of consumer preferences and tastes homogeneously. He 
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argued that consumers‘ preferences and tastes for housing vary, and their choices are 
limited as bounded rationality described (McFadden, 1977). 
The literature review of homebuyers‘ preferences and choices is organized as 
follows. First, this dissertation introduces the choice models used in the housing 
market. Second, the rest of the literature focuses on school quality preference and 
choice studies.  
Thereafter, the choice model has been used in various housing market studies, in 
particular, those related to tenure choice (Li, 1977), housing type choice, housing 
demand, neighborhood choice, and community or town choice (Nechyba & Strauss, 
1997; Rapaport, 1997) in the housing market.   
Some studies examined heterogeneous household location choice (Li, 1977; 
Rapaport, 1997), while others investigated the effect of public goods on location 
choice (Nechyba & Strauss, 1997). Using a logit model, Li examined heterogeneous 
homeownership decisions based on income, family size, age of the head of 
household, and race in Boston and Baltimore, using a logit model.  The findings of 
this study showed that the probability of a location choice for each demographic is 
heterogeneous. For instance, as income increases, the probability of homeownership 
goes up. Race and family size are also substantially influential on homeownership. 
Households with two-parents with an average age of 40 years old, four members, 
and income of $12,500 have the highest probability of having homeownership— 
72.6 percent in Boston and 81.4 percent in Baltimore, respectively.  
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Rapaport (1997) studied housing demand and community choice. By examining 
10,484 residents in Tampa, Florida, housing demand and community choice were 
estimated across household characteristics, such as gender, race, age of the head of 
household, and the number of children. Households, who are White, have higher 
educational attainment and higher income, and are a two-parent, demand housing 
more than those who are non-White, have lower income, less education, and disabled 
head of household.  
Using a logit model, Nechyba and Strauss (1997) focused on the effect of 
location decisions on public services. With 22,739 residents in New Jersey, they 
estimated the effect of community characteristics—including local public school 
spending, distance to a metropolitan area, and degree of commercial activity— 
holding housing characteristics constant. These community characteristic variables 
increase the probability of choosing a particular community. 
In contrast, by looking at race and immigrant status, Painter, Gabriel, and Myers 
(2001) investigated different homeownership rates and found that overall 
homeownership rates increased in Los Angeles County between 1980 and 1990. 
With the individual dataset PUMS (public use micro-data sample), their results 
indicated different homeownership rates among race-ethnicity groups when 
controlling for income, education, age, marital status, and size of household. Asians 
had high probability of homeownership, and the largest gap between homeownership 
probabilities was for Whites and Blacks. 
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Table 2-1 Summary of Choice Model Literature 
  
Author Year Title Method Dependent 
variable 
Independent variables Log 
Likelihood 
Findings 
Li 1977 A logit model of 
homeownership 
Logit Dummy (1 own, 0 
rent) 
Age of head of household, 
income, family size, race 
 Heterogeneous 
probability of 
homeownership 
Nechyba 
and 
Strauss 
1997 Community choice 
and local public 
services: A discrete 
choice approach 
Logit communities Public goods, private goods, 
housing prices, community 
characteristics 
 School quality 
plays significant 
role in choosing 
community 
Rapaport 1997 Housing demand 
and community 
choice: An 
empirical analysis 
Two 
stage 
(mixed 
logit 
Community/tenure 
choice 
Log_price, log_income, spouse, 
male_head, White immigrant, 
disabled, head_education, 
spouse_education, age, number 
of kids 
 Heterogeneous 
demand for level of 
housing  
Painter, 
Gabriel, 
& Myers  
2001 Race, immigrant 
status, and housing 
tenure choice 
Sample 
selection 
model 
Tenure choice Number of people and workers 
in household, income, 
immigrant status, race, length 
of stay, education, age 
-81237 Heterogeneous 
homeownership 
rate according to 
race, age, and 
immigrant status 
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On the other hand, many studies have examined the role of school quality in 
residential location choice using the various discrete choice models. One of these 
studies was done by Barrow (2002) with the multinomial logit model. Household 
characteristics were categorized into four items—income, education, age, and race. 
Barrow estimated the probability of location choice using SAT scores as a proxy for 
school quality.  Barrow found that households with children prefer a school district 
with higher SAT scores, although African American households with children put 
less weight on school quality than African American households without children. 
However, African American households with children in higher income, education, 
and age brackets weight school quality as high as other race/ethnicity households 
with children.  
 Bayer, Ferreira, and McMillan (2004) studied residential sorting empirically. 
They asserted that residential sorting is driven by demand for good school quality. 
Bayer, Ferreira, and McMillan also said that many studies had failed to capture the 
indirect effect of school quality generated by heterogeneity in demand for school 
quality and different preferences for the characteristics of their neighbors. Using 
census data from 1990 and a random utility model developed by McFadden, they 
were not only able to observe characteristics of house choice, including housing 
characteristics, tenure status, and neighborhood characteristics, but also socio-
demographic characteristics such as household race, income, education, and working 
status. Bayer, Ferreira, and McMillan were also able to determine the characteristics
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Table 2-2 Summary of School Quality Choice Literature 
 
Author Year Title Method Dependent 
Variables Independent Variables 
Log-
likelihood 
Findings 
Barrow 2002 School choice 
through 
relocation: 
evidence from 
the 
Washington, 
D.C. area 
Multinomial 
logit model 
Probability of 
choosing one 
of 26 school 
districts  
SAT (+), rent (-), distance from  D.C in 
miles (-), per capita county expend net 
on education (+), crime rate (-), land 
area (+), median rooms per housing unit 
(-), proportion owner-occupied housing 
units (+), proportion of persons in 
poverty (-), number of D.C. Metro 
stations (+), education (high school 
graduate (+), some college (+), college 
graduate (+)), number of housing units 
(+) 
-8,104 Different 
probability to 
choose location 
between each 
category; 
income, race, 
education, and 
age 
Bayer, 
Ferreira, 
& 
McMillan 
2004 Tiebout 
sorting, social 
multipliers and 
the demand for 
school quality 
Conditional 
logit model 
School 
districts 
Monthly house price  (-), average test 
scores (+), own (+), year built (-), 
elevation (-), population density (+), 
crime index (-),%black (-), % Hispanic 
(+.-), % Asian (+), % with college 
degree or more (+),average block group 
income (+),working status (+), and 
distance to work 
Not 
reported 
School quality 
facilitates 
residential 
sorting on 
neighborhood 
stratification 
Bayoh, 
Irwin, &  
Haab 
2006 Determinants 
of residential 
location choice: 
How important 
are local public 
goods in 
attracting 
homeowners to 
central city 
locations? 
Multinomial 
logit model 
School 
districts 
School quality (+), total crime (-),  
local tax (-), school district tax (-),  
per capita income (+),  
% houses built before 1970 (-),  
per capita business establishments (+),  
per capita retail establishments (-), 
commute time (-) 
-1,895 Strong 
evidence of the 
importance of 
local public 
goods— 
particularly 
school quality 
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of a neighborhood‘s race, educational attainment, and income. They also used 
housing price and working distance from residence. Ultimately, they found 
neighborhood stratification and heterogeneous preferences, and a willingness to pay 
for better school quality. 
2.4.2 Capitalization of School Quality in Housing Prices 
 
 Many studies have attempted to answer the questions of what is the most 
appropriate measure of school quality and what attributes are capitalized in housing 
prices. They also focused on what variables related to school quality are the most 
attractive factors for which a homebuyer is willing to pay. Although previous studies 
have confirmed school quality is positively capitalized into housing prices, it is still 
controversial which school measures are capitalized into the housing market.  
The seminal study capitalizing on the influence of school quality relative to 
housing prices dates back to Oates (1969). Oates used aggregated median house 
values in New Jersey. The purpose of Oates‘ study was to provide evidence that the 
output of public services should have influence in attracting residents and affecting 
property values. Oates examined the relationship between public expenditures and 
property values and hypothesized that the benefits resulting from providing public 
services exceed the cost of tax liability. Consumers who want high levels of public 
services tend to bid up property values in communities with high-quality public 
service programs. Using the two-stage-least-square estimation technique, Oates 
found that while property values have a significant negative relationship with 
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property taxes, property values are positively correlated with expenditure per pupil 
in the public schools. He found that the increase in one percent of property tax rate 
reduced housing prices by approximately $1,500. In contrast, the increase in 
expenditure per pupil from $350 to $450 made housing prices increase by 
approximately $1,200. He concluded that public services positively affect property 
values, and better schools have a significant positive influence on the value of local 
residential property. However, Oates‘ work is not free from criticism in terms of 
oversimplification. Pollakowski (1973) argued with the exception of per pupil 
expenditure as a proxy for educational services because Oates ignored other general 
public services proxies, without explicit explanation about the relationship between 
general public services and per pupil expenditure.   
Rosen and Fullerton (1977) also indicated that the variable of expenditure per 
pupil alone could not explain the influence of school quality clearly, because prices 
associated with educational factors, educational production function, and the 
endowments of non-market inputs differed among communities. They also stated 
that, if information such as output measures is included in the analysis, the statistical 
results are more consistent with theoretical prediction than when expenditure levels 
are used. Rosen and Fullerton replicated Oates‘ study, using achievement test scores 
as a measure of public benefits. They concluded that expenditures are inappropriate 
variables to capture the impact of school quality on housing price. Additionally, they 
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found that the expenditure per pupil variable has a negative sign and is statistically 
insignificant.  
After examining which attributes of local schools individuals consider, Downes 
and Zabel (2002) also concluded that the most important attribute of school quality is 
school achievement. Using housing values in Chicago for 1987 and 1991, they found 
test scores were reflected in housing price and that parents were willing to pay for a 
house close to a school with higher standardized test scores. Expenditure appeared to 
be statistically insignificant. Figlio and Lucas (2000) also complemented the Downes 
and Zabel (2002) study by exploring whether state school report cards influence 
parental decisions to purchase homes in certain communities correlated to housing 
prices. They found that the difference between an ―A‖ and a ―B‖ in the school report 
card reflected an estimated housing price difference of $21, 229. 
Using per pupil spending, test scores, and marginal effect of the school on 
student performance, Hayes and Taylor (1996) tested the relationship between 
school quality and housing prices in Dallas, Texas. Test scores were divided into 
both school effect and peer effect. Hayes and Taylor found that parents pay a 
premium not on per pupil spending or test scores, but on the marginal effect of the 
school on student performance.  
In education and economic research studies, the value-added method has been 
considered the most theoretically appropriate and has gained popularity. Because 
other effects such as parental background, neighborhood qualities, and innate 
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intelligence inherited from their parents might reflect on test scores and outcome, the 
value-added method measures improvements of academic achievement (Brasington, 
1999).  
Brasington and Haurin (2006) attempted to test empirically the hypothesis that 
the value added to student achievement influences housing prices. Using 77,578 
house transactions in Ohio, school quality was measured by expenditure per pupil, 
proficiency tests, and value added. They employed neighborhood control variables 
such as air quality, racial composition, income levels, tax rates, and crime rates, 
rather than using county fixed-effect dummy variables. However, their research had 
multicollinearity problems, which made the data unreliable. Ultimately, their results 
showed that school expenditures and proficient test scores are more readily 
capitalized into housing prices than the value added variable of schools. 
Seo and Simons
2
 (2009) also attempted to find the measure of school quality, 
which is capitalized into housing prices. With individual transacted housing sales in 
Cuyahoga County, Ohio, the relationships between various school quality 
measures—expenditure per pupil, test scores, performance index, and value added— 
and housing prices were tested.  They concluded that the comprehensive school 
measure, like the performance index introduced by the No Child Left Behind Act 
(2001), is more capitalized (by $9,667) than other school quality measures. They 
also found that school district designations—excellent, effective, continuous 
                                                 
2
 Seo and Simons‘ paper has been accepted and will be published in the Journal of Real Estate Research 
in 2009 
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improvement, academic watch, and academic emergency— are also capitalized into 
housing prices in Cuyahoga County, Ohio. 
The first attempt to explicitly address the implicit price of school quality was 
Brasington‘s (2002) study, which examined demand for public schooling using the 
price of public schooling and tax. The implicit price of school quality is calculated 
by multiplying the median house price by the Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) 
public school quality parameter (which is a unit of school quality price) and dividing 
by the proficiency test score. The reason he calculates the implicit price of school 
quality is that there is no explicit price of school quality in the market. Using the 
43,123 houses in 135 school districts in Ohio, he examined the different demand for 
school quality associated with various household demographic backgrounds such as 
high school diploma, income, and marital status using proficiency test scores as the 
dependent variable using the two-stage-least-square approach. He found that school 
quality is positively related with housing prices. The public schooling price elasticity 
of demand is -.11 while the tax price elasticity of demand is -.17. The income 
elasticity of demand for schooling is .32. Households with a high school diploma 
demanding school quality is more than those without a high school diploma— the 
elasticity is -2.62 for no high school diploma and -0.29 for high school graduates, 
respectively. Households who are currently married demand more school quality 
than single families or never married households.  
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Table 2-3a Summary of Capitalization of School Quality Literature 
Author Year Title Method Dependent 
Variable 
Independent Variables R 
2 Findings 
Oates 1969 The effect of 
property taxes 
and local public 
spending on 
property values; 
an empirical 
study of tax 
capitalization 
and the Tiebout 
hypothesis 
Two stage 
least square 
regression 
Housing 
price 
(median 
value of 
owner-
occupied 
dwellings) 
Effective percentage tax rate (-),  
annual current expenditure per pupil (+), 
distance to Manhattan (-),  
median number of rooms per owner-
occupied house (+), percentage of 
houses built since 1950 (+), family 
income (+), percentage if family income 
of less than $3,000 (+) 
93% Positive 
relationship 
between 
expenditure and 
housing price 
Hayes & 
Taylor 
1996 Neighborhood 
school 
characteristics: 
What signals 
quality to 
homebuyers? 
Hedonic 
model 
Housing 
price 
Housing size (+),  
year built (+), pool (-), fireplace (-),  
distance to the central business district 
(-), share of apartment in the 
neighborhood (+), private school (+), 
neighbors (-)‘  
peer group effect (+), school effect (+) 
54% Homebuyers are 
not only 
cognizant of 
differences in 
school quality 
but also reveal 
their preferences 
for higher quality 
schools by 
paying a 
premium for their 
home 
Rosen and 
Fullerton  
1977 A note on local 
tax rates, public 
benefit levels, 
and property 
values 
Hedonic 
model 
Median 
value of 
owner-
occupied 
housing  
Effective tax rate (-),  
expenditure per pupil (+,-),  
distance to midtown Manhattan (-),  
Median number of rooms per home (+), 
percentage of housing stock built in the 
last 10 years (+), median income of 
individuals (+), percentage of the 
population that has income under 
$4,000 (+) 
91% School 
achievement 
scores are 
positively related 
to housing price 
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Table 2-3b Summary of Capitalization of School Quality Literature (Cont.) 
Author Year Title Method Dependent 
Variable Independent Variables 
R 
2
 Findings 
Brasington 1999 Which 
measures of 
school quality 
does the 
housing 
market value? 
Hedonic 
model 
Log house 
price 
Air conditioning (+), fireplace (+), lot size (+),  
age (-), rooms (+), garage (+), full bathrooms (+), 
part bathrooms (+), deck (+), pool (+), Q2 (+), Q3 
(+), Q4 (+) for sales dummy, tax rate (-), median 
income (+), distance to MAS' CBD (-), percent 
minority (-), crime (-), expenditure per pupil (+), 
teacher master‘s plus (+), teacher salary (+), 
student/teacher ratio (+), average teacher experience 
(+), graduation rate (+), attendance rate (+), value 
added ( +) 
75% Proficiency 
tests are 
positively 
related to 
housing price 
Figlio & 
Lucas 
2000 What's in a 
grade? School 
report cards 
and housing 
prices 
Hedonic 
model 
Housing 
Price 
Student attributes (Third grade and free or reduced 
price lunch eligible) 
effect of an A grade versus a B grade (+) 
effect of an A grade versus a C grade (+) 
effect of an B grade versus a C grade (+) 
effect of an A grade versus a B grade (-) 
effect of an A grade versus a C grade (-) 
effect of an B grade versus a C grade (-) 
Not 
reported 
The positive 
relationship 
between 
school report 
card and 
housing price 
and 
residential 
sorting 
Downes & 
Zabel 
2002 The impact of 
school 
characteristics 
on house 
prices: 
Chicago 
1987-1991 
Hedonic 
model 
Natural log of 
house value 
Tax (+), proportion of African American Students 
(+), proportion of Hispanic students (-), proportion 
of students in limited proficiency (+), students with 
limited English proficiency (-), expenditure per pupil 
(+), 8
th
 grade reading (+), distance to CBD (-), 
median age of individual in the census tract (+), 
proportion of non-White individual in the census 
tract (-), proportion of individuals over 25 who have 
completed high school in the census tract (-) 
44% Current test 
performances 
of students 
are 
considered 
when 
purchasing a 
home 
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Table 2-3c Summary of Capitalization of School Quality Literature (Cont.) 
  
Author Year Title Method Dependent 
Variable 
Independent Variables R 
2
 Findings 
Black 1999 Do better 
schools matter? 
Parental 
valuation of 
elementary 
education 
Hedonic 
model 
House price Bedroom (+), bathroom  (+), age of building (-), 
lot size (+), internal square footage (+), 
distance to Boston (-), percent Hispanic (-), 
percent non-Hispanic black (-), percent 0-9 years 
old (+), percent 65+ years old (+), percent 
female-headed household with children(-), 
median household income (+), percent with 
bachelor's degree (+), percent with graduate 
degree (+), percent with less than high school (-) 
 
 
67% 
Parents do 
care about 
school peers 
and other 
unmeasured 
components 
of school 
quality 
Bogart & 
Cromwell 
2002 How much is a 
neighborhood 
school worth? 
Hedonic 
model 
Housing price 
index 
School district change(+), sales in 1987 or 
later(+), school district change and sale in 1987 
or later(-), % nonwhite in school(-), lot size(+), 
living area(+), construction grade AA or A+(+), 
construction grade (+), construction grade B or C 
or D (+), age of house(-), Bad or fair condition(-
), excellent condition (+), average room size(+), 
plumbing fixtures (+), heavy traffic (-), % 
nonwhite in tract 1980 (+), % nonwhite in tract 
1990 (-) 
 
 
65% 
Test score is 
good proxy 
for school 
quality and 
there is a 
positive 
relationship 
between test 
score and 
housing price 
Seo & 
Simons  
2007 The effect of 
school quality 
on residential 
sales price 
Hedonic 
model 
Housing price Housing characteristics (single residential (+), 
summer sale (+), year built (-), good condition 
(+), basement  (+), bedroom (-), bathroom (+), 
fire place (+) lot size (+)), Neighborhood (White  
(+) commuting time under 30 minutes (+)), 
School Quality (teacher salary (+), building 
expenditures (-), instruction expenditures (+) 4
th
 
grade math test scores (+), report card excellent 
(+)) 
 
 
78% 
School 
district 
designation 
has 
statistically 
significant 
positive 
relationship 
with housing 
price.  
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2.4.3 Heterogeneous Willingness to Pay 
 
The extent of capitalization of school quality can be interpreted as willingness to 
pay for school quality or the implicit school quality price a household is willing to 
pay, holding other variables constant.  In 1974, Rosen defined the hedonic price as 
follows: 
The implicit prices of attributes or characteristics are revealed to economic 
agents utilizing the observed prices of differentiated products and the specific 
amounts of characteristics associated with them. This constitutes the empirical 
magnitudes explained by the model. Economically, implicit prices are estimated by 
the first step regression analysis (product price regressed on characteristics) in the 
construction of hedonic price index. (p. 34). 
 
In market equilibrium, the hedonic price function specifies how much an 
attribute contributes to the price of a commodity (Eppel, 1987). In other words, the 
price of school quality can be estimated by regressing school quality on housing 
prices. The marginal utility bearing school quality and household willingness to pay 
in housing prices is the price of school quality. The estimate of school quality in the 
regression model is called ―hedonic price or implicit price (Rosen, 1974). The 
interpretation of parameters generated from the hedonic price model is transformed 
into the form of the implicit price of attributes. The magnitude of the effects of each 
attribute on housing sales price is the marginal utility and marginal willingness to 
pay.  
By applying Rosen‘s method, Bajari and Kahn (2005) examined the 
heterogeneous demand for differentiated products using three-step procedures. They 
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studied three MSAs—Chicago, Atlanta, and Dallas—with microdata from the 
Census Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS).  The first step of this study 
estimated hedonic housing prices using locally weighted kernel regression so as to 
recover the unobserved preference parameter. The second step estimated the 
preferences for continuous characteristics by applying the implicit prices, which was 
estimated from the first equation and the observed choice of housing characteristics. 
Lastly, the estimated implicit price was a function of residents‘ demographic 
characteristics.  They found the heterogeneous demand for housing products across 
race, income, household size, gender, and marital status. For instance, in regard to 
the demand for the number of rooms, African Americans had less willingness to pay 
for rooms than other races by approximately $172 while married couples were more 
willing to pay for rooms by $411 than households with other marital types. 
Brasington (2002) examined the elasticity of demand for public schooling using 
the price of public schooling and tax. The price of public school, the implicit price of 
school quality, was used as an indicator of market price of public schooling since 
there was no explicit price of school quality in the market. The implicit price of 
school quality is calculated by multiplying the median house price by the MSA‘s 
public school quality parameter (which is a unit of school quality price) and dividing 
by the proficiency test score. With the 43,123 houses in 135 school districts in Ohio, 
he examined the different demand for school quality associated with various 
households‘ demographic backgrounds, including high school diploma, income, and 
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marital status using proficiency test score as the dependent variable using two stage 
least square. He found that school quality is positively related to housing prices. The 
public school price elasticity of demand is -.11 while the tax price elasticity of 
demand is -.17. The income elasticity of demand for schooling is .32. Households 
with a high school degree demand more for school quality than those without a high 
school degree—the elasticity is -2.62 for no high school diploma and -0.29 for high 
school graduation, respectively. Households currently married demand more for 
school quality than single family or never married households.  
Table 2-4 Summary of Variables Used in Previous Literature 
 
Variables Preference  
for School Quality 
Willingness  
to Pay  
School District 
Choice  
Homebuyer with children NA + + 
Homebuyer without children NA +/- + 
Income below $40,000 NA - - 
Income above $40,000 NA -  -  
White NA + + 
Black NA +/- +/- 
Asian NA + +/- 
Hispanic NA +/- +/- 
High School Degree NA +/- +/- 
Bachelor‘s Degree NA + + 
Graduate Degree NA + + 
Blue collar worker NA - - 
White collar worker NA + + 
 
To summarize the literature review, school quality causes housing price 
variations within a region and also causes residential sorting.  School quality is a 
factor in location choice and is capitalized into housing prices by homebuyers with 
different income, education, and race/ethnicity. The relationship between school 
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quality, which is capitalized into housing prices and homebuyers with different 
demographic characteristics are indicated in Table 2-4. 
Most of the previous studies did not examine more specific categories of 
homebuyers‘ occupations or detailed stratification of income levels as the 
independent variables.   Moreover, none of the studies investigated various aspects 
of heterogeneous preference, location choice in school districts, and willingness to 
pay for school quality. The relationships investigated in this dissertation include the 
dependent variables of preference regarding school quality, willingness to pay for 
school quality, and location choice in school districts.   
This dissertation hypothesizes that different homebuyers‘ backgrounds and 
characteristics affect heterogeneous preferences regarding school quality, location 
choices in school district, and willingness to pay for school quality through housing 
prices. The next chapter introduces the hypothetical relationships between the 
independent variables describing homebuyers‘ backgrounds and characteristics 
(including income, education, race/ethnicity, occupation, and presence of school-age 
children in a household) and the dependent variables of preferences, school district 
choices, and willingness to pay for school quality. The detailed classifications of 
homebuyers‘ backgrounds and characteristics and the expected signs for the 
variables used are hypothesized in the following chapter. 
 
 
41 
 
Table 2-5 Homebuyer Backgrounds and Characteristics and Expected Signs 
 
 Variables 
Preference 
for School 
Quality 
Willingness to Pay 
for School  
Quality through  
Housing Price 
School 
District 
Choice 
Presence 
of school- 
age 
children 
homebuyer with children + + + 
homebuyer without children 
- +/- + 
Income Income Less than $10,000 - - - 
Income $10,000 to $14,999 - -  - 
Income $15,000 to $24,999 -  - - 
Income $25,000 to $34,999 +/- +/-   +/- 
Income $35,000 to $49,999 +/- +/-   +/- 
Income $50,000 to $74,999 + +   + 
Income $75,000 to $99,999 + +   + 
Income$100,000 to 
$149,999 +   +   + 
Income $150,000 to 
$199,999 +   +   + 
Income $200,000 or more + +   + 
Race White + + + 
Black + +/- +/- 
Asian + + +/- 
Hispanic + +/- +/- 
Some other race  + NA  NA 
Education  High School Degree + +/- +/- 
College Degree +/- + + 
Bachelor Degree + + + 
Master Degree + + + 
Doctoral Degree + + + 
Occupation  Management, professional, 
and related  + NA NA 
Service  + NA NA 
Sales and office  + NA NA 
Farming, fishing, and 
forestry  + NA NA 
Construction, extraction, 
maintenance and repair  + NA NA 
Transportation and 
warehousing, and utilities + NA NA 
Production, transportation, 
and material moving  + NA NA 
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CHAPTER III 
CONCEPTUAL MODEL 
3.1 Introduction 
 
In the previous chapter, the theoretical background provided is that consumers 
act rationally to maximize their utility, based on their preferences. A consumer 
makes a decision based on a well-defined preordering choice set. The choice set is 
constrained by budget, physical limitations, and information. The preference of a 
consumer can also be changed and affected by advertising, price change, and choices 
of other consumers (Green, 1971). 
This dissertation hypothesizes that utility derived by school quality will be 
heterogeneous and will vary according to household demographics and socio-
economic status (SES). The approach for this dissertation to modeling is to measure 
heterogeneous preference, school district choice, and willingness to pay for school 
quality.  
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When a homebuyer is looking to buy a house, he/she considers various aspects of 
the house: size, number of rooms, quality of neighborhoods, and other location 
factors, including school quality. The preferences for school quality would be 
different among homebuyers with different demographics and SES. For instance, a 
homebuyer with school-age children would sacrifice the size of the house in order to 
live in a good school district and vice versa. School district choice and willingness to 
pay would be different as well. 
 My conceptual model is devised to test the role of school quality on homebuyers 
by determining in which school districts they will live and how much they are 
willing to pay for school quality through their home purchase. This conceptual 
model describes the individual preference, choice, and willingness to pay. It also 
illustrates the aggregated willingness to pay for better school quality in 14 states. 
This dissertation expects similar results, although it will vary by unit of analysis and 
by state. 
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Figure3-1 Preference, Location Choices, and Willingness to Pay for School Quality 
 
Composition of 
Homebuyer 
 
Location 
 
Preference for 
School Quality 
Public 
Transportation 
Safety Amenity 
Source of Information 
Newsletter,  Newspaper, 
Magazine, Web-Site, MLS, 
and Word of mouth 
Output Variables + 
 Test Score + 
 Pass Rate + 
 Standardized Test 
Score + 
 Graduation Rate+ 
 Performance Index 
 + 
 Designation of  
School District + 
 Value added + 
 
 
 
School 
District 
Choice 
Willingness to Pay for 
School Quality  
(Housing price) 
School Quality 
Housing 
Characteristics 
Neighborhood 
Characteristics 
Input Variable
 + 
 Expenditure 
per pupil 
 + 
 Teacher‘s 
salary
 + 
 
Income, Education, 
Race/Ethnicity, 
Occupation, Marital 
status, and Presence 
of school age 
children 
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3.2 Hypotheses to be tested  
 
 The hypotheses in this dissertation are divided into four groups:  (1) Whether or 
not homebuyers prefer school quality differently based on their demographics and 
SES, (2) whether or not school quality affects a homebuyer‘s school district choice, 
(3) whether or not homebuyers with different backgrounds and characteristics have 
different willingness to pay for school quality and how much they are willing to pay 
for school quality, and (4) whether individual and aggregate models are indifferent. 
This dissertation defines school quality as a performance index or school district 
designation. For the national model, the comprehensive measure of school quality is 
used: reading and math performance (RAMP). The detailed hypotheses are discussed 
below.  
3.2.1 Hypotheses Group I 
 
The first group of hypotheses is to test whether or not homebuyers with different 
demographics and SES prefer school quality differently. The first group of 
hypotheses is tested by decomposing homebuyers‘ demographics and SES.  
Since homebuyers with school-age children can directly enjoy school quality by 
sending their children to public schools, this dissertation made the assumption that 
homebuyers with school-age children would prefer more school quality than those 
with children not school age, and those without children.  
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Hypothesis I-1 Preference for School Quality and Homebuyers with Children. 
 
 H0 = the probability of the preference for school quality is the same for homebuyers 
with children, with children but not of school age, and no children.  
 H1 = the probability of school quality preference for homebuyers with school-age 
children is higher than the average probability of school quality preference for all 
homebuyers. 
 H2 = the probability of school quality preference for homebuyers with children but 
not of school age is lower than the average probability of school quality preference 
for all homebuyers. 
 H3 = the probability of school quality preference for homebuyers with no children is 
lower than the average probability of school quality preference for all homebuyers. 
 
The second hypothesis tests heterogeneous homebuyers‘ preferences depending 
on household marital status. The probability for married homebuyers‘ preferences for 
school quality is higher than any other family types:  never married, widowed, and 
divorced. 
 
Hypothesis I-2 Preference for School Quality and Homebuyer’s Marital Status.  
 
 H0 = the probability of the preference for school quality is the same for homebuyers 
who are married, never married, divorced, and widowed.   
 H1 = the probability of school quality preference for homebuyers who are married is 
higher than the average probability of school quality preference for all homebuyers. 
 H2 = the probability of school quality preference for homebuyers who are never 
married is lower than the average probability of school quality preference for all 
homebuyers. 
 H3 = the probability of school quality preference for homebuyers who are divorced 
is lower than the average probability of school quality preference for all 
homebuyers. 
 H4 = the probability of school quality preference for homebuyers who are widowed 
is lower than the average probability of school quality preference for all 
homebuyers. 
 
 
The third hypothesis is whether there is a positive relationship between the 
probability of preferring school quality and income categories. Homebuyer annual 
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income categories are grouped as less than $10,000, $10,000 to $14,999, $15,000 to 
$24,999, $25,000 to $34,999, $35,000 to $49,999, $50,000 to $74,999, $75,000 to 
$99,999, $100,000 to $149,999, $150,000 to $199,999, and more than $200,000. 
Hypothesis I-3 Preference for School Quality and Homebuyer’s Income. 
 
 H0 = the probability of the preference for school quality is the same for homebuyers 
with different income categories.  
 H1 = the probability of school quality preference for homebuyers with income less 
than $10,000 is lower than the average probability of school quality preference for 
all homebuyers. 
 H2 = the probability of school quality preference for homebuyers with income 
$10,000 to $14,999 is lower than the average probability of school quality 
preference for all homebuyers. 
 H3 = the probability of school quality preference for homebuyers with income 
$15,000 to $24,999 is lower than the average probability of school quality 
preference for all homebuyers. 
 H4 = the probability of school quality preference for homebuyers with income 
$25,000 to $34,999 is lower than the average probability of school quality 
preference for all homebuyers. 
 H5 = the probability of school quality preference for homebuyers with income 
$35,000 to $49,999 is lower than the average probability of school quality 
preference for all homebuyers. 
 H6 = the probability of school quality preference for homebuyers with income 
$50,000 to $74,999 is higher than the average probability of school quality 
preference for all homebuyers. 
 H7 = the probability of school quality preference for homebuyers with income 
$75,000 to $99,999 is higher than the average probability of school quality 
preference for all homebuyers. 
 H8 = the probability of school quality preference for homebuyers with income 
$100,000 to $149,999 is higher than the average probability of school quality 
preference for all homebuyers. 
 H9 = the probability of school quality preference for homebuyers with income 
$150,000 to $199,999 is higher than the average probability of school quality 
preference for all homebuyers. 
 H10 = the probability of school quality preference for homebuyers with income 
more than $200,000 is higher than the average probability of school quality 
preference for all homebuyers. 
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The fourth hypothesis is based on homebuyers‘ educational levels. The 
hypothesis is that homebuyers with high educational attainment prefer more school 
quality than those with low educational levels. The education levels are divided as 
some high school, high school graduate, some college, college graduate, and post- 
graduate.  
 
Hypothesis I-4 Preference for School Quality and Homebuyer Education. 
 H0 = the probability of the preference for school quality is the same for homebuyers 
with different educational backgrounds.   
 H1 = the probability of school quality preference for homebuyers with some high 
school is lower than the average probability of school quality preference for all 
homebuyers. 
 H2 = the probability of school quality preference for homebuyers with high school 
degrees is lower than the average probability of school quality preference for all 
homebuyers. 
 H3 = the probability of school quality preference for homebuyers with some college 
is lower than the average probability of school quality preference for all 
homebuyers. 
 H4 = the probability of school quality preference for homebuyers with college 
degrees is higher than the average probability of school quality preference for all 
homebuyers. 
 H5 = the probability of school quality preference for homebuyers with post-graduate 
degrees is higher than the average probability of school quality preference for all 
homebuyers. 
 
 
Race/ethnicity is one of major factors affecting homebuyers‘ preferences for 
school quality. The race variables utilized in this dissertation are White, African 
American, Asian, Hispanic, and some other race. It is assumed that Whites have 
higher probability to have a preference for school quality. 
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Hypothesis I-5 Preference for School Quality and Homebuyer Race/Ethnicity. 
 H0 = the probability of the preference for school quality is the same for homebuyers 
who are White, African American, Asian, Hispanic and some other race.   
 H1 = the probability of school quality preference for homebuyers who are White is 
higher than the average probability of school quality preference for all homebuyers. 
 H2 = the probability of school quality preference for homebuyers who are African 
American is lower than the average probability of school quality preference for all 
homebuyers. 
 H3 = the probability of school quality preference for homebuyers who are Hispanic 
is lower than the average probability of school quality preference for all 
homebuyers. 
 H4 = the probability of school quality preference for homebuyers who are Asian is 
higher than the average probability of school quality preference for all homebuyers. 
 H5 = the probability of school quality preference for homebuyers who are some 
other race is lower than the average probability of school quality preference for all 
homebuyers. 
 
 
Occupation variables are grouped as management, professional, and related 
occupations; service occupations; sales and office occupations; construction, 
extraction, and maintenance occupations; and production, transportation and material 
moving occupations. Homebuyers with management, professional, and related 
occupations are assumed to have a higher probability than any other occupational 
categories (See Appendix 1).  
Hypothesis I-6 Preference for School Quality and Homebuyer’s Occupations. 
 H0 = the probability of the preference for school quality is the same for homebuyers 
with different occupations.  
 H1 = the probability of school quality preference for homebuyers who are 
unemployed is lower than the average probability of school quality preference for 
all homebuyers. 
 H2 = the probability of school quality preference for homebuyers in management, 
professional, and related occupations is higher than the average probability of 
school quality preference for all homebuyers. 
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 H3 = the probability of school quality preference for homebuyers in service 
occupations is lower than the average probability of school quality preference for 
all homebuyers. 
 H4 = the probability of school quality preference for homebuyers in sales and office 
occupations is lower than the average probability of school quality preference for 
all homebuyers. 
 H5 = the probability of school quality preference for homebuyers in construction, 
extraction, and maintenance occupations is lower than the average probability of 
school quality preference for all homebuyers. 
 H6 = the probability of school quality preference for homebuyers in production, 
transportation, and material moving occupations is lower than the average 
probability of school quality preference for all homebuyers. 
 
3.2.2  Hypotheses Group II 
 
Hypothesis Group II: Location Choice in School District.  
 In hypotheses group II, this dissertation tests whether homebuyers‘ school district 
choice is influenced by the presence of school age children, marital status, 
educational level, race/ethnicity, and occupation, as well as income. Holding income 
constant, different preferences for school quality, which stem from a variety of 
factors, lead to homebuyer school district choice to reside in a community, which 
provides public goods to maximize both the utilities of individual homebuyers and 
aggregated homebuyers. The designation of school district will be used as a proxy 
for school quality.  
The first hypothesis is to test whether homebuyers with school-age children are 
more or less likely to live in an ―excellent school district‖ than any other homebuyers 
or not. The hypothesis is that homebuyers with school-age children have a higher 
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probability to live in an excellent school district than homebuyers with children who 
are not school age, or homebuyers with no children.  
Hypothesis II-1 School District Choice and Homebuyers with School Age Children.  
 
 H0 = the probability of choosing an ―excellent school district‖ is the same for 
homebuyers with school-age children, with children but not at school age, and with 
no children.  
 H1 = the probability of choosing an excellent school district for homebuyers with 
school age children is higher than for homebuyers with children not of school age.  
 H2 = the probability of choosing an excellent school district for homebuyers with 
school age children is higher than for homebuyers with no children.  
 
 
Hypothesis II-2 School District Choice and Homebuyer with Marital Status.  
 
 H0 = the probability of choosing an ―excellent school district‖ is the same for 
homebuyers who are married, never married, divorced, and widowed.  
 H1 = the probability of choosing an ―excellent school district‖ for homebuyers who 
never have been married is lower than for homebuyers who are married. 
 H2 = the probability of choosing an ―excellent school district‖ for homebuyers who 
are divorced is lower than for homebuyers who are married. 
 H3 = the probability of choosing an ―excellent school district‖ for homebuyers who 
are widowed is lower than for homebuyers who are marrried.  
 
The probabilities for homebuyers who are married, never married, divorced, and 
widowed are estimated to test whether there is heterogeneous school district choice 
according to homebuyer marital status.  
Hypothesis II-3 School District Choice and Homebuyer Income.  
 H0 = the probability of choosing an ―excellent school district‖ is the same for 
homebuyers with various income categories. 
  H1 = the probability of choosing an ―excellent school district‖ for homebuyers with 
income less than $10,000 is lower than for homebuyers with income $50,000 to 
$74,999. 
 H2 = the probability of choosing an ―excellent school district‖ for homebuyers with 
income $10,000 to $14,999 is lower than for homebuyers with income $50,000 to 
$74,999. 
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 H3 = the probability of choosing an ―excellent school district‖ for homebuyers with 
income $15,000 to $24,999 is lower than for homebuyers with income $50,000 to 
$74,999. 
 H4 = the probability of choosing an ―excellent school district‖ for homebuyers with 
income $25,000 to $34,999 is lower than for homebuyers with income $50,000 to 
$74,999. 
 H5 = the probability of choosing an ―excellent school district‖ for homebuyers with 
income $25,000 to $34,999 is lower than for homebuyers with income $50,000 to 
$74,999. 
 H6 = the probability of choosing an ―excellent school district‖ for homebuyers with 
income $35,000 to $49,999 is lower than for homebuyers with income $50,000 to 
$74,999. 
 H7 = the probability of choosing an ―excellent school district‖ for homebuyers with 
income $75,000 to $99,999 is higher than for homebuyers with income $50,000 to 
$74,999. 
 H8 = the probability of choosing an ―excellent school district‖ for homebuyers with 
income $100,000 to $149,999 is higher than for homebuyers with income $50,000 
to $74,999. 
 H9 = the probability of choosing an ―excellent school district‖ for homebuyers with 
income $150,000 to $199,999 is higher than for homebuyers with income $50,000 
to $74,999. 
 H10 = the probability of choosing an ―excellent school district‖ for homebuyers with 
income more than $200,000 is higher than for homebuyers with income $50,000 to 
$74,999. 
 
The relationship between the probability of an excellent school district choice 
and homebuyers‘ educational levels is tested. Homebuyers‘ educational levels are the 
same as the first group of hypotheses. The hypothesis is that as homebuyers‘ 
educational level increases, the probability of their living in an excellent school 
district increases. 
Hypothesis II-4 School District Choice and Homebuyer Educational Level.  
 H0 = the probability of choosing an ―excellent school district‖ is the same for 
homebuyers with various educational levels. 
 H1 = the probability of choosing an ―excellent school district‖ for homebuyers with 
some high school is lower than for homebuyers who are college graduates. 
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 H2 = the probability of choosing an ―excellent school district‖ for homebuyers with 
high school diplomas is lower than for homebuyers who are college graduates. 
 H3 = the probability of choosing an ―excellent school district‖ for homebuyers with 
some college is lower than for homebuyers who are college graduates. 
 H4 = the probability of choosing an ―excellent school district‖ for homebuyers with 
post-graduate degrees is higher than for homebuyers who are college graduates. 
 
The fourth hypothesis tests the relationship between the probability of living in 
an excellent school district and homebuyers‘ race. It is believed that Whites are more 
likely to live in an excellent school district. 
Hypothesis II-5 School District Choice and Homebuyer Race/Ethnicity.  
 H0 = the probability of choosing an ―excellent school district‖ is the same for 
homebuyers who are White, African American, Asian, Hispanic, and some other 
race.   
  H1 = the probability of choosing an ―excellent school district‖ for homebuyers who 
are White is higher than for homebuyers who are African American.  
 H2 = the probability of choosing an ―excellent school district‖ for homebuyers who 
are White is higher than for homebuyers who are Asian. 
 H3 = the probability of choosing an ―excellent school district‖ for homebuyers who 
are White is higher than for homebuyers who are Hispanic. 
 H4 = the probability of choosing an ―excellent school district‖ for homebuyers who 
are White is higher than for homebuyers who are some other race. 
 
As previously stated, it is worthwhile to test homebuyers‘ occupations and their 
school district choices, because homebuyers with management, professional, and 
related occupations are assumed to have higher probability of choosing an excellent 
school district. 
Hypothesis II-6 School District Choice and Homebuyer Occupation.  
 H0 = the probability of choosing an excellent school district is the same for 
homebuyers in different occupations.  
 H1 = the probability of choosing an ―excellent school district‖ for homebuyers in 
service occupations is lower than for homebuyers in management, professional, and 
related occupations.  
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 H2 = the probability of choosing an ―excellent school district‖ for homebuyers in 
sales and office occupations is lower than for homebuyers in management, 
professional, and related occupations. 
 H3 = the probability of choosing an ―excellent school district‖ for homebuyers in 
construction, extraction, and maintenance occupations is lower than for 
homebuyers in management, professional, and related occupations. 
 H4 = the probability of choosing an ―excellent school district‖ for homebuyers in 
production, transportation, and material moving occupations is lower than for 
homebuyers in management, professional, and related occupations. 
3.2.3 Hypotheses Group III 
 
Hypothesis Group III: Willingness to Pay for School Quality through Housing 
Price. 
 
 In hypotheses group III, the heterogeneous homebuyer‘s willingness to pay for 
school quality through housing prices will be tested. As mentioned previously, 
consumer willingness to pay for school quality may vary by homebuyer demographic 
and SES.  
 The first hypothesis is to test the relationship between school quality, 
performance index, and housing prices. It is expected to be positive.  
Hypothesis III-1 Relationship between School Quality and Housing Prices.  
 H0 = there is no positive relationship between school quality and housing prices.  
 H1 = there is a positive relationship between school quality and housing prices. 
 
The second hypothesis is to test a positive relationship between school quality 
and willingness to pay for school quality by households with school-age children. 
 
Hypothesis III-2 Willingness of Households with School Age Children to Pay for 
School Quality. 
 
 H0 = the willingness to pay for school quality is the same for households with 
school-age children, with children not at school age, and with no children.  
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 H1= the willingness of households with school-age children to pay for school 
quality is higher than the average willingness of all households in Cuyahoga 
County. 
 H2= the willingness of households with children but not at school age to pay for 
school quality is lower than the average willingness of all households in Cuyahoga 
County. 
 H3 = the willingness of households without children to pay for school quality is 
lower than the average willingness of all households in Cuyahoga County. 
 
 
Hypothesis III-3 Willingness to Pay for School Quality and Household Marital 
Status.  
 
 H0 = the willingness to pay for school quality is the same for homebuyers who are 
married, and homebuyers who have never been married. 
 H1 = the willingness of married households to pay for school quality is higher than 
the average willingness of all households in Cuyahoga County. 
 H2 = the willingness of households who have never married to pay for school 
quality is lower than the average willingness of all households in Cuyahoga County. 
 
 
Hypothesis III-4 Willingness to Pay for School Quality and Household Income.  
 H0 = the willingness to pay for school quality is the same for households with 
income from $10,000 to $200,000. 
 H1= the willingness of households with a median income of $122,503 to pay for 
school quality is higher than the average willingness of all households in Cuyahoga 
County. 
 H2= the willingness of households with a median income of $43,227 to pay for 
school quality is lower than the average willingness of all households in Cuyahoga 
County. 
 H3= the willingness of households with a median income of $70,069 to pay for 
school quality is higher than the average willingness of all households in Cuyahoga 
County. 
 
 
Previous literature consistently found educational levels to be positively related 
to willingness to pay for school quality. The fifth hypothesis is to test the positive 
relationship between educational levels and willingness to pay for school quality. 
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Hypothesis III-5 Willingness to Pay for School Quality and Household Educational 
Levels.  
 
 H0 = the willingness to pay for performance index is the same for all educational 
levels of households.  
 H1 = the willingness of households with a high school diploma to pay for school 
quality is lower than the average willingness of all households in Cuyahoga County. 
 H2 = the willingness of households with college degrees to pay for school quality is 
higher than the average willingness of all households in Cuyahoga County. 
 H3 = the willingness of households with post-graduate degrees to pay for school 
quality is higher than the average willingness of all households in Cuyahoga 
County. 
 
 
Hypothesis III-6 Willingness to Pay for School Quality and Household 
Race/Ethnicity.   
 
 H0 = the willingness to pay for school quality is the same for households of all races.  
 H1 = the willingness of White households to pay for school quality is higher than 
the average willingness of all households in Cuyahoga County. 
 H2 = the willingness of African American households to pay for school quality is 
lower than the average willingness of all households in Cuyahoga County. 
 H3 = the willingness of Asian households to pay for school quality is higher than 
the average willingness of all households in Cuyahoga County. 
 H4 = the willingness of households of other races to pay for school quality is lower 
than the average willingness of all households in Cuyahoga County. 
 
 
Hypothesis III-7 Willingness to Pay for School Quality and Homebuyer Occupation.  
 
 H0 = the willingness to pay for school quality is the same for households of all 
occupations.  
 H1 = the willingness of households in management, professional, and related 
occupations to pay for school quality is higher than the average willingness of all 
households in Cuyahoga County. 
 H2 = the willingness of households in occupations other than management, 
professional, and related to pay for school quality is lower than the average 
willingness of all households in Cuyahoga County. 
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3.2.4 Hypothesis IV 
 
Hypothesis IV-1 Comparison of Cuyahoga County Hedonic Model and National 
Model. 
 
 H0 = there is no difference between the Cuyahoga County hedonic model and the 
national model in terms of the presence of school-age children, race, income, 
education, and occupation.  
 H1 = there is a difference between the Cuyahoga County hedonic model and the 
national model in terms of the presence of school-age children, race, income, 
education, and occupation. 
 
In summary, Chapter 3 discusses four groups of hypotheses used to estimate 
heterogeneous household preference for school quality, school district choice, and 
willingness to pay for school quality, based on household demographics and SES. A 
variety of methodological approaches are discussed in the following section.  
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CHAPTER IV 
RESEARCH DESIGN & METHODOLOGIES 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
 
 The objective of this chapter is to discuss the research design and methodologies 
utilized for this study. Three models were utilized: homebuyer preference for school 
quality, school district choice in school districts with survey data, and heterogeneous 
willingness to pay model run with the two different units of analysis. The first model 
(named Homebuyer Heterogeneous Preference for School Quality and School 
District Choice) is used to test the first and the second groups of hypotheses, and the 
second model (Heterogeneous Household Willingness to Pay for School Quality) is 
used to test the third and the fourth groups of hypotheses.  
With ideas that preference and school district choice are stochastic, although 
willingness to pay for school quality is deterministic, two models were used with 
three methodologies. Three methodological approaches—(1) the Analysis of Table 
(ANOTA) Model, (2) the Ordered Logit Model, and (3) the Spatial Hedonic 
Model— were used to test the hypotheses previously discussed in Chapter 3.  
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The study employed the use of ANOTA (Analysis of Table) to analyze 
homebuyer preference for school quality when purchasing a home (the first group of 
the hypotheses).  The ANOTA model allowed the researcher to analyze demographic 
data in order to determine variation in homebuyer preference for school quality in the 
selection of a home.  The ANOTA model also helps to find out what were the most 
influential school factors affecting homebuyer decisions.  
Conversely, the ordered logit model was used to analyze the hypothesis regarding 
the school district choice in homebuyer selections of housing based on the quality of 
the school districts.  The ordered logit model provides the researcher the ability to 
estimate the probability of location choices of homebuyers among school districts in 
which they decide to reside.  
In addition, the spatial hedonic price model was used to estimate household 
heterogeneous willingness to pay for school quality in Cuyahoga County. The two-
step procedure of the national model was used to compare the aggregated willingness 
to pay with an individual‘s willingness to pay.  
The procedures used for collecting data and the aforementioned methodological 
approaches for analyzing the data are discussed in this chapter. In section 4.2, with 
survey data, two models test homebuyer school quality preferences, and whether or 
not these preferences led to a location decision for the school district in which they 
live. Section 4.3 focuses willingness to pay for school quality among heterogeneous 
households in Cuyahoga County and 2,531 school districts in 14 states. 
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4.2  Preference for School Quality & School District Choice Among 
Homebuyers 
4.2.1 Introduction 
 
This section was designed to explore preferences for school quality among 
heterogeneous homebuyers. This was also developed to find evidence that school 
quality differently influence homebuyers‘ school district choices. First, ANOTA 
(Analysis of table), which is a useful statistical tool to analyze a categorical 
relationship between dependent and independent variables, was applied to test groups 
of hypotheses I:  Which location factors affect a homebuyer‘s decision on purchasing 
a home. The preferences for location factors were tested utilizing three models:  
school quality is the most important factor, how much school quality is important, 
and what school quality variables were considered when homebuyers purchased a 
house.  
Second, the ordered logit model allowed this study to estimate the probability 
with which homebuyers made a specific school district choice. Because the 
dependent variable of this model is school district designations, which is ordered, the 
ordered logit model was appropriate. Six models were utilized for each demographic 
and SES group:  presence of school age children, marital status, race, income, 
education, and occupation. 
 The survey data were analyzed using various methodological approaches, which 
included the use of ANOTA and ordered logit model. The ordered logit model is 
analogous to the multinomial logit model in terms of algorithm.    
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4.2.2 Data and Study Areas  
To test hypothesis groups I and II, the survey data set was used to analyze 
homebuyers‘ heterogeneous preferences and school district choices. The survey 
sample is homebuyers who purchased a house in Cuyahoga County in 2006.  
4.2.2.1  Study Areas and Survey Sample 
 
 It may be hard to measure heterogeneous individual preferences for school 
quality and individual choices with publicly available secondary data. This 
dissertation utilized a survey methodology to ascertain homebuyers‘ opinions about 
school quality. The survey results allow this dissertation to analyze homebuyers‘ 
actual preferences for school quality without any constraints, such as income and 
location of work. 
With the survey data, this study measured variances of preference for school 
quality variables and for school district choices among individual homeowners with 
different backgrounds and characteristics. Although they were well informed, after 
the No Child Left Behind Act (2001), homebuyers may be differently aware of the 
importance of school quality when purchasing a house. The fact that a homeowner 
lives in a good school district does not mean he/she cares about school quality more 
than those who live in a poor school district. The survey dataset was obtained from a 
telephone survey of single-family homeowners, who purchased a house in 2006 and 
currently live in Cuyahoga County. 
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The telephone survey is a method whereby interviewers collect data through 
telephone interviews with respondents. The advantages of the telephone survey 
include: rapid data collection, cost savings, anonymity, and assurance that 
instructions are followed; whereas the disadvantages of this method are: less control, 
less credibility, lack of visual materials, and reduced ability to ask complex questions 
(Bingham & Felbinger, 1989). The role of interviewers is more pronounced in the 
telephone survey versus a written survey with regard to the interview process (Rea & 
Parker, 2005). 
Participants of the telephone survey were homebuyers in 2006 randomly selected 
from various cities located in Cuyahoga County, with the exception of Cleveland, 
Ohio. A total of 400 surveys out of 11,900 housing sales from the Cuyahoga County 
Auditor were completed; however, only 397 of the 400 completed surveys contained 
valid information and were analyzed. The survey sample was divided into several 
categories: (1) the presence of school age children (homebuyers with school age 
children, those without children, and those with children who are too old or too 
young to attend K-12 school), (2) whether homebuyers moved from the same city or 
different cities, (3) relationship with a child, (4) race, (5) educational background, (6) 
income, and (7) occupation.   
4.2.2.2 Homebuyers’ Survey Instrument  
 
  The purpose of the survey is to find out homebuyers‘ preferences regarding 
school quality variables and school district choices. This survey reveals whether 
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school quality is the greatest factor when homebuyers purchase a house, what school 
quality variable is preferred when homebuyers make location decisions, and the 
amount of variation among different income levels, educational levels, race/ethnicity, 
and occupation. 
 The survey instrument was developed to obtain quantitative individual 
homebuyers‘ information regarding income, education, race/ethnicity, and 
occupation, as well as qualitative homebuyers‘ preferences regarding school quality. 
The survey instrument consists of four sections that focus on (1) general information, 
(2) information about school quality, (3) student information about the school he or 
she attends and the student‘s academic achievement, and (4) the homebuyer‘s 
demographic backgrounds and characteristic information. See the survey instrument 
in Appendix 3. 
 Questions 1 to 4 in Section I of the survey instrument try to ascertain information 
about the city in which respondents live, the price of housing, and from where a 
homebuyer moved. Section II was designed to look for homebuyers‘ preferences 
regarding school quality. Questions 5 to 11 ask about an information source, the 
school quality variables they considered when purchasing a house, and both the level 
of preferences for school quality and the most preferred school quality variable. 
Question 11 asks whether or not a homebuyer has a school age child. If a respondent 
answers ―Yes,‖ the respondent will be asked to answer questions about his/her school 
age child. 
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 Section III was designed for those who have a school age child. The questions are 
about what school the homebuyer‘s child attends, how well his/her child is doing in 
terms of academic achievement, and what the relationship is between the respondent 
and the student.  
 Lastly, Section IV was developed to find demographic information. Questions 17 
to 22 are about race/ethnicity, income, education, and occupation. Race/ethnicity 
includes White, African American, Hispanic, Asian, Native American, and others. 
Income is broken into ten groups: below $10,000, between $10,001 and $14,999, 
between $15,000 and $24,999,  between $25,000 and $34,999,  between $35,000 and 
$49,999, between $50,000 and $74,999, between $75,000 and $99,999,  between 
$100,000 and $149,999,  between $150,000 and $199,999, and over $200,000. 
Education levels are primary, high school incomplete, high school graduate, college 
graduate, associate degree, bachelor degree, masters‘ degree, and doctoral degree. 
Occupations are broken into categories as follows:  management, professional, and 
related occupations (hereafter MPO), service occupations (SO), sales and office 
occupations (SOO), construction, extraction, maintenance and repair occupation 
(CEMO), and utilities production, transportation, and material moving occupations 
(PTMO). 
4.2.2.3 Homebuyers’ Survey Administration 
 
The homebuyers‘ survey was conducted by Field House Marketing Research 
(FHMR) from February 28 to March 26, 2008. Four hundred surveys were 
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administered over the telephone to homebuyers out of 11,193 home sales, with the 
approval of the Institutional Review Board (IRB) in February, 2008. 
Sixteen surveys were completed by March 7, and 135 surveys were completed by 
March 13.  After reviewing the survey results, the sampling strategy was revised due 
to the lack of diversity of races and the lack of low income and low education 
households represented. The survey focused on the areas where African Americans, 
Asians, and Hispanics live, and households with low income and low education. On 
March 26, 2008, 400 surveys were completed out of 11,193. 
4.2.3 Methodology 
4.2.3.1 Descriptive Analysis 
 
 Descriptive analysis is helpful describing characteristics of respondents, and 
focuses on race, income, education, and occupation. Although the survey data set 
includes 400 survey respondents, three were removed because two of the respondents 
live in the city of Cleveland and one respondent did not properly answer the question 
concerning the number of employees are thier family. It ends up with 397 surveys 
ready to be analyzed.  
The survey results are analyzed by various descriptive statistical techniques such 
as frequency, chi-square, and median. The scale frequency distribution analysis will 
be utilized to answer the question of which school quality variables are preferred. 
Chi-square will be used to justify the differences between the averages of each group, 
since the school quality variables will use the Likert scale questions. This study will 
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also use median, considered the proper measure of central tendency, because the 
measurement scale for the school quality variables is ordinal data (Rea & Parker, 
2005).   
4.2.3.2  ANOTA Analysis   
 
In this section, ANOTA analysis was used to test the first group of hypotheses 
that there is no variation in preference for school quality across heterogeneous 
homebuyers. The preference for school quality refers to three measurements: whether 
school quality is the most influential factor, how much school quality is important, 
and what school quality variables homebuyers considered when they bought a house.  
 ANOTA permits exploring relationships between a bundle of homebuyer 
characteristics and a set of choices. The coefficients generated by ANOTA can be 
interpreted as those of a multiple regression since ANOTA is analogous to the 
regression model. The main difference is whether or not the both dependent and 
independent are categories. ANOTA measures the effect of the categories of the 
dependent variables and explore the categorical relationships. 
Although ANOTA is not frequently used, it is a useful tool to analyze the 
relationship between heterogeneous homebuyer demographica and SES, and a 
bundle of housing attributes.  ANOTA was used to examine tenure choices by 
households with different income and economic categories (Dieleman, Clark, & 
Deurloo, 1989). By separating the dataset by owner and renter, they compared 
housing consumption of two groups. Income is the most deterministic factor for 
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tenure choice. The probability of households with more than $30,000 for owning a 
house is 68.8percent, whereas, a low income family has a 38.8 percent probability to 
own a house. Other demographic factors such as size of household and marital status 
have an effect on choices. Larger and married households have a greater probability 
of owning a house than low income and smaller size households do. 
Murie, Dieleman and Hooimeijer (1991) focused on behavior of elderly 
homebuyers. Unlike other literature examining younger generations who are more 
mobile, they observed the importance of elderly households. A large number of 
elderly households are more likely homeowners, so their consumption behavior has 
an impact on the housing market. With ANOTA analysis, they decomposed elderly 
households by employment status, marital status, and income. While couples with 
high income are able to live in an expensive dwelling (64.7%), singles with low 
income tend to live in a cheap, rented dwellings (49.4%).  
4.2.3.3  ANOTA Model Specification 
 
Three models were used to explore the relationship of homebuyer preferences for 
location variables, the extent to which school quality is important, and which school 
qualities are the most preferred with heterogeneous homebuyers‘ demographics, 
including race, income, education, occupation, and marital status.  
The ANOTA model is specified as below (Bethlehem, 2006); 
  Pk(I)  =  k0  + 

m
i
ki I
1
)(    (4-1) 
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where Pk is a matrix of dependent scores,  k0 is constant, and  ki (I) is an unknown 
parameter. k is a number of dependent variables, and m is a number of independent 
variables. I is predict scores of dependent variables. 
The independent variables in the first model are location variables: location, 
public transportation, neighbors, amenity, safety, near friends/relatives, public school 
quality, housing size, and housing style. The first model of the ANOTA analysis 
reveals which location variables homebuyers take into account when they buy a 
house. The dependent variables for the first model are grouped into six categories; 
race, education, occupation, whether or not homebuyers have school age children, 
marital status, and income.  
The second model examines the relationship between the importance of school 
quality and the homebuyer‘s demographics. A group of the dependent variables is 
importance of school quality (i.e., very important, somewhat important, average 
importance, not very important, and not at all important).  
For the third model, 16 school quality variables are given in the choice set as 
dependent variables:  teacher education, teacher experience, teacher salary, class size, 
per pupil expenditure, school safety, sports programs, parent-teacher organization 
(PTO) meetings, percentage of students going to college, graduation rate, SAT scores, 
standardized math test scores, standardized reading test scores, and school district 
designation. 
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4.2.3.4 Ordered Logit Model  
 
In the previous section, ANOTA analysis was applied to examine differences in 
school quality preference. Although ANOTA allows analysis of the larger dataset, 
and the parameter is straightforward and easily interpreted, the drawback is that other 
variables affecting the dependent variable simultaneously cannot be controlled.  
 Choices made by consumers are not only affected by one factor but also by a 
variety of attributes in conjunction with different types of homebuyers. McFadden 
(1977) was skeptical about the hedonic model that treated residents as homogeneous 
groups. In reality, homebuyers actually have heterogeneous preferences, willingness, 
and choices. He argued that, ―consumers vary substantially in their preferences and 
tastes for housing, and their choice is limited as bounded rationality described 
(McFadden).‖ The basic concept of his model is that all attributes are not observed 
but unobserved variables will have some probability in the population, conditioned 
on the value of the observed variables.  
The various logit models are designed to analyze the categorical dependent 
variable. Various types of logit models— ordered, multinomial logit, and conditional 
logit— have been used to investigate residential satisfaction (Lu, 1999), tenure 
choice (Goodman, 1988), and community choice (Nechyba & Strauss, 1997).  
 In case dependent variables are ordinal, the ordinal logit model is recommended 
(Borooah, 2002). For example, Likert-type responses range from ―very important,‖ 
―somewhat important,‖ ―average important,‖ ―not very important,‖ to ―not at all 
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important.‖ The ordinary linear regression model is not an appropriate method 
because it treats ordered-nature variables as continuous variables by calculating the 
mean. The multinomial logit model fails to account for the ordinal nature of variables 
(Liao, 1994). In contrast, the ordered logit model is an appropriate approach to deal 
with polytomous variables. For example, Lu attempted to explain residential 
satisfaction (which was the ordinal dependent variable) by comparing the ordered 
logit model and the regression model with various explanatory variables, including 
individual attributes and housing and location variables. Lu concluded that the 
ordered logit model is more appropriate.  
4.2.3.5 Ordered Logit Model Specification 
 
The hypothesis of this dissertation is that different school quality has different 
influence on homebuyers‘ school district choices. As previously mentioned, the 
school district designations are used as dependent variables indicating school quality 
in the ordered logit model. The school district designation was introduced by the ―No 
Child Left Behind‖ Act (2001) to evaluate school performance and inform parents. 
The school district designations are ‗excellent,‘ ‗effective, ‘ ‗continuous 
improvement,‘ and ‗academic watch.‘ which are the dependent variable in the model, 
except academic watch. The model is designed to test the second group of 
hypotheses, school district choice.  
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Table 4-1 School District Designations in Cuyahoga County (2006) 
 
School District 
Designation 
Name of school districts Number of 
school districts 
Excellent Bay Village, Beachwood, Berea, Brecksville-
Broadview Heights, Chagrin Falls, Cuyahoga Heights, 
Independence, Mayfield, North Olmsted City Schools, 
North Royalton, Olmsted Falls, Orange City School 
District, Rocky River, Solon Strongsville, and 
Westlake. 
16 
Effective Brooklyn, Cleveland Heights-University Heights, 
Fairview Park, Garfield Heights, Parma, Shaker 
Heights, South Euclid-Lyndhurst, and Richmond 
Heights. 
8 
Continuous 
Improvement 
Bedford, Euclid, Lakewood, and Maple Heights 4 
Academic Watch Cleveland Municipal, East Cleveland, and Warrensville 
Heights. 
3 
Total   31 
Source: Ohio Education Department 
There are N observations (i=1,…, N) in the survey sample and K independent 
variables (k=1,., k). The ordered logit model, which is a form of the extension of the 
binary-outcome model, was applied.  
   S
*  
= 


k
k
iikk X
1
     (4-2)  
where S
* 
is a linear function of k factors, which, however, is not observable but is the 
underlying tendency (or latent variable) of an observed phenomenon (Liao, 1994). k  is 
the coefficient for the k
th 
variables and Xik is a matrix of homebuyer‘ demographics and 
SES. The role of school quality on a homebuyer‘s location decision depended on a 
variety of factors.  For instance, housing price, housing size (number of bedrooms and 
number of bathrooms), and local tax rate might be considered so that different choices 
72 
 
are excised differently. The model above is designed to examine the differences among 
homebuyers with heterogeneous demographics and SES, holding other things constant.  
The independent variables related to homebuyers‘ demographics and SES are presence 
of children, race, income, education, and occupation. 
S is an ordinal variable (school district designation; including excellent, effective, 
and continuous improvement), which is the unobserved implicit value of S*.  
   S = 1  if S*   1  
   S = 2   if 1   <  S*   2      
   S = 3   if 2  <  S*    (4-3)  
where   are threshold parameters, separating the categories to be estimated along 
with k .  
 If there are homebuyers who are the same race and have the same-grade children, 
same income bracket, and same occupation, school district choice may be different.  
 The probabilities of a homebuyer choosing a school district are estimated below;
  Prob(S = 1) =  


k
k
kk XL
1
1(  ), 
 Prob(S = 2) = 


k
k
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1
2(  ) - 


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k
kk XL
1
1(  ), 
 Prob (S = 3) = 1- 


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k
kk XL
1
2(  ).    (4-4) 
 
where  S = 1 if continuous improvement school district is chosen; 
 S = 2 if effective school district is chosen; 
 S = 3 if excellent school district is chosen; 
 L = Log Likelihood Function;  
 X = A vector of independent variables; 
   = Unknown parameter. 
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4.3 Heterogeneous Households’ Willingness to Pay for School 
Quality 
 
4.3.1 Introduction  
 
In order to investigate heterogeneous willingness to pay for school quality and to 
test the group of the third hypotheses, various methodologies are applied. Two 
approaches are adopted—separating data according to demographics and SES and 
utilizing a two-stage procedure model applied in this chapter designed to measure 
heterogeneous willingness to pay for school quality across households with different 
demographics and SES in Cuyahoga County and 14 states in the United States. It is 
assumed that different willingness to pay results from the fact that an individual 
values subjectively the bundle of various attributes of housing in the housing market.  
The unit of observation in the Cuyahoga County model is individual housing 
sales transacted in 2006 in Cuyahoga County. Due to the lack of individual 
demographic data, the heterogeneous demographics and SES are grouped by 
relatively homogeneous characteristics of households by conducting cluster analysis. 
By dividing the dataset into subsets of each demographic characteristic, this 
dissertation can examine the differences in the willingness of relatively 
homogeneous households to pay for school quality. The magnitudes of each 
parameter that represent household willingness to pay for each attribute are directly 
compared since the estimates generated from the hedonic model indicate the utility 
maximization derived by consuming school quality. 
74 
 
The national model is used to test heterogeneous willingness to pay for school 
quality across states. The unit of analysis is a school district; there are 2,531 school 
districts in the 14 states studied. A two-step procedure is utilized: the first is the 
hedonic price model that estimates the implicit prices of school quality and the 
second is heterogeneous willingness to pay model.   
4.3.2 Cuyahoga County Hedonic Price Model 
4.3.2.1 Study Area 
 
The study areas of the model include all school districts in Cuyahoga County, 
except the city of Cleveland. Cuyahoga County is a region where population has 
dissipated to other places, especially adjacent counties. From 1950 to 1970, 
according to the U.S. Census, population in Cuyahoga County rose and peaked at 
1.72 million, then declined sharply by 1980 (1.39 million in 2000). The age group of 
15 to 34 year-old decreased by 12 percent and those under age 18 increased slightly 
by four percent (Social Indicators 2003-2004, 2004). 
As population declined, the growth of owner-occupied housing units grew 
slowest in adjacent counties. The housing stock in Cuyahoga County has also aged 
due to lack of new construction. The median age of housing was 46 years in 2000, 
and half of housing units were built before 1954. Regarding housing price in the 
study area, the average housing price was $123,150 in 2000. The average housing 
price of the dataset analyzed is $176,715 in 2006, which is slightly higher than 
housing prices used for Figure 4.1 as a result of the cleaning process which will be 
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discussed in Section 4.3. In 2006, housing price in Cuyahoga County, Ohio, dropped 
by 1.8 percent from the previous year.   
Figure 4-1 Housing Price Trends from 1982-2007 in Cuyahoga County 
 
Source: Cuyahoga County Auditor 
According to the 2000 U.S. Census, Whites are the dominant race in Cuyahoga 
County, making up approximately 83.6 percent of the population. Other races are 
12.7 percent African American, 1.8 percent Asian, and less than 0.5 percent some 
other races. The average percentage of now married households is 57.4 percent. 
Regarding educational attainment, 29.0 percent are high school graduates. 
The median household income in 1999 dollars is $55,050. The higher-income 
households appear to live in suburban areas, whereas low-income households tend to 
live in downtown and inner-ring areas. 
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4.3.2.2 Data and Variables  
 
The study area of this model includes 30 school districts in Cuyahoga County, 
excluding the city of Cleveland. The source of the transacted housing sales data was 
from the Cuyahoga County Auditor. The County Auditor records housing 
characteristics and transacted housing prices for tax purposes. The dataset includes 
information about lot size, number of bedrooms, number of bathrooms, age of house, 
number of fireplaces, garage size, basement size, and total living area.  
Housing prices less than $50,000 and more than $400,000 were deleted because 
the lower and higher housing prices are not regarded as normal transactions in the 
market and are also regarded as outliers. Houses with more than five bedrooms, no 
living area, and unrecorded year built were also deleted. After cleaning this data, 
there are 11,193 observations to be analyzed out of 11,990.  
There are 31 school districts in Cuyahoga County. The Cleveland municipal 
school district is the largest. Enrollment was 57,698 in the 2005-6 school year. The 
second largest is the Parma school district (12,453). The smallest school district is 
Cuyahoga Heights, whose enrollment is 821. The average enrollment among school 
districts is 5,769. The average teacher salary is $59,393, and the average expenditure 
per pupil is $11,738. The detailed school districts and their designations are 
displayed in Table 4-1 in Section 4.2.3.5.  
Various school quality variables were used to test heterogeneous willingness of 
households to pay. School quality variables include input school variables 
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(expenditure per pupil, teacher salary, and teacher experience), output variables (10
th
 
grade math proficiency rate and performance index
3
), and value-added.  
Information about school quality used in this dissertation is publicly available 
and accessible to parents via the website of the Ohio Department of Education, 
newspapers, realtor databases, general reputation, or word of mouth, except value 
added. According to Ohio Department of Education (2006), value-added is defined 
as the point estimates of the mean gains for each grade-subject combination. In this 
dissertation, the value-added variable is defined as the difference between the 
previous year and the current year. The performance difference (value-added) was 
calculated by subtracting the current year (2005-6 school year) performance index by 
the previous year (2004-5 school year).  The performance index variable is a 
comprehensive measure calculated on how well each student does on all tested 
subjects in grades 3-8 and the 10
th
 grade graduation test.  
In addition to housing characteristics and school quality, demographic 
information is attached to the data file. The demographic data is obtained from the 
U.S. Census. The demographic dataset consists of information about races 
(percentage of White, African American, Asian, Hispanic, and some other race), 
median income, educational attainment (percentage with high school diploma, 
associate‘s degree, bachelor‘s degree, post-graduate education), occupation 
                                                 
3
 Since the variable of school district designation is calculated based on the performance index for each 
year, performance index and school district designation are treated interchangeably.  
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(management, services, sales and office, construction, and production), and marital 
status (never married, now married, widowed, and divorced).  
Regarding occupation variables, this dissertation utilizes the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics‘ standard occupation classification. The major occupation category in 
Cuyahoga County, Ohio, is management, which is a broad category including 
management, business, and financial operation occupations, and professional and 
related occupations, such as computer and mathematics, architecture and engineering, 
legal, education, art, and healthcare. The detailed occupation categories are displayed 
in Appendix 1.    
4.3.2.3 Methodology 
 
4.3.2.3.1 Cluster Analysis 
 
Cluster analysis, in general, involves grouping by breaking a heterogeneous 
group into relatively homogeneous groups. By measuring distance, the 
heterogeneous group is categorized by smaller groups. The distance method reflects 
how close two objects are. The Euclidean distance is utilized to measure the distance 
as follows: 
Dij =  
2
1
2






 ji xx      (4-5) 
where Dij is the Euclidean distance between object i and j, which measures the 
closeness (Lattan, Carroll, & Green, 2003) 
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The purpose of utilizing cluster analysis in this study is to break down the dataset 
into each category (marital status, proportion of school-aged children, race, income, 
education, and occupation). Therefore, we can compare the magnitude of school 
quality for clusters representing relatively homogeneous households‘ demographics 
and characteristics by clearly defining each cluster.  
4.3.2.3.2 Hedonic Price Model 
 
After grouping heterogeneous demographics and SES into homogeneous groups, 
the hedonic price model is utilized to estimate the willingness to pay for school 
quality. The hedonic model is commonly used to evaluate the effect of individual 
factors on housing sales price, based on actual transactions.  
The hedonic model developed by Rosen (1974) allows us to measure the implicit 
prices of goods by decomposing housing prices into attributes of the physical and 
neighborhood characteristics, and amenities. The estimate of the regression model 
indicates the proportion of each independent variable contributed in the model.  
Due to the easiness of interpretation and use, the hedonic price model has been 
conducted in various studies testing positive and negative externalities. There are the 
positive effects of desired amenities and policies and natural environments; water 
view (Benson, Hansen, & Schwartz, 2000), water quality (Legget & Bockstael, 
2000), open space (Bolitzer & Netusil, 2000), ocean view (Fraser & Geoff, 1998), 
and desert riparian areas (Colby & Wishart, 2002); and policies on historic 
designations (Coulson & Leichenko, 2001) and historic preservation (Leichenko, 
80 
 
Coulson, & Listokin, 2001). On the other hand, undesired environments— noise 
(Frankel, 1991), traffic (Hughes & Sirmans, 1992), and waste sites (Greenburg & 
Hughes, 1993)—lead to decrease in housing prices.  
4.3.3 Model Specification 
 
The hedonic price model is, in general, a linear function of the house‘s physical 
and local neighborhood characteristics and school quality: 
HP =  f (S, N, SQ)        (4-6)  
where S is the vectors of physical housing characteristics, N represents neighborhood 
characteristics, and SQ is school quality.  
A hedonic model was used to test the hypothesis that school quality is positively 
related to housing price. With school quality variables or school district dummy 
variables as independent variables in 2000 and 2005, the model‘s reduced form is: 
Ln(HP) = βo + β1S + β2N + β3SQ +    (4-7)  
Where, 
Ln(HP)        =  Log of sales price of the house; 
S          =  Vector for structural characteristics of the house; 
N          =  Vector that consists of neighborhood characteristics; 
SQ               =      School quality vector, including school district dummy 
variables, input factors (teacher characteristics and 
expenditure per pupil), output factors (PI (performance 
index) and 10
th
 grade math proficiency rate), and value 
added; 
          =   Parameters to be estimated; 
                  =  Error term. 
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 Although the detailed test for unbiased estimates is discussed in the diagnostic 
section, it is reasonable to believe that there is a spatial autocorrelation problem in 
the housing market. Basu and Thibodeau (1998) assert that there are two reasons for 
spatial autocorrelation: similar structure of housing and quality of public service. The 
residential developments, in general, occurred at the same time so that housing 
structure, size, and design might not be different. Another reason Basu and 
Thibodeau introduced the spatial autocorrelation problem is because neighborhood 
residents enjoy the same location and public amenities.  
Therefore, to modify the spatial autocorrelation problem in the model, this 
dissertation utilizes the spatial models; spatial lag and spatial error based on the 
Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test. The ―Lagrange Multiplier (LM test)4‖ was used to 
test spatial autocorrelation on this dataset.  According to Anselin (1998), Spatial 
dependence and heterogeneity is structural instability in the form of non-constant 
error variances or model coefficients. .  . Spatial autocorrelation is through the 
specification of a spatial stochastic process. Spatial stochastic processes are 
categorized as spatial autoregressive (SAR) processes.‖  
The spatial models are utilized and described as follows: 
Ln(HP) =  WHP+ β1S + β2N + β3SQ +    (4-8)  
Or 
     Ln(HP) =    X  + ,  =  Wu +u,  E (  ‘)  0         (4-9) 
 
                                                 
4
 The LM equation is: 
2
2
1 R
R
m
kn

  
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Model 4-8 is the spatial lag model and model 4-9 is the spatial error model. For 
the spatial lag model,   is the coefficient of autocorrelation that indicates the spatial 
relation, and W is the weighted matrix.
5
 For the spatial error model,   (Lambda) is a 
spatial autoregressive error parameter (Anselin, 2003). This dissertation used the spatial 
error model with the second order spatial matrix as a result of the LM test.    
4.3.4 National Model 
 
Unlike the county model discussed in the previous section, the national model is 
aggregated by school district. The purpose of utilizing the national model is to test 
whether or not aggregated willingness is consistent with individual decisions. With 
the 2,531 school district data in 14 states, two approaches were utilized to measure 
heterogeneous willingness to pay for school quality. 
 This model is analogous to Bajari and Kahn‘s (2005) method, which used the 
three-step procedure to find the total utility from housing characteristics. However, 
the model used in this dissertation differs from theirs in that the unit of analysis and 
the dataset is different and the purpose of this dissertation is to find the implicit price 
of school quality by adopting the marginal utility concept, which is proportional to 
the price. The national model in this dissertation was used to find the same result as 
the county model regarding willingness to pay for school quality. 
 
 
                                                 
5
 The second order of contiguity matrix was used.  
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4.3.4.1  Data and Study Areas 
 
The major source of the national model is from the 2000 U.S. Census dataset. 
The 2000 U.S. Census dataset is full of information not only about demographics but 
also about housing characteristics. This data set includes 11,039 school districts in 50 
states. States that do not have enough information about school quality were deleted, 
and those that use the county as the school district unit were also eliminated from the 
dataset. The school districts that have population more than five million and are in 
major cities were also excluded in this dissertation.  The total of 2,531 school 
districts in 14 states is ready to be analyzed (See Figure 4-2).   
Figure 4-2 Study Areas in the National Model 
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Table 4-2 Housing Prices and School Quality in Study Areas 
 
States 
N 
AVG HP  
($) 
LOG  
HP RAMP TEST 
Salary 
($) 
Spending  
($) 
Arkansas 
93 
65,040 
(19,195) 
11.04  
(0.28) 
41.67 
(10.86) 
22.74 
(10.95) 
5,439 
(460) 
2,677  
(187) 
California 
249 
207,965 
(140,184) 
12.07 
(0.57) 
43.41 
(15.46) 
49.08 
(16.48) 
6,519 
(743) 
3,147  
(353) 
Colorado 
34 
148,400 
(61,888) 
11.83 
(0.41) 
80.26 
(8.51) 
59.21 
(13.99) 
6,389 
(832) 
2,994  
(357) 
Delaware 
16 
112,913 
(26,355) 
11.61 
(0.22) 
66.13 
(7.26) 
41.94 
(10.88) 
8,243 
(656) 
3,888  
(396) 
Illinois 
173 
98,079 
(49,258) 
11.39 
(0.44) 
66.88 
(9.15) 
57.26 
(10.21) 
5,842 
(937) 
3,056 
 (483) 
Indiana 
206 
94,604 
(25,223) 
11.42 
(0.26) 
70.47 
(7.43) 
71.17 
(9.06) 
6,233 
(867) 
3,052  
(383) 
Massachusetts 
193 
205,624 
(91,310) 
12.16 
(0.38) 
57.20 
(13.43) 
57.31 
(15.95) 
8,059 
(1,478) 
4,204  
(620) 
Michigan 
316 
113,216 
(44,036) 
11.57 
(0.36) 
66.36 
(11.47) 
62.32 
(14.52) 
7,130 
(1,058) 
3,192 
 (403) 
New Jersey 
198 
190,176 
(80,081) 
12.07 
(0.41) 
72.23 
(14.49) 
58.78 
(18.95) 
10,015  
(1,622) 
4,918  
(678) 
Pennsylvania 
414 
100,083 
(40,783) 
11.44 
(0.38) 
60.36 
(11.17) 
51.71 
(13.62) 
7,384 
(1,189) 
3,697 
 (578) 
Rhode Island 
24 
149,592 
(30,204) 
11.90 
(0.20) 
51.38 
 (11.84) 
44.83 
(14.06) 
8,456 
(1,038) 
4,624  
(505) 
South Carolina 
65 
74,617 
 (22,574) 
11.18  
(0.27) 
26.69  
(9.79) 
17.54 
 (9.29) 
6,374 
(761) 
2,996  
(294) 
Texas 
421 
70,373 
(34,284) 
11.07 
(0.40) 
79.93 
(7.39) 
72.46 
(12.05) 
6,215 
(732) 
3,306 
 (331) 
Washington 
129 
147,118 
(56,835) 
11.85 
(0.31) 
49.11 
(10.32) 
37.30 
(11.59) 
6,294 
(395) 
3,070  
(179) 
 
The source of school quality data is from each state Department of Education. 
This study uses a comprehensive measure of school quality, called reading and math 
proficiency (RAMP). Ramp is calculated by the average of the proficiency rates 
achieved across all reading and math tests, weighted by the number of tests taken, 
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such that proficiency rates on tests with greater numbers of test takers have more 
influence than proficiency rates on tests with fewer test takers. 
6
 
In Table 4-2, the descriptive statistics were summarized. The number of 
observations in each state, the average housing price; the average RAMP, test scores, 
teacher salary, and the average spending per pupil was displayed. The average test 
scores are obtained from each state Department of Education, and spending and 
salary are available at the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES, 2000). 
4.3.4.2 National Model Specification and Variables 
 
In order to test the relationship between willingness to pay for school quality and 
heterogeneous homebuyers‘ demographics and SES, a two-step strategy was applied. 
The first step is analogous to the hedonic price model, which generates the implicit 
price of school quality. With implicit school quality prices, the second approach is to 
decompose different willingness to pay for school quality based on heterogeneous 
households‘ demographics and SES.     
The first step of this study is to estimate the implicit price of school quality by 
utilizing the hedonic model. The hedonic model consists of physical and 
neighborhood characteristics, amenities, and error.  The equation is as follows; 
 
 Ln (HP) =   0 +  1S +  2N +  3SQ +    (4-10)  
Where  
                                                 
6
 www.schooldatadirect.org 
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Ln (HP) = Log of housing price in a school district ; 
S = Vector of structural housing characteristics in a school 
 district in a state; 
N = Vector of neighborhood characteristics in a school district 
 in a state; 
 SQ  = A school quality variable in a school district in a state; 
    = Error term. 
 
In the national model, the variables for structural housing characteristics are a bit 
different from the individual hedonic model.  This study utilizes the percentage of 
owner-occupied housing units, the percentage of detached housing, median year built, 
and density.  The density variable is used to indicate the average size of houses. The 
density variable is calculated by dividing total housing units in a school district by 
total area. Regarding neighborhood characteristics, median income, percentage with 
a high school diploma, and percentage of White households were included in the 
model.  
As mentioned previously, RAMP is used as the school quality variable in this 
study
7
.  The hedonic model was run separately for each state because there are a 
great deal of variations in housing prices and school quality. For example, the state 
of California has the highest average housing prices ($207,965) among the study 
states, but its RAMP scores are the second lowest. The three states with the highest 
average housing prices are California, Massachusetts, and New Jersey. However, the 
states with the highest RAMP scores are Colorado, Texas, and New Jersey. 
                                                 
7
 This dissertation utilized other school quality variables such as test scores, teacher salary, and 
expenditure per pupil. However, the results of these coefficients were not statistically significant; therefore, 
RAMP was used as the proxy for school quality.  
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The coefficients estimated from the first step are the average implicit prices of 
school quality residents are willing to pay. After estimating the implicit prices of 
school quality for each state, this study recovers the different willingness to pay for 
school quality by multiplying the school quality estimate by standard deviation 
which indicates the percentage of willingness to pay for school quality. The equation 
is as follows; 
   

 ij  =  
tiySchoolQual
HPLn

 )(
* j     (4-11) 
where 

 ij     =  Implicit price of school quality in a school district in a state;  
j    =  Standard deviation of RAMP;  
Ln(HP) =  Log of housing price.  
 
In other words, the equation (4-11) measures the proportion of housing prices 
households are willing to pay for school quality. 
The educational preference parameter is a function of demographics. The degree 
of willingness to pay for school quality is determined by a compilation of household 
demographic background and SES. The reduced form model is as follows.  

 ij =   0 +  Dij +  ij     (4-12) 
Where,  

 ij = School quality preference and taste estimate in school district;  
  Dij =  Demographic and socio-economic status in school district;  
   ij = Error term. 
 
 
 Demographic backgrounds and SES are broken into five categories: race, 
educational attainment, marital status, income level, and occupation. The race 
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variable includes percentage of  households that are White, African American, 
American Indian, Asian, Native Hawaiian and other Pacific islander, and some other 
race.  
 Regarding educational attainment levels, the percentage of households with a 
high school diploma, associate‘s degree, bachelor‘s degree, master‘s degree, and 
doctoral degree were used as educational background variables. This study also 
examines whether those who are now married are more willing to pay for school 
quality than those not married.  Income level is broken down into seven intervals: 
income less than $10,000; income between $10,001 and $24,999; income between 
$25,000 and 39,999; income between $40,000 and $59,999; income between $60,000 
and $99,999; income between $100,000 and $149,999; and more than $150,000.  
 This study also utilizes occupation variables. The categories of occupation 
variables include management occupations; service occupations; sales and office 
occupations; construction, extraction, maintenance, and repair occupations; and 
production, transportation, and material moving occupations. According to the 
Standard Occupational Classification (SOC), management occupation includes 
managers for advertising and marketing, including top executives. However, this 
study has a broader range of management occupations, including management 
occupations, as well as business and financial operations occupations, professional 
occupations (architecture, engineering, computer and mathematical, life, physical, 
and social science occupations), and business and financial operation occupations.  
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In summary, this chapter discussed the methodological approaches to test three 
hypotheses groups: ANOTA, ordered logit, and the hedonic model. Each model was 
specified, and study areas and data were also stated. In particular, although the 
Cuyahoga county model and the national model were used to find willingness to pay 
for school quality, the former model used the individual housing sales data and the 
latter one used the aggregated average sales by school district. The following chapter 
discusses the results of those methodologies in detail. 
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Table 4-3 Summary of Hypotheses and Methodologies 
 
  Survey Data Secondary Data Methodology 
 Preference 
Model  
Choice 
model  
County 
Model 
National 
Model 
ANOTA 
Ordered 
Logit 
Hedonic  
Hypotheses Group I Preference for School Quality 
H I-1  Homebuyer with 
School-age Children 
X    X   
HI-2 Homebuyer‘s Marital 
Status 
X    X   
H I-3  Homebuyer‘s Income X    X   
H I-4   Homebuyer‘s 
Education 
X    X   
H I-5  Homebuyer‘s 
Race/Ethnicity 
X    X   
H I-6  Homebuyer‘s 
Occupations 
X    X   
Hypotheses Group II Location Choice in School Districts 
H II-1  Homebuyer with 
School-age Children 
 X    X  
H II-2 Homebuyer‘s Marital 
Status 
 X    X  
H II-3  Homebuyer‘s Income  X    X  
H II-4  Homebuyer‘s 
Education 
 X    X  
H II-5  Homebuyer‘s 
Race/Ethnicity 
 X    X  
H II-6  Homebuyer‘s 
Occupations 
 X    X  
Hypotheses Group III Willingness to Pay for School Quality 
H III-1 Relationship between 
School Quality and 
Housing Price.  
  
X X 
  
X 
H III-2  Homebuyer with 
School-age Children 
  X X   X 
H III-3 Homebuyer‘s Marital 
Status 
  X X   X 
H III-4  Homebuyer‘s Income   X X   X 
H III-5  Homebuyer‘s 
Education 
  X X   X 
H III-6  Homebuyer‘s 
Race/Ethnicity 
  X X   X 
H III-7  Homebuyer‘s 
Occupations 
  X X   X 
 
 
91 
 
 
 
CHAPTER V 
DATA ANALYSIS & RESULTS 
5.1 Introduction 
 
 This chapter explains the results of each methodology discussed in the previous 
chapter (descriptive and ANOTA analysis) to test the first group of hypotheses 
regarding homebuyers‘ preference for school quality, ordered logit for the second 
group of hypotheses regarding school district choice, and regression analysis for the 
last group of hypotheses regarding willingness to pay for school quality.  
 First, ANOTA analysis analyzed the categorical variables and tested the 
relationship between each demographic group and preference for school quality. The 
result of ANOTA indicates that heterogeneous demographic and SES groups prefer 
school quality differently. The ordered logit model provides the probability of a 
particular demographic group choosing to live in a specific school district. Income 
and tax rate were used as control variables to capture the differences of each school 
district.  Lastly, a regression and spatial analysis was utilized to measure 
heterogeneous willingness to pay for school quality in Cuyahoga County and 2,531 
school districts in 14 states.  
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5.2 Homebuyers’ Preferences for School Quality & School District 
Choice 
 
To test the groups of hypotheses I and II, the survey sample was analyzed using 
ANOTA and ordered logit statistical tools. The results of these analyses were 
introduced in the following sections (Section 5.2.1, 5.2.2, and 5.2.3). 
5.2.1 Results of Survey Analysis  
 
Although the survey data set includes 400 survey respondents, three were 
removed because two respondents live in the city of Cleveland and one respondent 
did not properly answer the question of how many workers are in the family. A total 
of 397 surveys were suitable for analysis.  
To check the validity of the sample, proportion analysis is a useful tool to justify 
the accuracy of the sample proportion and the size of the sample. The null hypothesis 
of proportion analysis is that the proportion is the same as the proportion of 
population (H0 :  Pp = Ps1). The results of proportion analysis indicate that I failed to 
reject the null hypotheses, that is, none of the city samples is statistically different 
from population. In other words, the sample is represented. The sample sizes of each 
city and 2006 housing sales in Cuyahoga County are summarized in Table 5-1.  The 
survey sample represents 3.3 percent of the population in the study area. The sample 
is generally quite representative of the population regarding geographical distribution, 
which is not statistically different at the 95 percent confidence interval.  
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Table 5-1 Comparison of Survey and Population in Cuyahoga County 
 
 
School District 
 Sample  Population 
Z-test 
scores 
Statistical 
significant 
Sample % 
Housing 
Sales % 
Bay Village  11 2.77 299 2.67 -0.04 TRUE 
Beachwood 6 1.51 106 0.95 -0.11 TRUE 
Bedford  5 1.26 342 3.06 0.10 TRUE 
Berea  17 4.28 690 6.16 0.27 TRUE 
Brecksville-Broadview Heights  24 6.05 228 2.04 -1.07 TRUE 
Brooklyn  5 1.26 141 1.26 -0.02 TRUE 
Chagrin Falls  4 1.01 72 0.64 -0.06 TRUE 
Cleveland Heights- University 
Heights 31 7.81 877 7.84 0.00 TRUE 
Cuyahoga Heights  5 1.26 44 0.39 -0.27 TRUE 
East Cleveland  0 0 228 2.04 NA NA 
Euclid  12 3.02 746 6.66 0.47 TRUE 
Fairview Park  11 2.77 243 2.17 -0.17 TRUE 
Garfield Heights  6 1.51 532 4.75 0.35 TRUE 
Independence  4 1.01 77 0.69 -0.06 TRUE 
Lakewood  32 8.06 590 5.27 -0.68 TRUE 
Maple Heights  6 0.5 500 4.47 0.26 TRUE 
Mayfield 10 3.53 372 3.32 -0.03 TRUE 
North Olmstead  13 3.27 390 3.48 0.01 TRUE 
North Royalton  6 1.51 298 2.66 0.22 TRUE 
Olmsted 8 2.02 175 1.56 -0.06 TRUE 
Orange village 6 1.51 122 1.09 -0.04 TRUE 
Parma  37 9.32 1,630 14.56 0.79 TRUE 
Richmond Heights  5 1.26 103 0.92 -0.07 TRUE 
Rocky River  15 3.78 250 2.23 -0.40 TRUE 
Shaker Heights  24 6.05 313 2.80 -0.78 TRUE 
Solon 32 8.06 208 1.86 -1.87 TRUE 
South Euclid- Lyndhurst 16 4.03 739 6.60 0.36 TRUE 
Strongsville  28 7.05 479 4.28 -0.55 TRUE 
Warrensville 0 0 120 1.07 NA NA 
Westlake  18 4.53 279 2.49 -0.46 TRUE 
Total 397 100 11,193 100   
Note: If the z-test scores are less that 1.96 at the 95 percent confidence interval, and if ―TRUE‖ 
appears in the statistical significant column, it means the sample is representative of the 
population. 
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Proportion analysis was used to check the validity of the survey sample regarding 
the presence of school-age children, homebuyers‘ marital status, income, education, 
race, and occupation.  Table 5-2 shows the representative of the survey sample.  
The results of proportion analysis
8
 indicate that homebuyers who are married, 
high income, high education, White, and have school-age children are over 
represented; whereas homebuyers who are single, in management, sales and office, 
and have high school diplomas are under represented. The total of Asians in the 
survey sample is represented, which is not statistically significant.  
                                                 
88 Over or under representation of the survey sample may cause biased results of  ANOTA and the 
ordered logit model. 
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Table 5-2 Comparison of Households Survey Sample and Population in Study Area 
 
  
Homebuyers  
  
Sample  Population Z-test 
scores 
Representative 
Frequency % 
Housing 
Sales % 
with school-age 
children 196 49.37 166,413 17.69 11.61 FALSE 
with children but not at 
school-age 119 29.97 NA NA NA NA 
no children 82 20.65 NA NA NA NA 
single 29 7.30 201,511 25.86 -2.28 FALSE 
married 333 84.40 414,478 55.44 10.63 FALSE 
divorced 24 6.30 75,366 10.23 -0.64 TRUE 
widowed 7 1.80 65,238 8.47 -0.63 TRUE 
median income $67,974   $59,396     
some high school  7 1.80 59,361 0.09 1.51 TRUE 
High school diploma 28 7.10 188,626 28.67 -2.52 FALSE 
some college 60 15.10 136,923 21.24 3.30 FALSE 
Associate‘s degree 173 43.60 37,502 5.42 8.15 FALSE 
College degree 127 32.00 123,570 19.18 3.67 FALSE 
post graduate degree 2 0.50 77,977 13.03 -0.53 TRUE 
White 340 85.60 730,550 81.40 1.99 FALSE 
African American 32 8.10 136,677 14.20 -0.99 TRUE 
Asian 9 2.30 18,865 2.10 0.04 TRUE 
Hispanic  2 0.50 11,812 1.50 -0.78 TRUE 
other 12 3.00 18,765 24.00 -6.37 FALSE 
management, 
professional, and related 
occupations 235 59.19 178,915 78.50 -7.20 FALSE 
service occupations 26 6.55 55,983 12.08 -0.87 TRUE 
sales and office 
occupations 45 11.34 132162 28.22 -2.52 FALSE 
construction, extraction, 
and maintenance 
occupations 12 3.02 28155 6.30 -0.47 TRUE 
production, transportation 
and material moving 
occupations 11 2.77 53347 11.25 -0.89 TRUE 
Total 397 100.00 11,971 100.00   
Note: If the z-test scores are less that 1.96 at the 95 confidence interval, and if ―TRUE‖ appears 
in the statistical significant column, it means the sample is representative of the population. 
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5.2.2 Results of ANOTA Analysis 
 
There are three models utilized to test homebuyers‘ preference for school quality: 
location factors, importance of school quality, and the measure of school quality. 
These models were applied for the first group of hypotheses regarding the 
relationship between preference for school quality and homebuyers with 
heterogeneous demographic backgrounds and SES. This dissertation hypothesized 
that there is no variation in school quality preference across homebuyers with 
different demographics and SES.  
5.2.2.1 Results of the Location Factor Model  
 
The first model of ANOTA analysis is utilized to test the first group hypotheses 
concerning which homebuyers prefer school quality. The choice set includes location, 
neighbors, amenity, safety, near friends/relatives, housing size, housing style, and 
none of the above. The results of ANOTA analysis indicate that the probability of 
choosing ―location‖ is unexpectedly the highest (36.2%), and the ―public school 
quality‖ is the second highest (26.7%).  
It is of interest to note that the probability of school quality choice for households 
with school-aged children (Hypotheses I-1) is high—up to 43.0 percent—compared 
to 15.3 percent for those with children but not at school age, and 3.8 percent for those 
with no children. The hypothesis that there is no variation in school quality choice 
among heterogeneous homebuyers can be rejected.  This is statistically significant.  
The detailed probabilities of the presence of school-age children are also summarized 
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in Table 5-4.  Figure 5-1 illustrates a variety of probabilities of homebuyers choosing 
location factors
9
.  
 
Figure 5-1 Presence of Children and Location Factors 
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Although it is believed that households with higher income and education are 
positively correlated with school quality preference in the housing market, marital 
status may be one of the major factors affecting preference for school quality; 
married households may place more importance on school quality than any other 
family types, such as single, divorced, and widowed households (Hypotheses I-2).  
                                                 
9
 Location includes all aspects of the other choices, such as reputation, transportation, distance to work, 
public school quality, living close to family, and other amenities. It can be defined as a comprehensive 
location factor.  
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Table 5-3 Probabilities of Households with Marital Status Choosing Location 
Factor 
Location Factor 
Marital Status 
Single Married Divorced Widowed 
Location 38% 37% 13%
***
 71%
**
 
Public Transportation 0% 1% 0% 0% 
Neighbors 0% 2% 4% 0% 
Amenity Of Convenience 
Facility 0% 2% 4% 0% 
Safety 7% 5% 0% 14% 
Near Friends/Relatives 17% 9%
***
 21%
**
 0% 
Public School Quality 14% 27% 42%
**
 14% 
Housing Size 4% 6% 0% 0% 
Housing Style 14%
*
 6% 8% 0% 
Other 7% 5% 8% 0% 
None Of The Above 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Note:   * =     .10,  ** =    .05,  *** =    .01 
 
The statistical results indicate homebuyers who are single and widowed are more 
likely to choose location than school quality (38% and 71%, respectively), while 
married and divorced households consider public school quality, rather than location. 
Interestingly, divorced households have a higher probability (42%) of choosing 
school quality than married households (27%). Although divorced households have 
high priority of public school quality over location, this result is not statistically 
significant. The null hypothesis that there is no variation in preference for school 
quality among homebuyers with different marital status cannot be rejected. 
As shown in Table 5-3, households with higher income have a higher probability 
of choosing school quality (Hypothesis I-3). For example, those households with 
incomes between $100,000 and $149,999, and more than $200,000 prefer public 
school quality the most, with 35.9 percent and 38.4 percent probabilities, respectively. 
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Although, the result of those households with income more than $200,000 indicate 
the highest probability of choosing school quality, it is not statistically significant. 
On the contrary, the result of households with income between $100,000 and 
$149,999 is statistically significant.  
Table 5-4 Probabilities of Households with Different Income Choosing Location 
Factor  
 
Location 
Factor 
Income 
$10K-
$24,999 
$25K-
$39,999 
$40K-
$54,999 
$55K-
$69,999 
$70K-
$84,999 
$85K-
$99,999 
$100K-
$149,999 
$150K-
$199,999 
$200K 
or 
more 
Location 25% 29% 44% 41% 33% 33% 36% 29% 46% 
Public 
Transportation 0% 0% 3% 2% 2% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Neighbors 0% 6% 3% 4% 2% 2% 1% 0% 8%* 
Amenity Of 
Convenience 
Facility 13%* 12%*** 0% 0% 2% 2% 3% 3% 0% 
Safety 0% 6% 3% 4% 4% 15%*** 3% 3% 0% 
Near Friends/ 
Relatives 25% 6% 13% 14% 13% 7% 6% 8% 4% 
Public School 
Quality 13% 29% 19% 14%*** 25% 28% 36%*** 29% 38% 
Housing Size 13% 0% 6% 6% 7% 4% 3% 11% 0% 
Housing Style 0% 6% 3% 4% 4% 6% 8% 16%*** 4% 
Other 13% 6% 6% 12%*** 7% 4% 3% 3% 0% 
None Of The 
Above 0% 0% 0% 0% 2%*** 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Note:   * =     .10,  ** =    .05,  *** =    .01 
 
 
The range of the probability of choosing public school quality is from the lowest 
of 13 percent ($10,000 to $24,999) to the highest of 38 percent ($200,000 or more). 
The range of probabilities to choose location is from the lowest of the 25 percent 
($10,000 to $24,000) to the highest of 46 percent ($200,000 or more). While low-
income homebuyers ($10,000 to $39,999) care more about amenities and housing 
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size, those with incomes from $100,000 to $149,999 and more than $200,000 
consider the quality of the neighborhood and housing style (12.5%). The income 
categories of $40,000 to $54,999, $55,000 to $69,999, $70,000 to $84,999, and 
$85,000 to $99,999 have the three percent to six percent chances of choosing housing 
style and near friends (7% to 14%) in addition to location and school quality. The 
detailed probabilities for each income category are summarized in Table 5-4. 
Table 5-5 Summary of Probabilities for Households Educational Level 
 
Location Factor 
Education 
Some 
High 
School 
High 
School 
graduate 
Some 
College 
College 
Graduate 
post-
Graduate 
Degree 
Location 25% 29% 44% 41% 33% 
Public Transportation 0% 0% 3% 2% 2% 
Neighbors 0% 6% 3% 4% 2% 
Amenity Of Convenience 
Facility 13%* 12%*** 0% 0% 2% 
Safety 0% 6% 3% 4% 4% 
Near Friends/Relatives 25% 6% 13% 14% 13% 
Public School Quality 13% 29% 19% 14%*** 25% 
Housing Size 13% 0% 6% 6% 7% 
Housing Style 0% 6% 3% 4% 4% 
Other 13% 6% 6% 12% 7% 
None Of The Above 0% 0% 0% 0% 2% 
Note:     * =     .10,  ** =    .05, ***=    .01 
 
The variables of educational attainment also have substantial influence on 
heterogeneous preference for school quality (Hypothesis I-4). Households run by 
college graduates have approximately 25 percent chance of choosing public school 
quality, which is highest among other education categories. The lowest probability is 
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13 percent for those with no high school diploma and 29 percent for those with some 
college, although these are not statistically significant. The probabilities for those 
with some high school to choose location and school quality are 25 percent and 13 
percent, respectively.  
Table 5-6 Summary of Probabilities for Presence of School-age Children and Race 
 
 
Location 
Factor 
Presence of school age children Race 
With 
 School-
Age 
Children 
With 
Children 
Not School 
Age 
No  
Children 
African 
American  White Asian 
Other 
Races 
Location 27%
***
 38% 54%
***
 19%
**
 38%
**
 11% 42% 
Public 
Transportation 1% 0%** 1% 3% 1% 0% 0% 
Neighbors 2% 4%
***
 1% 3% 2% 0% 0% 
Amenity of 
Convenience 
facility 2% 3% 3% 3% 2% 0% 8% 
Safety 5% 4% 5% 23%
***
 2%
***
 11% 17% 
Near Friends 
/relatives 8% 13%
**
 10% 3% 11% 11% 0% 
Public school 
quality 43%
***
 15%
***
 4%
***
 26% 27% 56%
**
 17% 
Housing size 4% 9%
***
 4% 10% 5% 0% 8% 
Housing style 4%
**
 9%
***
 9% 10% 7% 0% 0% 
Other 5% 4% 8% 0% 5% 11% 8% 
None of the 
above 0% 0% 1%
***
 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Note:   *  =     .10,  **  =    .05, *** =    .01 
 
Regarding race variables (Hypothesis I-5), Asian respondents predominately 
cited public school quality as the most influential factor in their location choice 
(56 %), which is statistically significant. The probability of Whites choosing location 
is 38 percent and public school quality is 27 percent. Whites were evenly divided 
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into location and public school quality; Asians focus more on public school quality 
than any other race. African Americans chose public school quality 26 percent of the 
time and location 19 percent of the time. African Americans also have a high 
probability of citing safety (23%) and housing size and style (10 % for each)—a 
probability higher than for Whites and Asians.   
 
Table 5-7 Probability for Occupational Categories of Choosing Location Factors 
10
 
 
Location Factor 
Occupations 
Unemployed  MPRO SO SOO CEMO PTMO 
Location 36% 33% 32%* 33% 55% 44% 
Public Transportation 0% 0% 0%* 0% 0% 11%*** 
Neighbors 0% 4% 5% 8% 0% 11%* 
Amenity of 
Convenience Facility 3% 2%* 0%* 0% 0% 0% 
Safety 2% 5% 5% 0% 9% 0% 
Near 
Friends/Relatives 6% 11% 5% 8% 0% 33% 
Public School 
Quality 29% 30% 32% 25% 36% 0%* 
Housing Size 9% 5% 11% 8% 0% 0% 
Housing Style 5% 6% 5% 8% 0% 0% 
Other 11% 3%** 5% 0%* 0%* 0% 
None of The Above 0% 0% 0% 8% 0% 0% 
Note:  Occupation Categories  
Unemployment, (MPRO) management, professional, and related occupations, (SO) service 
occupations, (SOO) sales and office occupations, (CEMO) construction, extraction, and 
maintenance occupations, and (PTMO) production, transportation and material moving 
occupations 
 
  * =     .10,  ** =    .05, ***=    .01 
 
 
Households in various occupations (Hypothesis I-6) tend to choose either 
location or public school quality among a given choice set. The probability of 
                                                 
10
 The occupation categories in this dissertation followed the Standard Occupation Classification of the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) 
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choosing ―location‖ ranges from 32 percent to 55 percent, and those for ―public 
school quality‖ are from 25 percent to 36 percent, except for production, 
transportation, and material moving occupations (0%). The majority of survey 
respondents were in management, professional, and related occupations (235 out of 
397), while there are only nine respondents of production, transportation, and 
material moving occupations. 
5.2.2.2 Results of the Importance of School Quality Model  
 
The second model of importance of school quality examines to what extent 
homebuyers prefer school quality. The survey results for this question are Likert-
scale responses: very important, somewhat important, average importance, not very 
important, and not at all important. As expected, most respondents answered that 
school quality is very important (58.9%) or somewhat important (20.7%). The 
probabilities of answering average importance, not very important, or not at all 
important are relatively small (6.3%, 5.8%, and 9.0%, respectively).  
Moreover, just as in the previous model regarding location factors, homebuyers 
with school-age children are more likely to answer very important and somewhat 
important. The probabilities of choosing these two categories are 83.4 percent and 
9.4 percent, respectively, both of which are statistically significant. The probabilities 
of choosing very important for homebuyers with children but not at school age or no 
children are obviously lower than for those with school-age children: 43.6 percent 
and 24.1 percent, respectively. Unexpectedly, the probability of choosing not at all 
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important for all households are 3.1 percent, 12.0 percent, and 14.0 percent, 
respectively.  The detailed probabilities are in Table 5-9.  
 Similar to the result of the previous model, divorced households have higher 
probabilities (62.5%) of responding ―very important‖ than married households 
(61.2%), although the probability of married households is statistically significant, 
and divorced is not significant. Overall, single and widowed households consider 
school quality as very important, but there are high probabilities of responding ―not 
at all important,‖ (13.8 % and 28.6 %, respectively).  
 
Table 5-8 Probability of Importance of School Quality for Martial Status 
 
 
Marital Status 
some 
high 
high 
graduate 
some 
college 
college 
graduate 
post-
graduate 
Very Important 43% 39%
**
 63% 63% 58% 
Somewhat Important 14% 14% 17% 20% 24% 
Average Important 29%
***
 18%
***
 5% 4%* 6% 
Not Very Important 0% 7% 7% 5% 6% 
Not At All Important 14% 22%
***
 9% 8% 5% 
Don't Know 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 
Note:   * =     .10,  ** =    .05, ***=    .01 
 
It is assumed that household income and school quality is positively correlated.  
In other words, this dissertation expects that higher income homebuyers have a 
higher probability of saying school quality is important, and vice versa.  
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Table 5-9 Probability of Importance of School Quality for Income Categories 
 
 
$10K-
$24,999 
$25K-
$39,999 
$40K-
$54,999 
$55K-
$69,999 
$70K-
$84,999 
$85K-
$99,999 
$100K-
$149,999 
$150K-
$199,999 
$200K 
or 
more 
Very 
Important 25%
**
 53% 63% 47%
*
 66% 61% 63% 50% 77% 
Somewhat 
Important 13% 18% 19% 24% 16% 24% 21% 26% 15% 
Average 
Importance 38%
***
 18%
**
 3% 4% 4% 7% 3% 8% 8% 
Not Very 
Important 0% 6% 6% 16%
***
 4% 4% 3% 11% 0% 
Not At All 
Important 25%
*
 6% 9% 10% 11% 4% 9% 5% 0% 
Don't Know 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Note:   * =     .10,  ** =    .05, ***=    .01 
 
The probability result, however, indicates that there are no differences among 
heterogeneous income categories. The sum of the probability of responding very 
important, somewhat important, and average importance range from 75 percent 
(income category of $55,000 to $69,000) to 100 percent ($200,000 or more). The 
probability of responding ―not at all important‖ is evenly distributed regardless of 
income category.  There is a 25 percent probability of homebuyers with income 
$10,000-$24,999 to answer ―not important‖ or ―not at all important,‖ and  9.4 percent 
($40,000-$54,999), 9.8 percent ($55,000-$69,999), and 10.9 percent ($70,000-
$84,999) probability of middle income homebuyers choosing these categories. See 
Table 5-9. 
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Table 5-10 Summary of Probabilities of Importance of School Quality for 
Education 
 
 
Education 
some 
high 
high 
graduate 
some 
college 
college 
graduate 
post-
graduate refused  
Very Important 43% 39%
**
 63% 63% 58% 83% 
Somewhat Important 14% 14% 17% 20% 24% 9% 
Average Important 29%
***
 18%
***
 5% 4%
*
 6% 3% 
Not Very Important 0% 7% 7% 5% 6% 2% 
Not At All Important 14% 22%
***
 9% 8% 5% 3% 
Don't Know 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 0% 
Note:    * =     .10, ** =    .05,***=    .01 
 
Homebuyers with some college or a college degree have a higher probability of 
answering school quality is very important than other educational categories, 63 
percent respectively. There are high probabilities for those who did not graduate 
from high school or with a high school diploma to consider school quality as not at 
all important (14.3 % and 21.5 %, respectively). 
Regarding race, the probability for any race to respond very important is very 
high: 78 percent (Asian), 71 percent (African Americans), and 58 percent (Whites), 
but none of them are statistically significant. Unlike other races, the probability of 
Whites answering not important and not at all important is 6 percent and 9 percent 
(No African Americans or Asians chose not at all important category). Holding 
income and education constant, Whites are 11.1 percent less likely to choose very 
important than African Americans and 20.1 percent less likely than Asians. Similar 
to the result of location factor model, Asians have a higher probability to respond 
that school quality is very important (see Table 5-11).  
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Table 5-11 Summary of Probabilities of Importance of School Quality for Presence 
of school Age Children and Race 
 
 
Presence Of School Age Children Race 
With 
School 
Age 
Children 
With 
Children 
Not School 
Age 
No  
Children 
African 
American Whites Asian 
Other 
Races 
Very 
Important 83%
***
 44%
***
 24%
***
 71% 58% 78% 50% 
Somewhat 
Important 9%
***
 27%
**
 37%
***
 13% 21% 22% 17% 
Average 
Important 3%
***
 9%
*
 10%
*
 10% 6% 0% 17% 
Not Very 
Important 2%
***
 7% 15%
***
 6% 6% 0% 0% 
Not At All 
Important 3%
***
 12%
*
 14%
***
 0%
*
 9% 0% 17% 
Don't 
Know 0% 1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Note:    * =     .10, ** =    .05,*** =    .01 
 
In a similar result to the previous model for occupations, the probability of 
responding very important is evenly scattered across occupations. The probabilities 
for choosing very important are from the highest of 64 percent to the lowest of 42 
percent. Households in service occupations give high priority to school quality, 
followed by management, professional, and related occupations. Interestingly, 
households who are not employed have a high probability of answering very 
important (60%). Conversely, households in construction, extraction, and 
maintenance occupations, and production transportation, and material moving 
occupations care less about school quality than other occupations (See Table 5-12).   
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Table 5-12 Probability of Importance of School Quality for Occupational 
Categories 
 
 Unemployed  MPRO SO SOO CEMO PTMO 
Very 
Important 60% 60% 64% 56% 42% 44% 
Somewhat 
Important 13% 22% 22% 25% 33% 11% 
Average 
Important 7% 5% 4% 9% 17% 11% 
Not Very 
Important 7% 7% 4% 2% 0% 0% 
Not At 
All 
Important 10% 6% 7% 9% 8% 33%*** 
Don't 
Know 2% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
 
Note:   1. Occupation Categories  
Unemployment, (MPRO) management, professional, and related occupations, (SO) service 
occupations, (SOO) sales and office occupations, (CEMO) construction, extraction, and 
maintenance occupations, and (PTMO) production, transportation and material moving 
occupations. 
2. * =     .10,  ** =    .05, ***=    .01 
5.2.2.3 Results of the Measure of School Quality Model  
 
The last model is designed to test what school quality variables were considered 
when a homebuyer bought a house. Groups of choice sets were given, such as 
teacher characteristics, after-school programs, academic performance, and 
miscellaneous. Among school quality variables, the probability of choosing school 
district designations is highest among school quality measures (27.7%), followed by 
school safety (16.1%) and class size (10.3%). In contrast to literature that considers 
test scores as the appropriate proxy to represent school quality in the housing market, 
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the probabilities of respondents choosing test scores for math and reading are very 
low, 0.8 percent and 1.5 percent, respectively.  
The probability of choosing school district designation is very high, although it 
varies according to the presence of school-age children. The probability of choosing 
school district designation is 29 percent for households with school-age children, 26 
percent for those with children not at school-age, and 25 percent for those without 
children, all of which are not statistically significant. See Table 5-15. 
Table 5-13 Probability of School Quality Measure Choice and Marital Status 
 
School Quality Measure Single  Married Divorced Widowed 
Teacher Education 0% 5% 21% 14% 
Teacher Experience  4% 5% 0% 29% 
Teacher Salary 0% 1% 0% 0% 
Class Size 0% 11% 17% 14% 
Expenditure Per Pupil 0% 2% 8% 0% 
School Safety 21% 16% 13% 14% 
Sports Programs 0% 1% 0% 0% 
PTO Meeting 0% 1% 0% 0% 
% Of Students Going To 
College 21% 8% 4% 14% 
Graduation Rates 7% 8% 17% 0% 
SAT Scores 0% 2% 0% 0% 
Standardized Math Test 
Scores 0% 1% 0% 0% 
Standardized Reading 
Test Scores 0% 2% 0% 0% 
School District 
Designation 31% 29% 13% 0% 
None Of The Above 17% 9% 8% 14% 
Note:   * =     .10,  ** =    .05, *** =    .01 
Single and married homebuyers are also more likely to respond that school 
district designations are important, 31 percent and 29 percent, respectively, although 
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neither of these are statistically significant. On the contrary, widowed homebuyers 
take teacher experience into account. Divorced homebuyers consider teacher 
education (20.8%), graduation rate (16.7%), class size (16.6%), and school safety 
and school district designation (12.5%), although none of them are statistically 
significant.   
Table 5-14 Probability of School Quality Measure Choice and Education 
 
School Quality 
Measure 
Some 
Other 
Race 
Some 
High 
High 
Graduate 
Some 
College 
College 
Graduate 
Post 
Graduate 
Teacher Education 8% 0% 22%
***
 7% 4% 4% 
Teacher Experience  17% 14% 4% 2% 6% 5% 
Teacher Salary 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 1% 
Class Size 8% 29% 4% 12% 9% 12% 
Expenditure Per 
Pupil 8% 0% 0% 5% 2% 2% 
School Safety 0% 29% 32%
***
 22% 14% 14% 
Sports Programs 0% 0% 4%
***
 0% 1% 0% 
PTO Meeting 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 1% 
% Of Students 
Going To College 25% 0% 4% 3% 8% 13% 
Graduation Rates 0% 29%
**
 11% 10% 7% 7% 
SAT Scores 0% 0% 0% 0% 2% 3% 
Standardized Math 
Test Scores 0% 0% 0% 0% 2% 0% 
Standardized 
Reading Test Scores 0% 0% 0% 2% 1% 2% 
School District 
Designation 25% 0% 7%
***
 22% 32%
*
 29% 
None Of The Above 8% 0% 14% 15% 10% 7% 
   Note:   * =     .10,  ** =    .05, *** =    .01 
 
School district designation tends to be chosen by homebuyers with higher 
education. For instance households with college degrees have 32 percent chance to 
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choose school district designation. Teacher characteristics and school safety are 
weighted more heavily by those with lower education, such as households with high 
school diploma. Interestingly, homebuyers without a high school diploma take into 
account graduation rates (29%, which is statistically significant). Homebuyers with 
post-graduate education consider school district designation with a 29 percent 
probability, which is not statistically significant.   
Table 5-15 Probability of School Quality Measure Choice and Presence of School-
age Children and Race 
 
School Quality 
Measure 
With School 
Age 
Children 
With 
Children Not 
at School Age 
No 
Children 
African 
American 
White Asian 
Some 
Other 
Race 
Teacher Education 7% 6% 3% 13%* 5% 0% 8% 
Teacher Experience  5% 7% 1%
*
 0% 5% 11% 17% 
Teacher Salary 0% 0% 3%
***
 0% 1% 0% 0% 
Class Size 12% 10% 6% 10% 11% 11% 8% 
Expenditure Per 
Pupil 2% 3% 4% 0% 3% 0% 8% 
School Safety 16% 16% 19% 19% 17% 11% 0% 
Sports Programs 1% 0% 1% 0% 1% 0% 0% 
PTO Meeting 0% 2%
**
 0% 3%
**
 0%
**
 0% 0% 
% Of Students 
Going To College 9% 5% 11% 16% 7% 
33%
*
**
 25% 
Graduation Rates 7% 10% 9% 6% 9% 0% 0% 
SAT Scores 3% 3% 0% 0% 2% 11%
*
 0% 
Standardized Math 
Test Scores 1% 1% 0% 7%
***
 0%
***
 0% 0% 
Standardized 
Reading Test 
Scores 3%
*
 1% 0% 3% 1%
**
 
11%
*
**
 0% 
School District 
Designation 29% 26% 25% 19% 28% 11% 25% 
None Of The 
Above 6%
***
 11% 
18%
**
*
 3% 11% 0% 8% 
 
Note:   * =     .10,  ** =    .05, *** =    .01 
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There is a 28 percent probability of Whites choosing a school district designation 
and 19 percent for African Americans, although neither of these is statistically 
significant. It is very interesting to note that Asians are more likely to respond 
―percentage of students going to college‖ as their school quality measure choice. 
There is also a high probability of choosing school safety, 19 percent (African 
American), 17 percent (White), and 11 percent (Asian), although neither of them are 
statistically significant. 
 
Table 5-16 Probability of School Quality Measure Choice and Homebuyer Income 
 
School quality 
measure 
10K-
24,999 
25K-
39,999 
40K-
54,999 
55K-
69,999 
70K-
84,999 
85K-
99,999 
100K-
149,999 
150K-
199,999 
200K or 
more 
Teacher Education 25%
***
 24%
***
 3% 10% 0%
**
 8% 5% 0% 4% 
Teacher 
Experience  13% 12% 3% 6% 6% 7% 2% 0% 0% 
Teacher Salary 0% 0% 0% 0% 2% 0% 1% 0% 0% 
Class Size 13% 0% 9% 10% 18%
**
 9% 7% 5% 12% 
Expenditure Per 
Pupil 0% 0% 3% 4% 4% 4% 0%* 5% 0% 
School Safety 25% 18% 19% 16% 18% 13% 20% 21% 8% 
Sports Programs 0% 0% 0% 2% 0% 0% 0% 3%
*
 0% 
PTO Meetings 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 2% 0% 3%
*
 0% 
% Of Students 
Going To College 13% 6% 9% 4% 6% 11% 10% 8% 15% 
Graduation Rates 0% 12% 9% 14% 4% 9% 8% 8% 12% 
SAT Scores 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 4% 2% 0% 15%
***
 
Standardized Math 
Test Scores 0% 6%
***
 0% 0% 2% 2% 0% 0% 0% 
Standardized 
Reading Test 
Scores 0% 0% 3% 2% 0% 4% 2% 0% 0% 
School District 
Designation 0%
*
 12% 28% 22% 29% 24% 36%
**
 37% 23% 
None Of The 
Above 13% 12% 13% 12% 13% 4%8 7% 11% 12% 
Note:    * =     .10,  ** =    .05, *** =    .01 
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Furthermore, respondents with higher income and higher levels of education have 
a higher probability of taking school district designation into account than 
homebuyers with lower income and lower levels of education. Homebuyers with 
incomes more than $70,000 are more likely to choose school district designation with 
probabilities ranging from 23 percent to 37 percent. Low-income homebuyers 
(between $10,000 and $24,999 and between $25,000 and $39,999) care about teacher 
education, while homebuyers with incomes between $100,000 and $199,999 regard 
school district designations as the measure of school quality. (See the second and 
third highest income categories). 
Table 5-17 Probability of School Quality Measure Choice and Homebuyer 
Occupation
11
   
 
School quality measure Unemployed  MPRO SO SOO CEMO PTMO 
Teacher Education 5% 4% 5%** 8%* 9% 0% 
Teacher Experience  9% 2% 5% 8% 9% 0% 
Teacher Salary 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Class Size 12% 10% 26%* 8% 36% 11% 
Expenditure Per Pupil 3% 2% 0% 0%* 0% 0% 
School Safety 15% 21% 26% 8% 9% 22% 
Sports Programs 0% 0% 0% 8% 0% 0% 
PTO Meeting 0% 0% 5% 0% 0% 0% 
% Of Students Going To College 8% 6% 0% 33% 18% 11% 
Graduation Rates 2%** 10% 5% 0% 0% 0%*** 
SAT Scores 6%*** 2% 0% 0% 0% 22% 
Standardized Math Test Scores 2% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Standardized Reading Test Scores 3% 1% 0% 0% 9% 0% 
School District Designation 21% 29% 21% 17% 9%* 33%* 
None Of The Above 15% 12% 5% 8% 0% 0% 
Note:  Occupation Categories  
Unemployment, (MPRO) management, professional, and related occupations, (SO) service 
occupations, (SOO) sales and office occupations, (CEMO) construction, extraction, and maintenance 
occupations, and (PTMO) production, transportation and material moving occupations 
  * =     .10,  ** =    .05, ***=    .01 
                                                 
11
 Refer to the note on Table 5.5 on page 102. 
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School district designation has a high probability to be chosen. Especially, 
homebuyers in production, transportation and material moving occupations focus on 
school district designation, 33 percent probability, which is statistically significant at 
the 90 percent confidence interval.  Homebuyers in management, professional, and 
related occupations also consider and have a high probability of choosing school 
district designation (29%), but it is not statistically significant. Overall, school safety 
and school district designation have higher probabilities to be chosen by homebuyers 
in service occupation, 26 percent (statistically significant at the 90 percent 
confidence interval) and 21 percent (not statistically significant), respectively. 
Homebuyers in construction, extraction, and maintenance occupations consider class 
size and percentage of students going to college, although neither of them is 
statistically significant.  
In summary, respondents were asked about three choice sets: location factors 
affecting the decision to purchase a house, the importance of school quality, and 
school quality variables. Among the first choice set, location and school quality are 
the most important factors homebuyers considered when they bought a house. 
Unexpectedly, location is the most important factor for homebuyers overall and 
school quality is the second most important. Homebuyers with school-age children, 
however, consider school quality as the most important location factor. Those with 
no children or no school-age children rated school quality lower than those with 
school-age children.  
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Table 5-18a Hypotheses Group I: Preference for School Quality with Survey Data 
 Note:  1. Numbers in parentheses are t-values. The dependent variable is school district designation in 
Cuyahoga County.  
2. * =     .10,  ** =    .05, ***=    .01 
 
 
Hypothesis # 
Hypothesis   
contents 
Expecte
d Sign 
N 
Statistical Results 
Location 
Factor 
Importance 
of SQ 
H I-1 
Preference 
for school 
quality and 
homebuyers 
with children 
With school-age children > 
average preference 
+ 196 
16.3  
(7.41)*** 
9.5 
(5.28)*** 
With no school age children < average 
preference 
- 119 
- 11.4 
 (-4.96)*** 
-5.2 
(-1.93)** 
No Children  <  average preference - 82 
-22.9   
(-6.74)*** 
-15.2 
(-4.47)** 
H I-2  
Preference 
for School 
Quality and 
Homebuyer 
Marital 
Status 
Married >  average preference + 333 0.6 (0.6) 1.53*(1.88) 
Never Married  <  average preference - 29 
-12.9  
(-1.63) 
-3.1 (-0.5) 
Widowed   < average preference - 7 
-12.4  
(-0.74) 
-28 
(-2.22)*** 
Divorced  < average preference - 24 15.0 (1.41) -6.7(-0.97) 
H I-3 
Preference 
for School 
Quality and 
Homebuyer 
Income 
less than 10,000  < average preference - 1   
10,000-24,999  <  average preference - 8 
-14.2 
 (-0.92) 
-8.1 (-070) 
25,000-39,999  <   average preference - 7 2.7 (0.25) 2.3 (0.28) 
40,000-54,999  <   average preference - 17 
-8.0 
 (-1.07) 
-1.0*** 
(-2.48) 
55,000-69,999 >  average preference + 33 
-13.0 
 (-2.24) 
-11.4 (-0.05) 
70,000-84,999 >  average preference + 51 
-1.3 
 (-0.24) 
-0.2 (1.14) 
85,000-99,999 >  average preference + 56 1.0 (0.18) 5.0 (0.27) 
100,000-149,999 > average preference + 89 
9.2*** 
(2.24) 
1.7 (0.53) 
150,000-199,999 >  average 
preference 
+ 39 2.2 (0.32) -1.3 (-0.25) 
200,000 or more > average preference + 27 11.7 (1.39) 14.1 (2.17)** 
H I-4 
Preference 
for School 
Quality and 
Homebuyer 
Education 
some high  <  average preference - 7 -12.4  (-0.75) -0.2 (-0.02) 
high graduate  <  average preference - 28 -5.3  (-0.65) 
-14.5** 
(-2.30) 
some college  <  average preference - 60 -10.0 (-1.07) -0.9 (-0.22) 
college graduate >  average preference + 173 5.1** (2.04) 1.4 (0.70) 
Post-graduate >  average preference + 127 -0.7 (-0.22) 1.5 (0.60) 
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Table 5-18b Hypotheses Group I: Preference for School Quality with Survey Data 
(Cont.) 
 
 
Note:  Numbers in parentheses are t-values. The dependent variable is school district designation in 
Cuyahoga County.  
*  =     .10,  **  =    .05, *** =    .01 
 
In light of the findings of the survey analysis, there are heterogeneous 
preferences evident for school quality across all homebuyers. Homebuyers with 
school-age children choose school quality as the most important location variable 
and answer that school quality is very important, both of which are statistically 
significant. Homebuyers with high income and high education, however, are more 
likely to care about school quality than those with low income and low education but 
Hypothesis # Hypothesis  contents Expected 
Sign N 
Statistical Results 
Location 
Factor 
Importance 
of SQ 
H I-5 
Preference for 
School Quality 
and 
Homebuyer 
Race/Ethnicity 
African American > 
average preference 
- 32 -0.0 (-0.12) 7.6 (1.34) 
White >  average 
preference 
+ 340 -0.2 (-0.22) -1.2 (-1.71) 
Asian <  average 
preference 
- 9 28.8** (1.97) 14.1 (1.23) 
some other <  average 
preference 
- 12 -10.1 (-0.80) -2.6(-0.26) 
H I-6 
Preference for 
School Quality 
and 
Homebuyer 
Occupations 
Unemployed < 
average preference 
- 68 
2.7 (0.55) -5.0 (-1.32) 
MPO> average 
preference 
+ 235 
1.4 (0.78) 0.9 (0.60) 
SO< average 
preference 
- 28 
5.4 (0.67) 3.4 (0.54) 
SOO< average 
preference 
- 45 
-4.5 (-0.73) 3.0 (0.61) 
CMO< average 
preference 
- 12 
-18.4 (-1.46) 5.8 (0.59) 
PMO< average 
preference 
- 9 
-26.7 *(-1.83) -19.2 (-1.67) 
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these results are not statistically significant. Interestingly, homebuyers with higher 
income and higher educational attainment have a higher probability of responding 
that school district designations are the most representative of school quality, 
although this variable is new.  
5.2.3 Results of the Ordered Logit Model 
 
There are a total of six models—the presence of school-age children, marital 
status, race, income, education, and occupation— run for each demographic 
characteristic and SES. These models test the second group of hypotheses regarding 
the school district choice based on homebuyers‘ demographic and SES. Unlike the 
previous models of the ANOTA analysis, in which the dependent variables relied 
upon respondents‘ answers, this model utilizes the dependent variable as the real 
location decision in which school district a homebuyer lives. There are three 
dependent variables categorized by school quality (excellent, effective, and 
continuous improvement). 
Although the Pseudo R
2 
is not analogous to the 
 
R
2 
in the ordinary lease square 
(OLS) regression that measures the goodness to fit, nor is the Pseudo 
 
R
2
 as 
meaningful as it in the OLS, the Pseudo R
2
 measures the goodness to fit in the 
maximum likelihood model. McFadden‘s  R2 is defined as:  1 - (LLFur/LLFr) where 
LLFur is the unrestricted log likelihood function and LLFr is the restricted log 
likelihood function (Gujariti, 2003). According to Gujariti, the Pseudo
 
R
2
 is the ratio 
of the total sum of squares to the residual sum of the squares because LLFur is 
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analogous to the residual sum of squares and LLFr is analogous to the total sum of 
squares.  
Chi-square was used to test how well the models fit and to test that all the slopes 
of coefficients are equal to zero, analogous to the F test in the OLS regression. The 
Log Likelihood tests whether all coefficients for independent variables in the model 
are simultaneously zero. 
As shown in Table 5-19, the Pseudo R
2 
are from 0.16 to 0.19, chi-squares are 
from 123.5 to 141.9, and -2 Log likelihoods are from 618.2 to 650.9.   
Table 5-19 Summary of Pseudo R
2
, Chi-square and Log Likelihood 
 
 Pseudo R
2
 Chi-Square Log Likelihood 
The presence of school age 
children 0.16 123.57 650.78 
Marital status  0.16 123.50 650.85 
Race 0.18 135.70 638.65 
Income 0.19 141.92 618.18 
Education  0.17 129.45 630.65 
Occupation 0.17 127.81 632.29 
 
Holding the number of bedrooms, bathrooms, housing prices, and tax rates 
constant, the overall probability of living in an excellent school district is 52 percent 
across the homebuyers who responded. There are lower probabilities of living in an 
effective or continuous improvement school district (39% and 8%, respectively). 
Unlike the ANOTA analysis, which shows relatively homogeneous homebuyers‘ 
preference for school quality, the ordered logit results show that there is apparently 
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heterogeneous school district choice according to homebuyers‘ demographics and 
SES.   
Figure 5-2 Probability of Homebuyers with School-age children Choosing a School 
District 
 
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
prob(y=CI) prob(y=EF) prob(y=EX)
With school age children with children but not school age No children
 
Note;  CI is Continuous Improvement School District Designation; 
EF is Effective; EX is Excellent School District Designation. Y axis indicates the probability of 
living in each school district designation  
      
To test the hypothesis of hypotheses II-1, three categories of the presence of 
children—homebuyers with school-age children, with children but not school age, 
and no children—were utilized as dependent variables in the model. The average of 
the probabilities of choosing an excellent, effective, or continuous improvement 
school district are 53 percent, 40 percent, and 8 percent, respectively. The probability, 
however, of homebuyers with school-age children choosing an excellent school 
district is 59 percent (48.5% for those with children not school-age and 44.5% for 
those with no children, which is not significant), while there is only a six percent 
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probability of choosing continuous improvement for the first group, and 9 percent 
and 10 percent likelihood for those with no school-age children and no children, 
respectively.  
Interestingly, households who are divorced have the highest probability of living 
in an excellent school district, followed by those who are married homebuyers, 68 
percent and 53 percent, respectively (Hypothesis II-2). Married homebuyers were 
used as a reference variable. The probabilities for households who are widowed and 
single are 45 percent and 39 percent, respectively. None of these are statistically 
significant. The probabilities of living in an effective school district are 48 percent 
for single homebuyers, 40 percent for married, 28 percent for divorced, and 45 
percent for widowed.  
Hypothesis II-3 is the probability of households with a variety of income levels 
choosing an excellent school district. The income category of $55,000 -$69,999, 
which is the median income group in the sample, was used as a reference variable. 
The probabilities of homebuyers with various incomes living in a specific school 
district were estimated. The statistical results indicate that as income increases, the 
probabilities of living in an excellent school district increase. Homebuyers with 
income less than $25,000 have a high probability of living in an excellent school 
district, which may be due to the small number of respondents. Households with 
higher income than the reference have a higher probability of living in an excellent 
school district, and this is statistically significant.  
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Similar to income groups, educational attainment (Hypothesis II-4) shows a 
similar result. The higher educational background homebuyers have, the higher 
probability they live in an excellent school district. Homebuyers with less than high 
school education attainment have a 31 percent probability of choosing an excellent 
school district and a15 percent probability of choosing a continuous improvement 
school district, whereas those with post-graduate degrees have a 58 percent and a six 
percent probability of choosing an excellent or continuous improvement district, 
respectively.  
Testing the third hypothesis regarding the probability of households of different 
races choosing an excellent school district (Hypothesis II-5), Asians have the highest 
probability of living in an excellent school district at 80 percent, and only an 18 
percent probability of living in an effective school district, both statistically 
significant. African Americans are more likely to live in an effective school district, 
55 percent, and a 22 percent chance to live in an excellent school district, both of 
which are statistically significant. Whites, which are a reference category, have a 54 
percent probability of living in an excellent school district, a 39 percent chance of 
living in an effective school district, and only a seven percent chance of living in a 
continuous improvement school district. 
Unlike the results of other homebuyers‘ characteristics, the probabilities of 
homebuyers with various occupations (Hypothesis II-6) living in an excellent school 
district do not vary much, ranging from 40 percent to 62 percent. The lowest 
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probability of choosing an excellent school district is for unemployed households, 
while the highest probability is for households in construction, extraction, and 
maintenance occupations. It is interesting to note that households in construction, 
extraction, and maintenance occupations live in either a continuous improvement 
district or an excellent school district.   
Consumer school district choice is composed of various demographics, and 
revealed using the ordered logit model. Obviously, the presence of school-age 
children and race are the most distinct demographic characteristics. Homebuyers 
with school-age children have the highest probability of living in an excellent school 
district. This is consistent with the answer of homebuyers with school-age children to 
the question that school quality is important.  
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Table 5-20 Results of Hypotheses Group II: School District Choice 
 
Note:   
1. Numbers in the parentheses are wald values. The dependent variable is school district designation 
in Cuyahoga County. 
2. Occupation Categories  
Unemployment, (MPRO) management, professional, and related occupations, (SO) service 
occupations, (SOO) sales and office occupations, (CEMO) construction, extraction, and maintenance 
occupations, and (PTMO) production, transportation and material moving occupations. 
3.   * =     .10,  ** =    .05, ***=    .01 
 
Hypothesis # Hypothesis Contents 
Excepted 
Signs 
N 
Statistical 
Results 
H II-1  
School District Choice and 
Homebuyer with Children. 
With school-age children NA 196 Reference 
With no school-age children < 
reference  
- 119 -0.41*** (2.86) 
No Children  < reference - 82 -0.58*** (4.25) 
H II-2   
School District Choice and 
Homebuyer Marital status 
Married  333 Reference 
Never Married   < reference  - 29 -0.56* (1.95) 
Widowed  <   reference  - 7 -0.31 (0.17) 
Divorced  <   reference  - 24 0.64 *(1.95) 
H II-3   
School District Choice and 
Homebuyer Income 
less than 10,000 <  reference  NA 1 NA 
10,000-24,999  <   reference  - 8 1.49*** (3.87) 
25,000-39,999  <   reference  - 7 0.04 (0.005) 
40,000-54,999 <  reference  - 17 0.45 (1.19) 
55,000-69,999 + 33 Reference 
70,000-84,999 >  reference  + 51 0.51** (2.08) 
85,000-99,999 >  reference  + 56 0.60 ***(2.87) 
100,000-149,999 >  reference  + 89 1.22*** (13.23) 
150,000-199,999 >  reference  + 39 1.49*** (9.26) 
200,000 or more >  reference  + 27 1.33*** (5.20) 
H II-4   
School District Choice and 
Homebuyer Education 
some high school  <   reference  - 7 -1.01* (1.80) 
high school graduate  <   
reference  
- 28 -1.54 ***(14.26) 
some college  <  reference  - 60 -0.31 (0.99) 
college graduate  173 Reference 
Post-graduate >   reference  + 127 0.0005 (0.00) 
H II-5  
 School District Choice and 
Homebuyer Race/Ethnicity 
African American < reference  - 32 -1.43*** (14.34) 
White + 340 Reference 
Asian  <  reference - 9 1.20*** (2.96) 
some other <  reference  - 12 0.17 (0.08) 
H II-6 
School District Choice and 
Homebuyer Occupations 
Unemployed < the reference 68 - 0.30 (0.89) 
MPRO >the reference  235 NA Reference 
SO < the reference  28 - -0.21 (0.26) 
SOO < the reference  45 - 0.14 (0.18) 
CEMO < the reference  12 - -0.57 (0.98) 
PTMO< the reference  9 - -0.40 (0.37) 
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In summary, hypotheses group II was used to test different school district choices 
based on homebuyers‘ demographics and SES. The signs and magnitudes of the 
results are as expected.  Whether or not a homebuyer has school-age children is an 
important factor in choosing an excellent school district.  A homebuyer with a high 
income and a high education level is also more likely to choose an excellent school 
district, although the occupational categories are not as clear as are other 
demographics and SES.  
Another distinctive demographic characteristic is race. In particular, Asians 
consistently ranked school quality as important and are more likely to live in a high-
quality school district. These results may be affected by the fact that Asian 
respondents were more likely to be older (between 41years old and 50 years old) and 
have high school age children attending public school. Furthermore, African 
Americans addressed school quality as very important with a probability of 71 
percent; however, they have a chance of only 22 percent of living in an excellent 
school district. 
Table 5-22 displays the summary of the heterogeneous probabilities of school 
district choice according to homebuyers with different demographics and SES, using 
the ordered logit model, holding housing characteristics constant. 
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Table 5-21 Summary of Probability for Households with Different Demographic 
And Socioeconomic Status To Choose School District 
 
 Probability (CI) Probability (EF) Probability (EX) 
Presence of 
Children 
With school age children 6% 35% 59% 
With no school age children 9% 43% 48% 
No Children 10% 45% 44% 
Marital 
Status 
Single 13% 48% 39% 
Married 8% 40% 53% 
Divorced 4% 28% 68% 
Widowed 10% 45% 45% 
Race 
African American 23% 55% 22% 
White 7% 39% 54% 
Asian 2% 18% 80% 
Income 
10K_25K 4% 26% 70% 
25K_40K 14% 51% 36% 
40K_55K 9% 45% 46% 
55K_70K 14% 51% 35% 
70K_85K 9% 44% 47% 
85K_100K 8% 42% 50% 
100K_150K 5% 31% 65% 
150K_200K 3% 25% 72% 
morethan200K 4% 29% 67% 
Education 
Some High school 16% 51% 33% 
HIGH School Graduate 24% 53% 22% 
Some College 9% 42% 49% 
College graduate 7% 36% 57% 
Post-graduate 6% 36% 58% 
Occupation 
Unemployed  6% 54% 40% 
MPRO  8% 44% 48% 
SO  10% 38% 53% 
SOO  
7% 49% 44% 
CEMO  13% 25% 62% 
PTMO  11% 31% 58% 
 Note: Occupation Categories  
Unemployment, (MPRO) management, professional, and related occupations, (SO) service 
occupations, (SOO) sales and office occupations, (CEMO) construction, extraction, and 
maintenance occupations, and (PTMO) production, transportation and material moving 
occupations. 
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Taking results from ANOTA and ordered logit analysis into account, this 
dissertation indicates that consumers‘ location choice is heterogeneous and is 
affected by their preferences and interests. There are slightly different probabilities 
for heterogeneous homebuyers to state that school quality is important, although 
there are distinctive school district choices among homebuyers. The following 
section explains to what extent households are willing to pay for school quality by 
looking at their demographics and SES. Various methods are utilized to measure the 
differences in willingness to pay for school quality.   
5.3 Heterogeneous Households’ Willingness to Pay for School 
Quality 
 
 In order to measure heterogeneous willingness to pay for school quality, this 
dissertation takes two approaches: grouping heterogeneous demographics and SES as 
relatively homogeneous subgroups and applying a two-step procedure. These two 
datasets are applied to individual housing sale transactions in Cuyahoga County and 
to housing sales that are aggregated by school district throughout 14 states. 
5.3.1 Cuyahoga County Model  
5.3.1.1 Result of Cluster Analysis  
 
Cluster analysis was conducted in order to group the heterogeneous data into 
homogeneous demographic subsets. The purpose of utilizing cluster analysis in this 
study is to break down the dataset for each category (marital status, proportion with 
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school-age children, race, income, education, and occupation). Therefore, we can 
compare the magnitude of school quality for clusters representing relatively 
homogeneous household demographics and characteristics by clearly defining each 
cluster.  
Figure 5-3 White Population Distribution in Cuyahoga County 
 
 
 
 
With the 11,193 housing sales data for Cuyahoga County, heterogeneous 
households‘ willingness to pay for school quality is analyzed. Regarding households‘ 
demographics and SES in the study area, the average housing price is $162, 915, and 
the average proportion of Whites and African Americans is 84 percent and 13 
128 
 
percent, respectively. Asian and some other race account for less than two percent. 
The geographical pattern of White population distribution, as shown in Figure 5-3, is 
concentrated on the outskirts of the county. Regarding school quality, the averages 
for performance index, test scores, and value added are 95.6, 84.4, and 3.2, 
respectively, in the study area.   
This dissertation utilized dendrograms for each demographic and SES category. 
The dendrograms illustrate the distance between each observation and help 
researchers make a decision based on the cluster numbers. The decision as to how 
many clusters should be used in this dissertation was made using the dendrogram 
displayed in Figure 5-4.  
The proportion of school-age children in a census block group may have 
substantial influence on a household‘s willingness to pay for school quality. The 
proportion of school-age children is the ratio of the total population to the number of 
school-age children. There are three clusters based on the proportion of school-age 
children in a census block group. The first cluster has 4.08 percent of school-age 
children; 4,379 observations belong to the first cluster. The second cluster (4,707 
observations) has the lowest proportion of school-age children of three clusters, with 
an average of 6.96 percent. The third cluster has 10.26 percent of school-age children, 
which is the highest proportion of school-age children. The overall average of the 
proportion of school-age children is 6.46 percent. See Appendix 32.
12
  
                                                 
12
 Appendix 32 contains all tables supporting the figures in this section (5.3.1.1). 
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Figure 5-4 Dendrogram Of Proportion Of School Age Children 
 
 
There are three clusters for four marital status categories:  never married, married, 
widowed, and divorced. The hypothesis is that the married couples have more 
willingness to pay for school quality than any other household types. In other words, 
the higher the proportion of married couples, the higher the willingness to pay for 
school quality. The first cluster of marital status is characterized as married 
households, and 4,788 observations belong to this first cluster. The average 
proportion of married households is 66.3 percent. The second cluster has the highest 
proportions of households who never married among three clusters. The average 
proportion of never married is 38.9 percent in the second cluster. However, 
approximately 40 percent married households also belong to the second cluster. The 
third cluster has mixture of households who never married (26.3), married (53.3), 
widowed (9.6), and divorced (10.8). 
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In Cuyahoga County, the dominant races are White and African American, with 
overall average percentages of 83.6 percent and 12.7 percent, respectively. The 
average proportions of Asians and some other races are less than two percent—1.8 
percent and 0.4 percent, respectively.  Two clusters were grouped for race variables. 
The first cluster is defined as White population (average of 92.1%). There are 9,719 
observations belongings to this first cluster. The second cluster is more likely to be 
African American (average of 68.4 percent). For Asian and some other race, there 
are 1.9 percent and 0.4 percent for the first cluster, and 1.1 percent and 0.4 percent 
for the second cluster, respectively.  
With the median income in the census block group, income categories were 
grouped into three clusters. The overall median income of the study area is $53,937. 
The first cluster for income represents the average income group with the average 
income of $48,297, and 5,979 observations belong to this cluster. The second cluster 
is characterized as the high-income group, with an average of $78,916. The third 
cluster is the low-income group ($33,518).  
There are two clusters for education: one for high school graduate and associate‘s 
degree and the other for college and post-graduate degrees. For the educational 
clusters, the first cluster is defined as the high educational group, and the second is 
low educational group. The first cluster has 17.7 percent high school graduation, 5.4 
percent associate‘s degree, 28.4 percent bachelor‘s degree, and 21.6 percent post-
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graduate degree. The second cluster has 36.2 percent, 6.0 percent, 13.9 percent, and 
5.8 percent, respectively.  
The prevailing occupation in Cuyahoga County is management and professional 
(38.7%), followed by sales and office (29.9 %), production and transportation 
(12.4 %), and service occupations (12.3 %). The smallest occupation is construction 
(6.7%). Due to the fact that households with various occupations are dispersed across 
the county, it is very difficult to define the clusters. However, the first cluster has a 
higher proportion of sales and office occupations (35.6%). The second cluster show a 
mixed proportion of occupation. The third cluster represents management and 
professional occupations, with an average of 60.9 percent. The fourth cluster can be 
defined as construction and production occupations, with averages of 9.2 and 21.6 
percent, respectively.  
Due to the lack of individual data for households‘ demographics and SES, cluster 
analysis was used. There are 18 clusters representing each demographic and SES 
group. It is hard to say that these clusters behave as individuals, but it is assumed that 
they have a relatively homogeneous willingness to pay for school quality. The 
willingness to pay for school quality of households in each cluster is interpreted as a 
household collective willingness to pay. Detailed housing prices, median income, 
and school quality are summarized in Table 5-22. 
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Table 5-22 Summary of Cluster Housing Prices, Average Income, and School 
Quality 
 
    
Housing 
price 
($) 
Average 
Income 
($) 
10
th
 
grade 
math 
Performance 
Index 
Value 
Added 
Expenditure 
Per pupil 
($) 
Teacher 
Salary 
($) 
Overall  173,275 55,049 84.4 83.1 3.2 11,316 57,575 
Proportion 
of school-
age 
children 
Cluster 
1 160,562 51,369 94.7 86.0 3.1 11,131 59,212 
Cluster 
2 165,488 55,079 96.6 83.4 3.2 11,570 58,868 
Cluster 
3 162,059 56,724 95.1 93.3 3.0 11,254 56,572 
Marital 
status 
Cluster 
1 195,984 66,913 88.9 99.5 2.7 11,360 58,221 
Cluster 
2 127,811 37,972 89.7 89.7 4.2 12,061 59,643 
Cluster 
3 141,123 46,004 82.7 93.5 3.3 10,997 57,606 
Race 
Cluster 
1 169,437 55,660 86.8 97.2 2.9 11,081 58,163 
Cluster 
2 119,912 56,852 68.3 85.1 5.0 12,642 56,852 
Income 
Cluster 
1 310,491 122,503 89.6 102.8 1.7 10,961 56,316 
Cluster 
2 135,126 43,227 81.8 93.0 3.4 11,026 56,667 
Cluster 
3 208,267 70,069 89.5 100.6 2.8 11,561 60,078 
Education 
Cluster 
1 206,126 68,492 87.4 99.5 2.8 12,328 61,005 
Cluster 
2 137,841 45,492 82.6 93.3 3.4 10,682 56,240 
Occupation 
Cluster 
1 133,699 44,441 83.5 93.7 3.1 10,639 56,183 
Cluster 
2 176,386 56,992 88.4 98.6 2.9 11,117 59,992 
Cluster 
3 230,836 76,784 86.4 99.7 2.7 13,208 62,348 
Cluster 
4 117,191 40,662 76.6 89.1 4.2 10,689 54,626 
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5.3.1.2 Results of Regression of the County Model  
 
 
 With 11,193 individual housing sale transaction data in Cuyahoga County, the 
spatial hedonic price model was used to estimate household willingness to pay for 
school quality. The R
2
 of the input model is 72.4 percent and those of the outcome 
models of test and value added are slightly higher than the input model, 72.5 percent 
for each. The highest R
2
 is 72.6 percent for the performance index model. The λ 
(spatial error variable) is statistically significant.  
Table 5- 23a Result of the Spatial Hedonic model in Cuyahoga County
13
 
 
Variables Input Model 
Performance 
Index Test Value-added 
CONSTANT 6.48
**
(38.20)  6.32 
**
 (37.81)  6.43 
**
 (38.36)  6.62
**
 (37.25) 
LOG_LIVO 0.40 
**
(37.89) 0.40
**
 (38.26) 0.40
**
 (38.35) 0.40
**
 (37.99) 
LOG_LOT 0.08
**
(14.57) 0.07
**
 (13.22) 0.07
**
 (13.95) 0.08
**
 (14.06) 
AGE -0.004
**
(-25.62) -0.003
**
(-24.62) -0.003
**
 (-24.45) -0.0036
**
 (-24.79) 
BASESQFT 0.00007
**
(13.59) 0.0001
**
(14.15) 0.00007
**
(13.95) 0.00007
**
(13.67) 
BEDROOMS 0.01
**
(2.38) 0.01
**
 (2.41) 0.01
**
 (2.43) 0.01
**
 (2.34) 
BATHS 0.06
**
 (10.76) 0.06
**
 (10.89) 0.06
**
 (11.01) 0.06
**
 (10.80) 
FIREPL 0.04
**
 (8.52) 0.04
**
 (8.48) 0.04
**
 (8.49) 0.04
**
 (8.59) 
GARSIZE 0.00017
**
(10.02) 0.0002
**
 (9.97) 0.0002
**
 (9.79) 0.0002
**
 (9.86) 
P_WHITE 0.002
**
 (15.02) 0.0016
**
 (9.47) 0.0016
**
 (8.13) 0.0023
**
 (13.49) 
P_MARR 0.001
**
 (2.67) 0.0011
**
 (2.51) 0.0012
**
 (2.76) 0.0012
**
 (2.65) 
P_HIGH -0.004
**
 (-9.79) -0.003
**
 (-8.54) -0.004
**
 (-9.41) -0.00 4
**
 (-10.03) 
TAXRATE -1.52 (-1.36) -0.59 (-0.54) -0.29 (-0.26) -2.20
*
 (-1.93) 
D_CBD 0.0041
**
 (3.35) 0.0032
**
 (2.75) 0.0035
**
 (2.98) 0.0041
**
 (3.41) 
SQ_D_CBD 0.0001 (0.75) -0.0001 (-0.94) 0.00001 (-0.10 ) 0.0001 (1.10) 
P_OWNER_OC -0.11
**
 (-4.98 ) -0.10
**
 (-4.67 ) -0.10
**
 (-4.88) -0.10
**
 (-4.77 ) 
DENSITY 0.15
**
 (3.71) 0.13
**
 (3.11) 0.14
**
 (3.39) 0.15
**
 (3.59) 
D_WATER 0.07
**
 (5.03) 0.08
**
 (6.39) 0.08
**
 (5.68) 0.07
**
 (5.36) 
LOG_INCOME 0.10
**
 (6.38) 0.09
**
 (5.75) 0.09
**
 (5.76) 0.10
**
 (6.04) 
EXPENDITURE 0.000003(1.20) 0.00001
**
(4.24) 0.000008
**
(3.32) 0.000004 (1.64) 
EXPERIENCE -0.01
**
 (-4.84) -0.01
**
 (-5.53 ) -0.01
**
 (-4.63) -0.01
**
 (-5.37) 
SALARY 0.00001
**
(11.46) 0.000007
**
(5.64) 0.00001
**
 (7.63) 0.00001
**
(10.65) 
 
                                                 
13
 The detailed description is displayed in Appendix 6a.  
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Table 5-23b Result of the Spatial Hedonic model in Cuyahoga County 
(Cont.) 
 
Variables Input Model 
Performance 
Index Test Value-added 
PI56  
0.007** 
(9.51)   
TEST   0.004** (7.71)  
VALUE 
ADDED    
-0.005** (-
2.61) 
λ 0.41** (19.96) 0.37** (17.70) 0.38** (18.46) 0.40** (19.69) 
 
R
2 
72.4 % 72.6% 72.5% 72.5% 
Log likelihood 1227.95 1271.03 1256.76 1231.34 
Note:  Numbers in the parentheses are t-values. The dependent variable is log of housing price in 2006. 
 
   * =    .05, ** =    .01 
 
In the Cuyahoga County model (Hypotheses Group III), the overall willingness 
of households to pay for school quality is positive (Hypothesis III-1). In particular, 
households‘ willingness to pay for the performance index is 5.3 percent of housing 
prices, which is $8,567 at average housing prices of $162,915. The test model is 
similar to the performance index model but slightly lower, that is, $6,799. The value-
added model indicates negative willingness to pay at -$1,791, all of which are 
statistically significant at the 99 percent confidence interval.  
Table 5-24 Households’ Willingness to Pay for School Quality 
 
Mean of 
housing 
prices 
Median 
Income 
Performance 
Index TEST Value-Added 
% $ % $ % $ 
$162,915 $53,937 5.3***  8,567 4.2*** 6,799 -1.1*** -1,791 
   Note  : * =     .10, **  =    .05,*** =    .01 
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As shown in Table 5-23, seventy two models were run separately for each cluster. 
Overall, the R
2
 values for input models are less than the output models. The largest 
R
2
 is 76.4 percent for the first cluster of household martial status, which has 61.3 
percent of married households. On the contrary, the smallest R
2
 is 39.4 percent for 
the race cluster 2, which is characterized as African American, 68.4 percent. The 
detailed R
2
 and log likelihood values are displayed in the table.  
Table 5-25 Summary of R
2
 and Log Likelihood for Four School Quality Model 
 
  
Input 
Performance 
Index TEST Value-Added 
R
2
 
Log 
likelihood         R
2
Log 
likelihood         R
2
Log 
likelihood         R
2
Log 
likelihood         
Overall  72.4 1227.95 
 
72.6 
 
1271.03 72.5 1256.76 72.5 1231.34 
Proportion 
of school 
age children 
C1 69.92 438.65 69.99 445.66 69.95 441.37 69.94 439.99 
C2 75.20 659.10 75.38 684.56 75.34 679.56 75.21 661.12 
C3 72.18 194.39 72.35 203.19 63.93 126.64 72.40 205.00 
marital 
Status 
C1 76.3 964.31 76.4 977.50 76.4 969.82 76.3 964.40 
C2 49.5 -45.22 49.6 -45.75 49.6 -45.80 49.6 -45.28 
C3 61.6 483.91 61.6 509.51 61.6 505.99 61.4 486.35 
Race 
C1 74.3 1537.12 74.4 1581.76 74.4 1563.76 74.3 1541.34 
C2 39.4 -126.09 39.5 -125.91 39.6 -124.67 39.5 -1254.83 
Income 
C1 60.25 809.52 60.53 836.29 60.47 830.89 60.25 809.85 
C2 67.69 325.59 67.81 337.37 67.72 329.39 67.76 330.89 
C3 52.30 226.04 52.43 229.68 52.47 230.29 52.30 226.07 
Education 
C1 68.4 80.28 68.6 101.45 68.5 90.91 68.4 80.39 
C2 65.1 1376.17 65.4 1415.03 65.3 1407.22 65.1 1376.61 
Occupation 
C1 54.9 643.53 55.5 667.69 55.4 665.54 54.9 644.23 
C2 67.7 539.99 67.8 548.96 67.8 545.43 67.7 540.47 
C3 67.3 4.59 67.5 10.27 67.4 6.87 67.3 4.65 
C4 51.0 312.60 51.4 321.28 51.4 320.37 51.1 313.13 
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Regarding the proportion of school-age children clusters, the R
2
 ranges from the 
lowest of 63.93 percent to the highest of 75.38 percent. The signs and magnitudes of 
housing characteristics variables—age, basement size, number of bedrooms, 
fireplaces, and so on—are consistent with other studies and are statistically 
significant.  
 The school input variables—expenditure per pupil, teacher experience, and 
teacher salary—have small effects on housing prices. The signs of expenditure per 
pupil and teacher salary are positive and statistically significant at the 95 percent 
confidence interval. Teacher experience is negative and statistically significant, 
holding others constant.  
Regarding the performance index model for the proportion of school-age children, 
the highest R
2
 is 75.38 percent for the second cluster. The signs of performance index 
are positive and statistically significant as expected. The magnitudes of these 
coefficients are 0.007, 0.004, and 0.007 for each cluster. These coefficients of the 
performance index can be interpreted as the collective willingness to pay of 
households in a block group.  
To test Hypothesis III-2, households in the first cluster, which has 4.08 percent of 
school-aged children in a block group, are willing to pay 5.3 percent of their housing 
price for school quality, accounting for $8,589 of the average housing price of 
$160,562. Households in the second cluster, which has an average of 6.96 percent 
school-age children, has a willingness to pay $4,953, accounting for 3.1 percent of 
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their housing prices at $165,488 mean housing price for school quality. The result of 
the third cluster, which has the highest proportion of school-age children in a block 
group, shows households in this cluster are willing to pay 5.2 percent of their 
housing prices, accounting for $8,378 at a mean housing price of $162,059.  
 The results of the test model are similar to the performance index model, 
although households‘ willingness to pay for test scores are less than those of the 
performance index model. Households‘ willingness to pay for test scores in the first, 
second, and third clusters are 1.9 percent ($3,033), 5.4 percent ($8,747), and 1.4 
percent ($2,229), respectively. The average percentage of school-age children in the 
base model is 6.46, and willingness to pay for test scores in the base model is $6,798. 
Interestingly, households with school-age children care about test scores, rather than 
performance index. The signs of value added are negative in all models, except the 
first cluster with the average of 4.08 percent school-age children in a block group, 
holding other factors constant. The willingness to pay for value added, therefore, is 
negative: 1.0 percent ($1,555), -1.3 percent ($2,164), and -4.8 percent (-$7,652), 
respectively.  
Table 5-26 Results of proportion of School-age Children Cluster Model 
 
  
Mean  of 
Proportion of 
school age 
children 
Mean of 
housing 
prices 
($) 
Performance 
Index TEST Value-Added 
% $ % $ % $ 
C1 4.08% 165,562 5.3*** 8,589 1.9** 3,033 1.0** 1,555 
C2 6.96% 165,488 3.1***  4,953 5.4 *** 8,747 -1.3* -2,164 
C3 10.26% 162,059 5.2*** 8,378 1.4  2,229 -4.8 -7,652 
Note :   * =     .10,  **  =    .05, *** =    .01 
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As mentioned previously and shown in the results of the ANOTA and the ordered 
logit model, households‘ marital status affects the preference for school quality and 
school district choice. Therefore, it is assumed that married households have a 
greater willingness to pay for school quality than households who never married.  
Hypothesis III-3 is that households who are married have higher willingness to 
pay for school quality than any other types of households including single, divorced, 
and widowed. The marginal willingness of households in the first cluster (married 
households) to pay for the performance index is $7,547, for test scores, $4,887, and 
for value added, $382. The second cluster is characterized as never married (single), 
and their willingness to pay for school quality is lower than the first cluster that has 
more married households. The third cluster is mixed and has more widowed 
households. The results of the third cluster indicate the lowest willingness to pay for 
school quality: $665 for the performance index, $963 for the test scores, and -$911 
for value added. The detailed results are described in Table 5-25 below.  
Table 5-27 Results of Marital Status Cluster Model 
 
  
Mean  of 
Proportion 
of married 
(%) 
Mean  of 
Proportion 
of never 
married 
(%) 
Mean of 
housing 
prices 
($) 
Performance 
Index TEST Value-Added 
% $ % $ % $ 
C1 61.28 22.46 188,040 4.7*** 8,621 3.9*** 7,088 -0.9 -1,593 
C2 35.54 46.28 160,886 2.0 2,685 2.2 2,869 -0.6 -791 
C3 43.89 31.87 168,971 0.5*** 665 0.7*** 963 -0.7** -911 
Note  :   * =     .10,  ** =    .05, ***=    .01 
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In general, there is a positive correlation between household income and 
willingness to pay for school quality (Hypothesis III-4). The statistical results of the 
income models support this statement. The average income in the base model of the 
county is $53,937, and the average willingness to pay for the performance index is 
5.3 percent ($8,567 of their housing prices) and test scores is 4.2 percent ($6,799 of 
their housing prices). 
 In comparison, the average income of the first cluster of block groups is $48,297, 
and their willingness to pay for the performance index is slightly lower at 4.6 percent 
($6,657 of their housing prices) and for test score results is 4.1 percent ($5,944 of 
their housing prices). The second cluster of block groups has an average income of 
$78,916, their willingness to pay for the performance index is 5.0 percent ($11,233 
of their housing prices), and for test score results is 3.0 percent ($6,744 of their 
housing prices). Households living in the third cluster of block groups have an 
average income of $33, 518, and their willingness to pay for the performance index 
is 3.0 percent ($3,597 of their housing prices) and for test score results is 3.4 percent 
($4,116 of their housing prices). 
Table 5-28 Results of Income Cluster Model 
 
  
Mean  of 
income 
($) 
Mean of 
housing 
prices  ($) 
Performance 
Index TEST 
Value 
Added 
% $ % $ % $ 
C1                              48,297 145,264 4.6*** 6,657 4.1*** 5,944 0.4                                    621 
C2 78,916 226,379 5.0*** 11,233 3.0*** 6,744 -2.2*** -4,937 
C3 33,518 120,374 3.0*** 3,597 3.4*** 4,116 -0.3 -306 
Note :   * =     .10,  ** =    .05, ***=    .01 
140 
 
There are two clusters for the education groups: the first cluster characterized as 
high educated households and the second as low educated. As expected, the higher 
proportion of highly educated households in a block group, the higher willingness to 
pay for school quality, except for value added (Hypothesis III-5). The magnitudes of 
performance index are 0.0099 and 0.0069 for each cluster. They can be interpreted 
that households in the first cluster have a willingness to pay $13,579 and those in the 
second cluster, $7,590. The results of the test model are similar, $10,453 and $6,610 
for the first and second, respectively.  The results of value added indicate household 
negative willingness to pay as in other models: -0.3% (-$635) and -0.5% (-$623), 
although the value added is not statistically significant.  
Table 5-29 Results of Education Cluster Model 
 
  
Mean  of 
proportion 
of high 
school 
degree  
Mean  of 
proportion 
of 
bachelor 
and post- 
graduation 
Mean of 
housing 
prices 
($) 
Performance 
Index 
TEST Value  
Added 
% $ % $ % $ 
C1 17.7% 50.0% 206,126 6.6*** 
 
13,579  5.1*** 
 
10,453  -0.3 - 635 
C2 36.2% 19.7 % 137,841 5.5***  7,590 4.8***  6,610  -0.5 -623 
Note :   * =     .10,  ** =    .05, ***=    .01 
 
Regarding race variables (Hypothesis III-6), there are two clusters: the first 
cluster (Whites) and the second cluster (African American). The R
2
 ranges from the 
lowest 39.4 percent to the highest 74.4 percent. The signs of teacher experience are 
negative for both first and second cluster models, while those of teachers‘ salary and 
expenditure per pupil are positive and statistically significant, with the exception of 
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the expenditure per pupil variable for the second cluster. Results show that 
households‘ willingness to pay for performance index in the first cluster is $9,151, 
which is higher than the average, and $1,324 in the second cluster, which is lower 
than the average. For test scores, households in the first cluster are willing to pay 
$6,832 and those in the second cluster, $2,558. The value added model, however, 
indicates negative willingness to pay, -$2,219 and -$2,327, respectively.  
Table 5-30 Results of Race Cluster Model 
 
  
Mean  of 
Proportion 
of white 
(%) 
Mean of 
Proportion 
of  
African 
American 
Mean  
of 
housing 
prices 
($) 
Performance 
Index TEST Value-Added 
 % $ % $ % $ 
C1 93.1 4.2% 169,437 5.4*** 9,150 4.0*** 6,832 -1.3*** -2,219 
C2 27.9 68.4% 119,911 1.1 1,324 2.1* 2,558 -1.9 -2,327 
Note  :   * =     .10,  ** =    .05, *** =    .01 
 
This dissertation includes the occupational variable (Hypothesis III-7) as a proxy 
for human capital. Four models of occupational clusters were run. Households 
belonging to the third cluster, the highest proportion of management occupation 
(60.9%), have the highest willingness to pay for school quality in terms of dollar 
amount. The result of what percent of housing prices households are willing to pay 
for school quality indicates that the first-cluster households have a higher willingness 
to pay for school quality.  
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Table 5-31 Results of Occupation Cluster Model 
 
 
Mean of the 
proportion  
of 
management 
occupation 
Mean 
of 
income 
($) 
Mean of 
housing 
prices 
 ($) 
Performance 
Index TEST 
Value 
Added 
% $ % $ % $ 
C1 28.9% 44,441 133,699 5.3***  7,122 5.0*** 6,740 -0.9 -1,175 
C2 42.9% 56,992 176,386 3.3*** 5,741 2.8*** 4,872 0.5  967 
C3 60.9% 76,784 230,836 4.8*** 11,160 3.1**  7,133 -0.3 - 753 
C4 24.6% 40,662 117,190 4.2***  4,971 3.8*** 4,474 -0.8 -959 
Note  :   * =     .10,  ** =    .05, *** =    .01 
 
In summary, the average willingness of households to pay for performance index 
in the base model is 5.3 percent of their housing prices. As expected, households‘ 
willingness to pay for school quality is heterogeneous. For instance, households with 
a high proportion of school-aged children, high income, and high education have a 
high willingness to pay for performance index. White households are also highly 
willing to pay for performance index. 
Interestingly, although households in the highest income cluster were expected to 
have the highest willingness to pay for school quality, those in the second highest 
income cluster ($70,068) have a higher willingness to pay than the highest income 
cluster. This result may be due to the small number of households in the high income 
cluster and a small standard deviation of performance index. It is also noteworthy 
that households in a block group with a mixture of public and private school children 
have higher willingness to pay for performance index than those in the block group 
that has many school-age children in public school.  
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5.3.1.3 Diagnostics 
 
The diagnostic tests applied in this dissertation are the normality test, 
multicollinearity test, non-linearity test, and heteroscedasticity test. Without various 
tests, the parameters estimated by the model are not reliable and violate the 
properties of regression that are a linear function of independent variables in the 
model and unbiased estimates with least variances. The graphing method is utilized 
to test normality, mulitcollinearity, non-linearity, and heteroscedasticity.  Regarding 
spatial autocorrelation, Moran‘s I plot, particularly, is applied along with the value of 
Moran‘s I.  
Figure 5-5 Result of Normality Test 
 
                                
 
First, the assumption of the ordinary least squares model, normality of residuals 
distribution, was tested. The graphical method was utilized as shown in Figure 5-5.  
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Figure 5-6 Result of Heteroscedasticity Test 
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The heteroscedasticity test detects whether the model goes against the 
assumption of homoscedasticity that is equal variance. The graphical method was 
utilized to illustrate the pattern of residuals. As shown in Figure 5-6, there is a 
systematical pattern in residual.  
The spatial autocorrelation problem is that there is a systematic residual pattern 
due to the spatial autocorrelation. The presence of spatial autocorrelation can be 
detected by Moran‘s I test, which is based on residuals in the model, that is; 
I = e
‘
We/e
‘
e 
where e is a vector of the regression residuals, and W is a spatial weight matrix. 
Moran‘s I can be visualized as the slope in the scatter plot with the spatial weighted 
error versus the unweighted error. The slope of the regression line indicates the 
Moran‘s I statistics. See Figure 5-7.  
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Figure 5-7 Result of Moran’s I Test 
 
 
 
Another approach to test the spatial autocorrelation problem is the LM test.  The 
LM test is applied to test for two types of misspecification of the model due to either 
the omission of a spatial autoregressive or the omission of a spatially lagged 
dependent variable. The LM test statistic for the detection of residual spatial 
autocorrelation has the following form:  
2
2
1 R
R
m
kn

      (5-1) 
Multicollinearity problems arise when there are linear relationships among 
independent variables. The multicollinearity problem causes biased estimates 
generated in the model.  In order to detect the multicollinearity problem, the variance 
inflation factor (VIF) is used as an indicator of multicollinearity.  If the VIF value of 
a variable is greater than ten, we can say there is a multicollinearity problem. For 
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example, although there were initially 18 independent variables used in the model, 
the variables of age and age squared have high VIF values; therefore. the age 
variables were removed. The VIF test also shows that other variables have no 
multicollinearity problems: the VIF ranges from 1.03 to 3.51. 
5.3.2 Results of the National Model 
 
The national model was used to estimate collective willingness to pay in a school 
district in 14 states. The first step (called the hedonic model) is to estimate household 
marginal willingness to pay for school quality for each state. The amount of 
household marginal willingness to pay for school quality is estimated by multiplying 
the marginal willingness to pay by the standard deviation.  This was used as the 
dependent variable in the second step procedure (called the heterogeneous 
willingness to pay model). The amount of willingness to pay is a function of 
household demographics and SES (Bajari & Kahn, 2005). The detailed results of 
each step follow. 
5.3.2.1 Result of the Hedonic Price Model  
 
The results of the first step of the hedonic price model indicate the positive 
relationship between housing prices and school quality variables. The detailed results 
of the hedonic price model are described in Appendix 35. The R
2
 for each state 
model ranges from 76.8 percent to 92.4 percent, which are highly satisfactory. There 
are no spatial autocorrelation and multicollinearity problems in the national model.   
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Unexpectedly, the signs of percentage of homeownership are negative and 
overall statistically significant (13 out of 14 states). These results reflect the fact that 
the median housing prices used in this dissertation are not single-family detached 
housing prices, but are all kinds of housing types, including multi-family housing 
and attached.  
The variable of vacancy rates is not statistically significant, and they are negative 
overall. The percentage of detached housing has mixed impacts. It is positive in 
Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and Washington, which is statistically significant at the 
95 percent confidence interval, while it is negative in California and Illinois, all both 
of which are statistically significant.   
It is of interest to note that income
14
 has substantial influence on willingness to 
pay for school quality in the national model as opposed to the results of the 
Cuyahoga County model. The coefficients of income have a small effect in the 
models, but those are statistically significant at the 95 percent confidence interval 
and have very high t-values ranging from 26.48 to 3.10.  
The variable of housing age is negative overall and statistically significant. 
Unlike the county model, tax rate is positively related to housing prices. The variable 
of density, which is a proxy for lot size, has mixed and is statistically significant 
overall. 
 
 
                                                 
14
 The income variable is standardized as same as the z scores. 
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Table 5-32 Descriptive Statistics of the National Model 
 
States 
# of  
school 
districts 
Housing 
prices 
 ($) RAMP 
Std. 
RAMP 
%  
WTP 
Avg. 
WTP  
($) Rank 
Massachusetts  193 205,624 57.2 13.43 10.7
***
 (4.48) 22,496 1 
New Jersey  198 190,176 72.23 14.49 11.6
***
 (5.55) 22,050 2 
Rhode Island  24 149,592 51.38 11.84 13.0
**
 (2.10) 19,485 3 
California  249 207,965 43.41 15.46 9.3
***
 (4.82) 19,327 4 
Colorado  34 148,400 80.26 8.51 10.2
**
 (2.29) 15,089 5 
Washington  129 147,118 49.11 10.32 9.3
***
 (5.47) 13,683 6 
Delaware  16 112,913 66.13 7.26 8.7
***
 (2.64) 9,839 7 
Michigan  316 113,216 66.36 11.47 5.7
***
 (5.53) 5,308 8 
Texas  421 70,373 79.93 7.39 5.2
***
 (5.03) 3,631 9 
Arkansas  93 65,040 41.67 10.86 5.5
***
 (2.56) 3,551 10 
Pennsylvania  414 100,083 60.36 11.17 3.4
***
 (4.42) 3,362 11 
Indiana  206 94,604 70.47 7.43 2.9
***
 (3.20) 2,787 12 
Illinois  173 98,079 66.88 9.15 2.7
***
 (1.93) 2,686 13 
South 
Carolina  65 74,617 26.69 9.79 2.0 (0.81) 1,463 14 
Note  :   * =     .10,  ** =    .05, *** =    .01 
 
The school quality variables, RAMP, salary, expenditure per pupil, and test 
scores were used as the measures of school quality. School outcomes, test scores, 
RAMP are a better measure of school quality in terms of R
2
, t-values and the 
magnitudes of coefficients. The school quality output measure of RAMP is 
statistically significant in most of the states (11 out of 14), while the input measures 
are not statistically significant.  Table 5-30 shows the number of school districts, the 
average housing prices, and RAMP, and the average willingness to pay for school 
quality. The rank is in an order of willingness to pay for school quality in dollars.  
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By applying the methodology set forth by Black (1999), the implicit prices of 
RAMP are recovered as shown in Table 5-30. The highest willingness to pay for 
RAMP in dollars is in Massachusetts, while states with the highest willingness to pay 
for school quality are Rhode Island (13.0%), New Jersey (11.6%), and Massachusetts 
(10.7%) in terms of the proportion of housing price. The states with the lowest 
willingness to pay for school quality are South Carolina (2.0%, $1,463), Illinois 
(2.7%, $2,686), and Indiana (2.9%, $2,787). 
5.3.2.2 Result of Heterogeneous Willingness to Pay Model   
 
The model of the second stage is designed to find the heterogeneous willingness 
to pay for school quality across school districts with the presence of school-age 
children, marital status, income, education, race, and occupation. For each model of 
willingness to pay for school quality, since the price of school quality is standardized, 
the variance in tax rate and income in each school district were controlled in the 
model. The national model was used to test Hypothesis IV. 
Due to the large differences in the housing market and the implicit prices of 
school quality in each state, this dissertation also standardized the implicit school 
quality prices by the same logic of z-value, which is the difference to the mean 
divided by standard deviation. It is a necessary process for this model when dealing 
with states that have large variations in housing prices. 
Regarding marital status, the R
2
 is 74.8 percent, and adjusted R
2
 is 74.8 percent. 
While the tax rate in this model is negative and is not statistically significant, the 
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variable of income is positive and has a high t-value (67.42).  There are four 
categories: never married, now married, widowed, and divorced.  Although the 
magnitude of never married coefficient is small and is not statistically significant, the 
signs of those variables are positive. Unexpectedly, other variables are negative and 
statistically significant at the 95 percent confidence interval.  
Since there is a multicollinearity problem, the race model cannot test Whites and 
African Americans simultaneously, so two models were run separately. The first 
model tests the White population‘s willingness to pay for school quality. The positive 
sign implies that the higher proportion of Whites in a school district, the more they 
are willing to pay for school quality. Interestingly, a school district with a high 
proportion of Asians has a greater willingness to pay for school quality than one with 
Whites. Households living in a school district with some other race and African 
Americans have less willingness to pay for school quality.  
The adjusted R
2 
of the education model is 78.2 percent. As expected, education is 
an important determinant of willingness to pay for school quality. The variables of a 
high school graduate and associate‘s degree have negative signs, while the variables 
of higher education—bachelor‘s or post-graduate degree—have positive signs, 
respectively. 
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Table 5-33 Statistical Results of the National Model  
 
Demographics 
and SES Variables Estimate t-value R
2
 
Adjusted 
R
2
 F 
Marital Status 
(Constant) 1.766 10.768 74.84% 74.78% 1251.14 
P_Never married 0.000 0.886    
P_Now married -0.024 -11.417    
P_Widowed -0.012 -2.335    
P_Divorced -0.020 -3.995    
TAX_RATE 0.000 0.187    
income 0.915 67.418    
Race 
(Constant) -0.106 -1.243 73.30% 73.25% 1386.63 
P_ White 0.002 2.202    
P_ Asian 0.013 4.783    
P_ some other -0.002 -1.486    
TAX_RATE 0.000 -1.216    
income 0.839 72.959    
Education 
(Constant)   78.29% 78.24% 1516.91 
P_High schools -0.005 -3.306    
P_Associate degree -0.035 -7.044    
P_Bachelor  0.015 5.016    
P_postgraduate 0.033 8.685    
TAX_RATE -0.002 -5.149    
Standardized_income 0.691 52.265    
Income 
(Constant) -1.169 -2.646 64.49% 64.39% 654.64 
P_10,000_24,999 -0.029 -3.655    
P_25,000_39,999 0.020 2.852    
P_40,000_59,999 0.020 3.311    
P_60,000_99,999 0.023 3.950    
P_100,000_149,000 0.008 1.000    
P_more than 150,000 0.129 21.312    
TAX_RATE -0.007 -13.459    
Occupation 
(Constant) 0.039 0.138 75.90% 75.82% 992.59 
P_management 0.012 5.940    
P_education  -0.017 -2.512    
P_service 0.002 0.450    
P_sales -0.011 -2.939    
P_construction -0.012 -2.622    
P_production -0.003 -0.979    
TAX_RATE -0.002 -4.272    
income 0.739 45.858    
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Similar to the result of the education model, income is one of the best measures 
of willingness to pay in the national model.  The R
2 
is 64.5 percent and F-value is 
654.64. Households in a school district with a median income of $10,000 to $25,999 
have less willingness to pay for school quality than households with the higher 
income. It is also worthwhile to note that the higher the income, the higher the 
willingness to pay for school quality, holding other variables constant.  This result is 
opposed to the findings of the county model.  
Regarding the occupation variables, the results indicate that households who live 
in a school district in management (statistically significant) and service (statistically 
not significant) occupations in a school district show positive willingness to pay, 
while the others show negatively. The detailed results are displayed in Table 5-31. 
In summary, the results of the national model are different from those of the 
individual model. Marital status is not important, while income and education are the 
most influential variables for willingness to pay for school quality. The different 
results may result from geographical variances in each state in terms of housing 
prices and school quality.     
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
This dissertation was motivated by idea that there is a heterogeneous influence of 
school quality on households of varying demographics and socioeconomic status 
(SES).  Household demographics and SES include the presence of school-age 
children, marital status, income, race, education, and occupation. This dissertation 
analyzed the supporting evidence, which includes: 
 heterogeneous preference; 
 school district choice in an excellent school district; and 
 willingness to pay for school quality. 
 By applying various statistical methodologies, my dissertation was developed to 
find new approaches to modeling preference for school quality and the role of school 
quality on homebuyers‘ school district choices using the discrete choice model, and 
estimated the heterogeneous willingness to pay for school quality in Cuyahoga 
County and 14 states in the United States using the hedonic models.  
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This final chapter starts with the summary of the study, including the purpose of 
the study and the research question. The summary of research design is discussed in 
the next section (Section 6.3); followed by four groups of hypotheses regarding 
household‘s preference, school district choice, and willingness to pay for school 
quality. The major findings from the analyses used in this dissertation are addressed 
and the limitations and the conclusions of this dissertation are also stated, as well as 
policy implications.  
6.2 Summary of Study 
 
 The purpose of this dissertation is to examine the role of school quality on 
homebuyers‘ preference in location decisions and willingness to pay. When 
homebuyers make a decision to buy a house, they choose a community with either 
good school quality or a lesser school quality.  They also choose how much they are 
willing to pay for the quality of the public school education. This study focuses on 
homebuyers‘ heterogeneous preferences for school quality, school district choices, 
and willingness to pay for school quality, based on homebuyers‘ demographics and 
SES. 
Household preference, school district choice, and willingness to pay are mosaics 
of the local housing market and affect housing prices among regions. In other words, 
variances in household preference, school district choice, and willingness to pay lead 
to housing price differences among regions, as well as regional economic fortunes.  
Differences in housing prices in a region would reflect heterogeneous households‘ 
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willingness to pay for the quality of public services and school quality, holding other 
variables constant. In addition, differences in household preference, school district 
choice, and willingness to pay result in heterogeneous demographic backgrounds and 
SES. This dissertation inquired which types of households care more about school 
quality. 
The study was designed around three research questions: (1) Which homebuyers 
care about school quality when purchasing a house?, (2) Which homebuyers choose 
school districts with high school quality or low school quality?, and (3) How much 
are homebuyers willing to pay for better school quality? Which variables of school 
quality are most valued? 
The research questions designed for this study lead to the development of three 
groups of hypotheses: the first group of hypotheses tests for homebuyers‘ preference 
of school quality. The second group of hypotheses tests homebuyers‘ school district 
choice. The third group of hypotheses tests homebuyers‘ willingness to pay for 
school quality. The last hypothesis IV is to compare the Cuyahoga County model to 
the national model.  
6.3 Summary of Hypotheses Tests 
 
 
This study was motivated by an idea that the utility derived from school quality 
might be different for each household. The lack of individual information led this 
research to develop survey data and various methodologies. Three methodological 
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approaches to modeling are to measure heterogeneous preference, school district 
choice, and willingness to pay. 
6.3.1 Hypotheses Group I 
 
I used three approaches to modeling homebuyers‘ preference for school quality in 
order to test the Hypothesis Group I. Homebuyer‘s preference can be defined as their 
actual preference, and three hypotheses were used to determine their preference. The 
first approach to examining school quality preference is to test the first hypothesis 
that ―Public School Quality‖ is the most important factor for homebuyers among a 
given location choice set. The second approach is to explore to what extent 
homebuyers consider school quality important. The last approach is to define the 
measure of school quality homebuyers take into account when purchasing a home.  
In previous studies, the relationship between school quality and housing prices is 
positive. School quality is considered a key factor affecting housing prices in a 
region. Many studies have quantitatively analyzed not only the positive relationship 
but also the measures of school quality which are most correlated with housing prices.  
Homebuyers were asked whether or not school quality is the most important 
determinant of housing prices and what measure of school quality was considered 
when homebuyers purchased a house. To test the hypothesis, this dissertation directly 
asked homebuyers who purchased a home in Cuyahoga County in 2006.   
The detailed results of the first group of hypotheses are as follows. First, the 
result of the location factors homebuyers think are the most important are stated. 
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Second, the analysis of the degree of the importance of school quality is addressed. 
Lastly the measure of school quality homebuyers considered is discussed. 
6.3.1.1 Result of Location Factors 
 
When given a reason for buying a house, ―location‖ was the most important 
factor for homebuyers. The second most important location factor was ―public school 
quality.‖  The probabilities of choosing location were high across almost all 
homebuyer demographics and SES (income, education, race, marital status, the 
presence of school-age children, and occupation).  The higher the probability of a 
homebuyer choosing location as the most important factor, the more likely the 
household is higher income, higher education, and White. Interestingly, the 
probabilistic results for the presence of school-age children and Asian are distinctive 
from those of other demographics and SES features. The probability of choosing 
public school quality for homebuyers with school-age children is 43 percent, while 
the probability of these households choosing location is 27 percent, both of which are 
statistically significant at the 95 percent confidence interval. On the contrary, the 
probability for households without children choosing public school quality is only 
four percent, while the probability of these households choosing location is 54 
percent, both of which are statistically significant at the 95 percent confidence 
interval. It is worthwhile to note Asians
15
 substantially consider school quality. The 
probability of choosing public school quality for Asian households is 56 percent 
                                                 
15
 The sample size of Asians is only 9 respondents.  
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(which is statistically significant at the 95 percent confidence interval, while Whites, 
African Americans, and other races have 27 percent, 26 percent, and eight percent 
probability, respectively. However, none of them are statistically significant. 
6.3.1.2 Result of Importance of School Quality 
 
The second approach to testing the first group of hypotheses is to find out to what 
extent homebuyers consider school quality is important on the Likert-scale: very 
important, somewhat important, average importance, not very important, and not at 
all important. This analysis leads to measuring the heterogeneous willingness to pay 
for school quality. 
As expected, most respondents across all demographics and SES answered that 
school quality is important. Their summations of probability answering very 
important, somewhat important, and average importance range from 67 percent to 
100 percent. For each demographic and SES category, homebuyers with incomes 
between $10,000 and $24,999, and $55,000 and $69,999 have the lowest 
probabilities of rating second quality as important (76 percent and 75 percent, 
respectively). The probability for households with children is 95 percent, and it is 
only 71 percent for those with no children. Asians and African Americans have 
probabilities of 100 percent and 94 percent, respectively. Regarding educational 
attainment, as educational attainment goes up, the probabilities of stating that school 
quality is important goes up, with the exception of the some high school category (86 
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percent).  Unexpectedly, the probabilities for occupation variables are not different 
from one another statistically.  
6.3.1.3 Result of School Quality Measure 
 
Inspired by the controversy in the previous literature about which measure of 
school quality is capitalized into property value, the approach this dissertation made 
is to ask homebuyers directly. Previous research focused on the relationship between 
school quality and housing prices confirmed that school outcomes, such as test scores, 
is a better school measure than input.  
The probabilities for each household category are that households with school-
age children care about school safety (16%) and school district designation (29%), 
but neither of these are statistically significant. Interestingly, each race category cares 
about school measures differently. Asians primarily consider school quality as the 
percentage of going to college. Whites consider school district designation (28%) 
and school safety (17%), but neither of these are statistically significant. The 
preference for school quality measures of African Americans is evenly distributed 
into school safety (19%), the percentage going to college (16%), and school district 
designation (19%), but neither of these are statistically significant. 
Regarding income categories, low-income households take teacher characteristics 
and school safety into account, while high-income households think of school district 
designation. The results of educational attainment indicate the same as the income 
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results. The higher the educational attainment of the household, the higher 
probability of choosing school district designation. 
Table 6- 1a  Hypothesis Group I : Preference for School Quality 
 
Note:  * =     .10,  ** =    .05, *** =    .01 
 
Hypothesis # Hypothesis  contents 
Expected 
Sign 
Results  
Sig. 
H I-1  
Preference for school 
quality and homebuyers 
with children 
With school-age children > the average 
preference 
+ + 
*** 
With no school age children < the 
average preference 
- - 
*** 
No Children <  average preference - - 
** 
H I-2   
Preference for School 
Quality and Homebuyer’ 
Marital Status 
Married >  average preference + +  
Never Married <  average preference - -  
Widowed  < average preference - -  
Divorced < average preference - +  
H I-3  
Preference for School 
Quality and Homebuyer’s 
Income 
less than 10,000 < average preference - NA  
10,000-24,999 < average preference - -  
25,000-39,999 <  average preference - +  
40,000-54,999 <  average preference - -  
55,000-69,999 >  average preference + -  
70,000-84,999 >  average preference + -  
85,000-99,999 >  average preference + +  
100,000-149,999 >  average preference + + *** 
150,000-199,999 >  average preference + +  
200,000 or more > average preference + +  
H I-4  
Preference for School 
Quality and Homebuyer’s 
Education 
some high <  average preference - -  
high graduate <  average preference - -  
some college <  average preference - -  
college graduate >  average preference + + ** 
Post-graduate >  average preference + -  
H I-5  
Preference for School 
Quality and Homebuyer’s 
Race/Ethnicity 
African American < average preference - -  
White >  average preference + -  
Asian <  average preference - + ** 
some other <  average preference - -  
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Table 6- 1b Hypothesis Group I : Preference for School Quality (Cont.) 
 
 
Note:  Occupation Categories  
Unemployment, (MPRO) management, professional, and related occupations, (SO) service 
occupations, (SOO) sales and office occupations, (CEMO) construction, extraction, and maintenance 
occupations, and (PTMO) production, transportation and material moving occupations 
 
  * =     .10,  ** =    .05, ***=    .01 
 
 
6.3.2 Hypotheses Group II 
 
In order to test the second group of the hypotheses of homebuyers‘ 
heterogeneous location choice in a school district, six groups of homebuyer 
demographics and SES were tested. The ordered logit results indicate somewhat 
different results from those of the ANOTA model. 
The probabilities of choosing excellent school districts for households with 
school-age children, without school-age children, and no children are 59 percent, 46 
percent, and 42 percent, respectively. Recalling that the results of the probabilities of 
choosing public school quality were 43 percent, 15 percent, and four percent, 
Hypothesis # Hypothesis  contents Expect
ed Sign 
# of 
respondents 
Sig. 
H I-6 
Preference for School 
Quality and Homebuyer’s 
Occupations 
Unemployed < average 
preference 
- +  
MPRO> average preference + +  
SO< average preference - +  
SOO< average preference - -  
CEMO< average preference - -  
PTMO< average preference - - * 
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respectively, the difference in the probabilities of living in an excellent school district 
does not seem substantial.    
Marital status, income, and educational attainment are also important factors 
affecting school district location choices. The highest probability of living in an 
excellent school district is 68 percent for a married couple, while a single person has 
the lowest probability at 39 percent. The higher income and educational attainment 
households are more likely to make a location choice in an excellent district. These 
results are consistent with the previous findings. 
The probabilities for occupational categories living in excellent school districts 
range from 44 percent (sales and office occupations) to 62 percent (construction, 
extraction, and maintenance occupations). Unexpectedly, households in management 
and professional related and office occupations have less likely to live in excellent 
school districts and service related occupations. Those in service occupations, and 
production, transportation, and material moving occupations have higher probability 
of living in excellent school districts. The detailed probabilities of school districts 
choices are displayed in Table 5.13 in section 5.2.3 ―Results of the ordered logit 
model.‖ 
 In summary, the results of location choices in school districts are slightly 
different from those of the ANOTA model, which explores the preference for school 
quality. The affordability to live in a good school district plays a critical role in 
homebuyers‘ location decision. 
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Table 6-2 Hypotheses Group II: School District Choice  
 
Note:  * =     .10,  ** =    .05, ***=    .01 
 
 
 
 
 
Hypothesis # Hypothesis  contents 
Except
ed 
signs 
Results  Sig. 
H II-1 
School District Choice 
and Homebuyer with 
Children. 
With school-age children NA NA Reference 
With no school-age children < 
reference category 
- - ***  
No Children < reference category - - ***  
H II-2 
School District Choice 
and homebuyers’ 
marital status 
Married NA NA Reference 
Never Married  < reference category - - *  
Widowed <  reference category - -  
Divorced <  reference category - + * 
H II-3 
School District Choice 
and Homebuyer’s 
Income 
less than 10,000 <  reference category NA NA NA 
10,000-24,999 <  reference category - + ***  
25,000-39,999 <  reference category - +  
40,000-54,999 <  reference category - +  
55,000-69,999 NA NA Reference 
70,000-84,999 >  reference category + + **  
85,000-99,999 >  reference category + + *** 
100,000-149,999 >  reference category + + ***  
150,000-199,999 >  reference category + + ***  
200,000 or more >  reference category + + ***  
H II-4 
School District Choice 
and Homebuyer’s 
Education 
some high school <  reference 
category 
- + *  
high school graduate <  reference 
category 
- + *** 
some college <  reference category - +  
college graduate NA NA Reference 
Post-graduate >   reference category + +  
H II-5 
School District Choice 
and Homebuyer’s 
Race/Ethnicity 
African American < reference 
category 
- - ***  
White NA NA Reference 
Asian <  reference category - + 1***  
some other <  reference category - +  
H II-6 
School District Choice 
and Homebuyer’s 
Occupations 
Unemployed < the reference category - +  
MPO > the reference category + NA Reference 
SO < the reference category - -  
SOO <  the reference category - +  
CMO < the reference category  - -  
PMO<  the reference category - -  
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6.3.3 Hypotheses group III 
 
The third group of hypotheses to be tested is how much households are willing to 
pay for school quality. This dissertation hypothesized that there is heterogeneous 
willingness to pay for school quality according to households‘ demographics and 
SES. It also expected this result would be related to their choices in the sense that 
households who want to and can pay more for school quality would make a location 
choice in a good school district. 
Two different units of analyses methodological approaches were utilized with 
individual sales in Cuyahoga County and with aggregated median housing prices in 
14 states. The similar results of these models were hypothesized and expected, 
holding housing and neighborhood characteristics and other school quality constant, 
in particular differences across states in the national model.  
6.3.3.1 Cuyahoga County Model 
 
The methodological approach of this dissertation for the inexistence of individual 
data is to group heterogeneous households‘ demographics and SES into relatively 
homogeneous groups by utilizing cluster analysis. Cluster analysis allows this 
dissertation to make 18 relatively homogeneous groups for each household 
demographic and SES in Cuyahoga County based on the proportion of school-age 
children (four clusters), marital status (three clusters), race (two clusters), income 
(three clusters), educational attainment (two clusters), and occupation (four clusters). 
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 This dissertation used three school measures: performance index, test scores, and 
value added, as well as other school inputs. The performance index is a superior 
school measure over other school measures used in the sense that the performance 
index is more capitalized than other measures in most of the models.  
 The overall average willingness to pay for school quality in Cuyahoga County is 
$8,566 for the performance index, $6,799 for the test scores, and -$1,791 for value 
added. However, households with school-age children, who are married, White, have 
higher education, higher income, and are in management and professional occupation, 
have a higher willingness to pay for school quality than the average willingness for 
households living in Cuyahoga County.   
 Comparing the result of the willingness to pay for school quality model with the 
results of the preference for school quality models, it is true that households with 
school-age children and married households prefer school quality, live in an 
excellent school district, and are willing to pay for school quality.  
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Table 6-3 Hypotheses Group III: Willingness to Pay with Cuyahoga County Sales 
and Block Group Demographics  
 
Note: The T-test was conducted to test whether or not two groups that is statistically different.   
   *  =     .10,  **  =    .05, *** =    .01 
 
Hypothesis Expecte
d Signs 
Results  
Sig. 
H III-2 
Homebuyer with 
Children 
Willingness of  households with school-age children 
to pay for school quality> average willingness to pay 
for school quality 
+ + ** 
Willingness of  households with no children to pay for 
school quality<  average willingness to pay for school 
quality 
- - ** 
H III-3 
homebuyers’ 
Martial Status 
Willingness of  households who are married to pay for 
school quality > average willingness to pay for school 
quality 
+ + ** 
Willingness of  households who are never married to 
pay for school quality <  average willingness to pay 
for school quality 
- - ** 
H III-4 
Preference for 
School Quality 
and 
Homebuyer’s 
Income 
Willingness of  households with income $43,227 to 
pay for school quality < average willingness to pay for 
school quality 
- - ** 
Willingness of  households with $70,069 to pay for 
school quality > average willingness to pay for school 
quality 
+ + ** 
Willingness of  households with $ 122,503 to pay for 
school quality > average willingness to pay for school 
quality 
+ + ** 
H III-5 
Preference for 
School Quality 
and 
Homebuyer’s 
Education 
Willingness of  households with high school graduate 
or less to pay for school quality < average willingness 
to pay for school quality 
- - ** 
Willingness of  households with college graduate or 
more to pay for school quality > average willingness 
to pay for school quality 
+ + ** 
H III-6 
Preference for 
School Quality 
and 
Homebuyer’s 
Race/Ethnicity 
Willingness of  households who are Whites to pay for 
school quality > average willingness to pay for school 
quality 
+ + ** 
Willingness of  households who are African American 
to pay for school quality < average willingness to pay 
for school quality 
- - ** 
H III-7 
Preference for 
School Quality 
and 
Homebuyer’s 
Occupations 
Willingness of  households in  management and 
professional occupation  to pay for school quality > 
average willingness to pay for school quality 
+ + ** 
Willingness of  households in other than management 
and professional occupation  to pay for school quality 
<  average willingness to pay for school quality 
- - ** 
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6.3.3.2 National Model 
 
The findings of the national model are slightly different from those of the 
Cuyahoga County model since housing prices used in Cuyahoga County and the 
national model are different in terms of housing characteristics. While housing prices 
in the Cuyahoga County model are single housing transaction data, those in the 
national model are from various housing types. Additionally, the unit of observation 
in the national model is a school district while that in the county model is individual 
housing. The results of willingness to pay for school quality for each household 
demographic and SES are mixed. For instance, although married households were 
expected to have more willingness to pay for school quality, the result indicates that 
those who are never married have the highest willingness to pay for school quality. 
The results of race in both the Cuyahoga County and the national model are 
consistent. The result of the national model confirms the positive relationship 
between household income and education and willingness to pay for school quality. 
6.3.31 Hypothesis IV 
 
The fourth group of hypotheses compares the results of the Cuyahoga County 
model to those of the national model. It is hard to compare them to each other since 
housing prices utilized in the both models are not the same regarding data, study 
areas, and methodology. The Cuyahoga County model was run with individual 
housing sales data by separating block groups that have a high proportion of 
households for each demographics and SES group. The national model has 14 states 
168 
 
with aggregated data by school districts using the two-stage model. It is also 
worthwhile to note that there are tremendous differences among states in terms of 
income and housing prices. 
Five groups of household demographics and SES were compared: marital status, 
race, income, education, and occupation. Interestingly, the results of race, income 
education, and occupation indicate similar patterns. For instance, Whites and Asians 
are willing to pay more for school quality, and households with higher income, 
higher education, and management and professional occupations tend to have a 
higher willingness to pay for school quality. 
On the contrary, for households‘ marital status, the results of both models are not 
consistent. Married households have the highest willingness to pay for school quality 
in the Cuyahoga County model, while those who are single seem to have highest 
willingness to pay for school quality in the national model.  
6.4  Conclusions and Policy Implications 
 
 
School quality has been considered a location-specific amenity that is positively 
capitalized into housing prices, and it is believed to play a critical role in households‘ 
consumption decisions on purchasing a home and location decisions on where to live. 
The attention is paid to school quality due to the importance of education in the 
current economy. The importance of school quality in the housing market varies by 
household in terms of preference, choice, and willingness to pay. 
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This dissertation explored consumer behavior using a utility function by 
integrating stochastic (ANOTA and ordered logit) and deterministic (hedonic) 
approaches. In particular, homebuyers‘ preferences to purchase homes in a certain 
school district as indicative of their willingness to pay for school quality based on 
their demographics and SES. Therefore, this dissertation hypothesized consumer 
home buying behaviors regarding their different preferences, school district choices, 
and willingness to pay. The approach to modeling their different behaviors of 
preference, choice, and willingness to pay is to combine the survey, which is 
homebuyers‘ active voices of preference regarding school quality, with the housing 
sales dataset in Cuyahoga County. The statistical findings of this dissertation 
conclude that household preferences, choices, and willingness to pay are 
heterogeneous.  
More specifically, this dissertation surveyed homebuyers‘ preference for school 
quality in order to listen to their actual voice. The preference in this dissertation is 
regarded as homebuyers‘ stated preference which can be defined as preference 
without any limitation, although household preference has been estimated from their 
observed behaviors in previous studies. Therefore, the findings on preference for 
school quality in this dissertation are quite different from those of previous studies, 
while the results of school district choice and willingness to pay for school quality 
are consistent with previous studies (Barrow, 2002; Bayer, Ferreira, & McMillan, 
2007; Haurin and Brasington, 1996).  
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It is believed that households with higher income and higher education are 
willing to purchase homes based on school quality and have the ability to live in a 
better school districts, while the opposite is true for households with lower income 
and lower education. However, the statistical findings indicated that elderly 
households have low priority to school quality, but tend to live in good school 
districts and have willingness to pay for school quality. Conversely, households who 
are married with school-age children prefer school quality more, tend to live in better 
school districts, and have higher willingness to pay for school quality than any other 
household types that are statistically significant. 
Tiebout (1956) asserted that consumer-voters reveal their preference by making 
location choice in a community that provides the most satisfactory public goods. 
Previous studies estimate household preference from their observed behavior (Bajari 
& Kahn, 2005; Bayer, Ferreira, & McMillan, 2007). By estimating households‘ 
willingness to pay for a certain characteristic, Bajari and Kahn , and Bayer, Ferreira, 
and McMillan attempted to recover household preference. Preference recovered in 
their studies was from observed household behaviors in the housing markets and was 
regarded as an indicator of willingness to pay for school quality. 
However, the statistical results of this dissertation do not support Tiebout‘s 
assumption that consumers‘ reveal their preferences by choosing a community. Some 
households cannot reveal their preference by making a school district choice because 
it is assumed that they cannot afford to pay the premium for school quality in a good 
171 
 
school district. For instance, households with school-age children, low income and 
low education prefer school quality, but they cannot afford in a good school district. 
African American households rate school quality highly, but the probability of an 
African American household to live in an excellent school district is only 22 percent. 
On the other hand, widowed households do care about school quality (only 14 
percent probability to choose public school quality), but the probability of living in 
an excellent school district is 45 percent.  
As a result, there is a gap between preference for school quality and actual 
consumption of school quality by choosing a school district and willingness to pay 
for school quality. This gap implies disutility or inequity of households who do not 
reveal their preference. This disutility may cause problems, market failure, and false 
efficiency. The gap may also result in the issues of affordability of public goods and 
residential disadvantages.  
Any existing economic theory and technique that estimates the unobserved 
preference from observed consumers‘ behavior cannot capture households‘ disutility 
and explain problems taking place in urban areas because they recover consumers‘ 
preference from their observed behaviors. The falsely estimated demand hampers the 
local government in dealing with those problems of disutility and efficiency. In time, 
the problems become worse. Failing to estimate demand for school quality does not 
allow the local governments to allocate resources efficiently.  
o There are gaps between households‘ preference and their behavior. 
172 
 
o These gaps imply disutility and disadvantage of households, which in turn 
cause problems, market failure, and false efficiency in the housing market. 
o  The results of this dissertation recommend the efficient allocation of 
educational resources such as the school voucher program.  
The findings of this dissertation provide information to policy makers regarding 
their residents‘ heterogeneous preference for a specific public good, school quality, 
based on residents‘ demographics and SES. The results of this study also can assist in 
determining the level of expenditure for education based on the extent residents are 
willing and able to pay. It also can contribute to educational reform by addressing the 
efficient allocation of resources to economically disadvantaged residents. The 
dissertation calls for expanding and facilitating policies providing residents the 
freedom to choose a school district, particularly in reducing the gap between desire 
and affordability of residents with school-age children.  
6.5  Limitations and Future Research 
 
The limitations of this dissertation come from two issues: the number of the 
survey sample and multi-type housing prices in the national model. The survey 
methodological approach was to hear the active voice of homebuyer preference 
regarding school quality. One of the major limitations of this dissertation is the small 
number of survey data, making the survey dataset skewed to high income and 
education. It is hard to find statistical significance due to the small sample for each 
households‘ demographic and SES.  For instance, there are only two Hispanic 
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respondents and only one respondent with income less than $10,000. Asian 
households are represented to some degree, which is statistically significant, however, 
there are only nine respondents. That causes a threat to validity and reliability, which 
may affect the accuracy of the measurement.  
Additional survey data are needed to find statistical significance in homebuyers‘ 
preference for school quality. In future research, more survey samples validate 
comparisons of actual preference for school quality and consumption behavior for 
how much a homebuyer is willing to pay for school quality. More survey data for 
each household‘s demographic and SES would also give this model more power to 
explain households‘ preference for school quality and school district choices. In the 
ordered logit model, the thresholds are very large and statistically significant, which 
means a large portion of the model remains unexplained. 
In addition to survey data, the housing data used for the national model was not 
all based on single-family housing but consisted of various housing types (e.g., 
multi-family, apartment, and condominium), which limited the researcher‘s ability to 
compare single-housing sales data collected from Cuyahoga County.  
Future research in this subject includes interaction variables of households that 
have multiple characteristics such as African American and middle income 
households. For instance, although households with school-age children are assumed 
to prefer school quality, their behaviors also vary by race, income, and education. 
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The last recommendation for future studies is that various advanced 
methodological approaches such as the sample selection model should be developed 
because households‘ consumption behaviors in a housing market are complex and 
complicated.  
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APPENDIX 4:  Survey Results 
 
2. What year did you purchase your house? 
           
Value Frequency Percent Cum. % 
2006 348 87 87 
2007 51 12.75 99.75 
2008 1 0.25 100 
    
Mean: 2006.132   
Median: 2006   
Standard deviation: 0.347   
Standard error: 0.017   
Value: 2006   
Frequency: 348   
 
 
3B. May I have your zip code? 
           
Value Frequency Percent Cum. % 
    
41107 1 0.25 0.25 
44017 9 2.25 2.5 
44022 7 1.75 4.25 
44070 12 3 7.25 
44105 1 0.25 7.5 
44106 1 0.25 7.75 
44107 31 7.75 15.5 
44112 1 0.25 15.75 
44116 15 3.75 19.5 
44117 1 0.25 19.75 
44118 28 7 26.75 
44120 7 1.75 28.5 
44121 14 3.5 32 
44122 21 5.25 37.25 
44123 6 1.5 38.75 
44124 15 3.75 42.5 
44125 7 1.75 44.25 
44126 11 2.75 47 
44128 1 0.25 47.25 
44129 14 3.5 50.75 
44130 16 4 54.75 
44131 11 2.75 57.5 
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44132 4 1 58.5 
44133 6 1.5 60 
44134 10 2.5 62.5 
44136 12 3 65.5 
44137 2 0.5 66 
44138 9 2.25 68.25 
44139 32 8 76.25 
44140 11 2.75 79 
44141 13 3.25 82.25 
44142 3 0.75 83 
44143 13 3.25 86.25 
44144 5 1.25 87.5 
44145 18 4.5 92 
44146 5 1.25 93.25 
44147 11 2.75 96 
44149 16 4 100 
    
Mean:  44116.12  
Median:  44129  
Standard deviation:  153.122  
Standard error:  7.656  
Value:   44139  
Frequency  32  
 
 
4A. How many bedrooms do you have? 
 
           
Value Frequency Percent Cum. % 
2 16 4 4 
3 182 45.5 49.5 
4 172 43 92.5 
5 24 6 98.5 
6 5 1.25 99.75 
7 1 0.25 100 
    
Mean: 3.558   
Median: 4   
Standard deviation: 0.744   
Standard error: 0.037   
Frequency:  182   
Value:  3   
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4B. How many bathrooms? 
 
Value Frequency Percent Cum. % 
1 61 15.25 15.25 
2 191 47.75 63 
3 104 26 89 
4 34 8.5 97.5 
5 5 1.25 98.75 
6 4 1 99.75 
7 1 0.25 100 
    
Mean: 2.368   
Median: 2   
Standard deviation: 0.977   
Standard error: 0.049   
Frequency: 191   
Value: 2   
 
5. What was the purchase price of your home? 
                              
              
Value Frequency Cum. % 
Less than $100,000 5 3.25 
$100,000-$150,000 117 29.25 
$150,001-$200,000 93 53.75 
$200,001-$300,000 107 80.5 
$300,001-$40,0000 39 90.25 
more than $400,000 39 1000 
   
Mean: 243432  
Median: 200000  
Standard deviation:       168989  
Standard error: 8449  
Frequency: 25  
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6. Where did you live previously? 
 
 Frequency Percent 
  1 The Same City                  99 24.80% 
   2 Different City In The Same 
County     171 42.80% 
   3 A Different County                   48 12.00% 
   4 Outside Ohio                         82 20.50% 
    Total Qualified                      400 100.00% 
 
7. When searching for your new home, where did you get information about 
school quality? 
 
 Frequency Percent 
1 Newsletter                       13 3.20% 
2 Newspaper                             54 13.50% 
 3 Magazine                             51 12.80% 
4 Web-Site                           137 34.20% 
5 Word Of Mouth                 227 56.80% 
6 Parent/Teacher Meeting        15 3.80% 
7 Multiple Listing Service         39 9.80% 
8 (Do Not Read) Other (Specify)    72 18.00% 
9 (Do Not Read) Did Not Research/Don't Know                39 9.80% 
Total Qualified                       400 100.00% 
 
 
8A. What was the most important reason for your decision to buy the house you 
did? 
 
                                   Frequency Percent 
1 Location 144 36.00% 
2 Public Transportation 3 0.80% 
3 Neighbors 9 2.20% 
4 Amenity Of Convenience Facility 9 2.20% 
(Shopping Center, Etc.)   
5 Safety 18 4.50% 
6 Near Friends/Relatives 42 10.50% 
7 Public School Quality 106 26.50% 
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8 Housing Size 21 5.20% 
9 Housing Style 25 6.20% 
10 (Do Not Read) Other (Specify) 22 5.50% 
11 (Do Not Read) None Of The Above 1 0.20% 
   
Total Qualified 400 100.00% 
 
 
 
8B. What was the second most important reason for your decision to buy the 
house you did? 
 
 Frequency Percent 
1 Location 74 18.50% 
2 Public Transportation 5 1.20% 
3 Neighbors 29 7.20% 
4 Amenity Of Convenience Facility 31 7.80% 
(Shopping Center, Etc.)   
5 Safety 34 8.50% 
6 Near Friends/Relatives 45 11.20% 
7 Public School Quality 58 14.50% 
8 Housing Size 44 11.00% 
9 Housing Style 47 11.80% 
10 (Do Not Read) Other (Specify) 28 7.00% 
11 (Do Not Read) None Of The Above 5 1.20% 
Total Qualified 400 100.00% 
 
8c. What was the third most important reason for your decision to buy the house 
you did?   
 
 Frequency Percent 
1 Location 55 13.80% 
2 Public Transportation 4 1.00% 
3 Neighbors 31 7.80% 
4 Amenity Of Convenience Facility 66 16.50% 
(Shopping Center, Etc.)   
5 Safety 48 12.00% 
6 Near Friends/Relatives 33 8.20% 
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7 Public School Quality 47 11.80% 
8 Housing Size 39 9.80% 
9 Housing Style 43 10.80% 
10 (Do Not Read) Other (Specify) 27 6.80% 
11 (Do Not Read) None Of The Above 7 1.80% 
   
Total Qualified 400 100.00% 
 
9. How important was school quality when you were deciding to buy your house? 
 
 Frequency Percent 
1 Very Important 235 58.80% 
2 Somewhat Important 83 20.80% 
3 Average Importance 25 6.20% 
4 Not Very Important 23 5.80% 
5 Not At All Important 33 8.20% 
6 (DO NOT READ) DON'T KNOW/Refused 1 0.20% 
   
Total Qualified 400 100.00% 
 
 
11a. Which school factor was most important when you were deciding to buy 
your house? 
 
                                     Frequency  Percent 
    1 A. Teachers' Education                22 5.50% 
    2 B. Teacher Experience                 21 5.20% 
    3 C. Teacher Salary                     2 0.50% 
    4 D. Class Size                         42 10.50% 
    5 E. Per Pupil Expenditure              11 2.80% 
    6 F. School Safety                      66 16.50% 
    8 H. Sports Programs                     2 0.50% 
    9 I. Parent Teacher Organization (PTO) Meeting 2 0.50% 
    10 J. Percent Of Students Going To College  33 8.20% 
    12 L. Graduation Rates                    32 8.00% 
    13 M. Sat Scores                          8 2.00% 
    14 N. Standardized Math Test Scores       3 0.80% 
    15 O. Standardized Reading Test Scores    6 1.50% 
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    16 P. School District Designations, such As Excellent, 
Effective, Etc 110 27.50% 
    17 (Do Not Read) None Of The Above       40 10.00% 
   
Total Qualified 400 100.00% 
 
 
12a. Do you know the school district designation that the state of Ohio has given 
to your school district? 
 
 Frequency Percent 
1 YES 202 50.50% 
2 NO 198 49.50% 
 
 
13. How many children do you have? 
           
Value Frequency Percent Cum. % 
0 82 20.5 20.5 
1 87 21.75 42.25 
2 136 34 76.25 
3 70 17.5 93.75 
4 15 3.75 97.5 
5 8 2 99.5 
6 1 0.25 99.75 
8 1 0.25 100 
    
Mean: 1.708   
Median: 2   
Standard deviation: 1.261   
Standard error: 0.063   
Value: 2   
Frequency: 136   
 
14. Do you have a k-12 school-aged child? 
 
 Frequency Percent 
1 YES 198 62.30% 
2 NO 120 37.70% 
   
Total Qualified 318 100.00% 
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15. Which is more important? 
 
 Frequency Percent 
1 school district quality 134 67.70% 
2 or, features at your oldest age child's school 58 29.30% 
3 (do not read) not sure 6 3.00% 
   
Total qualified 198 100.00% 
 
 
16. What grade is your oldest child in k-12? 
 
 Frequency Percent 
1 K 11 5.60% 
2 1ST 13 6.60% 
3 2ND 19 9.60% 
4 3RD 16 8.10% 
5 4TH 19 9.60% 
6 5TH 13 6.60% 
7 6TH 19 9.60% 
8 7TH 12 6.10% 
9 8TH 13 6.60% 
10 9TH 17 8.60% 
11 10TH 21 10.60% 
12 11TH 16 8.10% 
13 12TH 9 4.50% 
   
Total Qualified 198 100.00% 
 
17. Please indicate the type of school 
 
 Frequency Percent 
1 Public School 161 81.30% 
2 Home Schooling 4 2.00% 
3 Charter School 3 1.50% 
4 Religious Private School 26 13.10% 
5 Non-Religious Private School 4 2.00% 
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Total Qualified 198 100.00% 
 
18. Is your child in any of the following? 
                                      
 Frequency Percent 
1 Remedial Math 9 4.50% 
2 Advanced Placement Math 34 17.20% 
3 Honors Math 25 12.60% 
4 Remedial Science 5 2.50% 
5 Advanced Placement Science 23 11.60% 
6 Honors Science 19 9.60% 
7 Remedial Reading 10 5.10% 
8 Advanced Placement Reading 21 10.60% 
9 Honors Reading 25 12.60% 
10 (Do Not Read) Don't Know/None Of The Above 116 58.60% 
   
Total Qualified 198 100.00% 
 
 
19. What is your child's overall grade point average (approximately)? 
 
 Frequency Percent 
1 Less Than 2.0 2 1.00% 
2 2.0-2.9 18 9.10% 
3 3.0-3.9 95 48.00% 
4 4.0 Or Higher 30 15.20% 
5 (Do Not Read) Not Sure 53 26.80% 
   
Total Qualified 198 100.00% 
 
20. What is your relationship to the child? 
 
 Frequency Percent 
1 Mother 126 63.60% 
2 Father 60 30.30% 
3 Stepmother Or Stepfather 8 4.00% 
6 Grandmother Or Grandfather 3 1.50% 
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7 Legal Guardian 1 0.50% 
   
Total Qualified 198 100.00% 
 
 
21. What is your (respondent) gender? 
 
 Frequency Percent 
1 MALE 200 50.00% 
2 FEMALE 200 50.00% 
   
Total Qualified 400 100.00% 
 
22. WHAT IS your (respondent) AGE? 
 
 Frequency Percent 
2 21-30 78 19.50% 
3 31-40 145 36.20% 
4 41-50 116 29.00% 
5 51-60 46 11.50% 
6 61-70 9 2.20% 
7 71-80 4 1.00% 
8 OLDER THAN 80 1 0.20% 
9 (DO NOT READ) REFUSED 1 0.20% 
   
Total Qualified 400 100.00% 
 
 
23. WHAT IS your (respondent) race? 
 
 Frequency Percent 
1 African American 34 8.50% 
2 White 341 85.20% 
3 Hispanic 2 0.50% 
4 Asian 9 2.20% 
6 Other 12 3.00% 
7 (Do Not Read) Refused 2 0.50% 
   
Total Qualified 400 100.00% 
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24. What is your approximate total household income per year before Tax? 
 
 Frequency Percent 
1 LESS THAN $10,000 1 0.20% 
2 $10,000-$24,999 8 2.00% 
3 $25,000-$39,999 17 4.20% 
4 $40,000-$54,999 34 8.50% 
5 $55,000-$69,999 53 13.20% 
6 $70,000-$84,999 56 14.00% 
7 $85,000-$99,999 55 13.80% 
8 $100,000-$149,999 89 22.20% 
9 $150,000-$199,999 39 9.80% 
10 $200,000 OR OVER 27 6.80% 
11 (DO NOT READ) REFUSED 21 5.20% 
   
Total Qualified 400 100.00% 
 
25. What is the highest education level your (respondent) completed? 
 
 Frequency Percent 
2 Some High School 8 2.00% 
3 High School Graduate 29 7.20% 
4 Some College 61 15.20% 
5 College Graduate 173 43.20% 
6 Post Graduate 127 31.80% 
7 (Do Not Read) Refused 2 0.50% 
   
Total Qualified 400 100.00% 
 
26. How many people in your family work outside the home? 
 
Value Frequency Percent Cumm. % 
0 14 3.5 3.5 
1 141 35.25 38.75 
2 229 57.25 96 
3 13 3.25 99.25 
4 2 0.5 99.75 
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99 1 0.25 100 
    
Mean: 1.863   
Median: 2   
Standard deviation: 4.91   
Standard error: 0.246   
Value: 2   
Frequency: 229   
 
27. If you are employed, is it...? 
 
 Frequency Percent 
1 FULL TIME 302 75.50% 
2 PART-TIME 37 9.20% 
3 (DO NOT READ) NOT EMPLOYED 61 15.20% 
   
Total Qualified 400 100.00% 
 
29. ARE YOU....? 
 
 Frequency Percent 
1 SINGLE 29 7.30% 
2 MARRIED 335 84.40% 
3 DIVORCED 25 6.30% 
4 WIDOWED/WIDOWER 7 1.80% 
5 (DO NOT READ) REFUSED 1 0.30% 
   
Total Qualified 397 100.00% 
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APPENDIX 5: School District Designation in Ohio 
 
Source: Ohio Education Department
 
Rating 
State 
Indicators 
Met 
. 
      
Performance 
Index Score 
      AYP Determination   
Performance Index 
Growth Criteria 
Excellent 
24-25 or 
94% - 100 % 
or 100 to 120   and   Met or Missed AYP   Not Eligible 
                        
Effective 
19-23 or 
75% - 93.9% 
or 90 to 99.9   and   
 
Met or Missed AYP 
 
  Not Eligible 
                        
Continuous 
Improvement 
0-18 or 0% - 
74.9% 
and 0 to 89.9   and   Met AYP     
13-18 or 
50% - 74.9% 
or 80 to 89.9   and   Missed AYP   
Designated Academic 
Watch but improved at 
least 10 points in 2 years 
with at least 3 points in 
most recent year. 
                        
Academic 
Watch 
9-12 or 31% 
- 49.9% 
or 70 to 79.9   and   Missed AYP   
Designated Academic 
Emergency but improved 
at least 10 points in 2 
years with at least 3 points 
in most recent year. 
                        
Academic 
Emergency 
0-8 or 0% - 
30.9% 
and 0 to 69.9   and   Missed AYP     
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APPENDIX 6: Location Factors and Homebuyers: Marital Status 
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APPENDIX 7: Location Factors and Homebuyers: Income 
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APPENDIX 8: Location Factors and Homebuyers: Education  
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APPENDIX 9: Location Factors and Homebuyers: Race 
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APPENDIX 10: Location Factors and Homebuyers: Occupation 
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APPENDIX 11:  Importance of School Quality: Marital Status 
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APPENDIX 13:  Importance of School Quality: Education  
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APPENDIX 16:  Measure of School Quality: Marital Status  
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APPENDIX 17:  Measure of School Quality: Education  
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APPENDIX 18:  Measure of School Quality: Income 
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APPENDIX 19:  Measure of School Quality: Race 
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APPENDIX 20:  Measure of School Quality: Occupation  
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APPENDIX 21:  School District Choice: Marital Status 
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APPENDIX 23:  School District Choice: Income  
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APPENDIX 24:  School District Choice: Education  
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APPENDIX 25 School District Choice: Occupation  
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APPENDIX 26a:  Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variables Description Sources Signs 
Dependent Variable 
Ln (HP) Log of Housing Price Auditor's   
Independent Variables 
Housing Characteristics   
Log_livo Log of Total living area (SQFT) Auditor's  +   
Log_lot Log of lot size Auditor's  +   
age Year Built Auditor's   - 
basesqft Basement size Auditor's + 
bedrooms Number of bedrooms Auditor's  +   
baths Number of bathrooms Auditor's  +   
firepl Fire Place Auditor's  +   
garsize Garage Size Auditor's  +   
Location characteristics 
Tax rate  Property tax rates   
D_CBD Distance to central business district   
SQ_D_CBD Squared distance to central business district   
Density The ratio of the number of households to area   
D_water Dummy for close to water front  (a quarter mile)   
School Quality   
Expenditure Expenditure per pupil Department of Education  +   
Test 10th grade math test scores Department of Education  +   
Experience Teachers‘ experience (year) Department of Education  +   
Salary Teachers‘ salary ($) Department of Education  +   
PI Performance Index Department of Education  +   
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APPENDIX 26b: Descriptive Statistics (Cont.) 
 
Variables Description Sources Signs 
DEMOGRAPHICS & SES   
P_White Percentage of White Population U.S. census + 
P_AA Percentage of African American Population U.S. census +/- 
P_Asian Percentage of Asian Population U.S. census +/- 
P_Hispanic Percentage of Hispanic Population U.S. census +/- 
Some R Some Other Races U.S. census NA 
P_school_a Percentage of  Public Students in block group U.S. census +   
P_high Percentage of  High school graduation rate U.S. census +   
P_asso Percentage of  College graduation rate U.S. census +   
P_post Percentage of  post graduate degree   
P_ba Percentage of  Bachelor Degree U.S. census +   
Income Median Income U.S. census +   
WSC Households with school age children U.S. census + 
WOSC Households with children but of school age U.S. census - 
WNO Households with no children U.S. census - 
Married Households who are married U.S. census + 
Never_m Households who are never married U.S. census - 
Divorced Households who are divorced U.S. census - 
Widowed Households who are widowed U.S. census - 
MPRO Management, professional, and related occupations U.S. census NA 
SO Service occupations U.S. census NA 
SOO Sales and office occupations U.S. census NA 
CEMO Construction, extraction, maintenance and repair occupations U.S. census NA 
PTMO Production, Transportation and Material moving occupations U.S. census NA 
I_U10K Income Less than $10,000 U.S. census - 
I_10K_15K Income $10,000 to $14,999 U.S. census -  
I_15K_25K Income $15,000 to $24,999 U.S. census  - 
I_25K_35K Income $25,000 to $34,999 U.S. census +/-   
I_35K_50K Income $35,000 to $49,999 U.S. census +/-   
I_50K_75K Income $50,000 to $74,999 U.S. census +   
I_75K_100K Income $75,000 to $99,999 U.S. census +   
I_100K_150K Income$100,000 to $149,999 U.S. census +   
I_150K_200K Income $150,000 to $199,999 U.S. census +   
I_O200K Income $200,000 or more U.S. census +   
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APPENDIX 27:  Dendrogram: Marital Status 
 
 
 
APPENDIX 28:  Dendrogram: Race 
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APPENDIX 29:  Dendrogram:  Income 
 
 
APPENDIX 30:  Dendrogram:  Education  
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APPENDIX 31:  Dendrogram: Occupation  
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 APPENDIX 32:  Cluster Analysis 
 
Cluster ID  Variable N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
 p_w 11193 0 100 83.61 23.76 
 p_aa 11193 0 100 12.68 23.63 
 p_a 11193 0 16 1.75 2.27 
 p_so 11193 0 10 0.42 0.96 
 p_school_a 11193 0 21.16 29.48 2.50 
 p_never_m 11193 4.92 85.31 25.03 7.58 
 p_marr 11193 11.69 85.25 57.21 10.27 
 p_widowed 11193 0.62 50.82 8.38 4.34 
 p_divorced 11193 0.73 24.3 9.38 4.02 
 p_high 11193 0 55.7 29.40 11.19 
 p_asso 11193 0 16.76 5.79 2.53 
 p_ba 11193 0 54.35 19.19 9.21 
 p_post_ 11193 0 74 11.64 10.28 
 p_manage 11193 2.51 85.8 38.68 13.90 
 p_service 11193 0 48.04 12.28 5.13 
 p_sales_of 11193 7.57 48.46 29.86 6.42 
 p_construc 11193 0 29.7 6.70 3.74 
 p_producti 11193 0 37.25 12.40 6.70 
 Income  11193  $10,879 $200,001 $53,937.11 $20,134.30 
Cluster ID  Variable N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
PROPORTION OF CHILDREN 
cluster 1 P_school_a 4379 0 5.6 4.1 1.1 
cluster 2 P_school_a 4707 5.6 8.7 7.0 0.9 
cluster 3 P_school_a 2107 8.7 21.2 10.26 1.4 
MARITAL STATUS 
cluster 1 p_never_m 4788 4.92 30.66 19.61 3.66 
 p_marr 4788 56.49 85.25 66.33 5.02 
 p_widowed 4788 0.62 24.39 7.43 3.40 
 p_divorced 4788 0.73 13.95 6.62 2.43 
cluster 2 p_never_m 1409 20.22 85.31 38.91 7.07 
 p_marr 1409 11.69 49.8 39.99 6.81 
 p_widowed 1409 0.9 31.46 7.36 4.92 
 p_divorced 1409 1.36 24.3 13.74 4.03 
cluster 3 p_never_m 4996 7.24 37.36 26.30 4.21 
 p_marr 4996 26.15 61.13 53.32 4.51 
 p_widowed 4996 1.15 50.82 9.58 4.65 
 p_divorced 4996 1.59 20.76 10.80 3.34 
 
 
EDUCATION 
EDUCATION 
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RACE 
Cluster 1 p_w 9719 58.69 100 92.05 7.76 
 p_b 9719 0 36.93 4.23 6.84 
 p_a 9719 0 16 1.85 2.30 
 p_so 9719 0 10 0.43 0.96 
Cluster 2 p_w 1474 0 57.4 27.91 17.80 
 p_b 1474 32.48 100 68.40 18.84 
 p_a 1474 0 14 1.06 1.91 
 p_so 1474 0 7 0.39 0.91 
INCOME 
Cluster 1 Avg. income 5979 39,737 60,664 48,297 5,618 
Cluster 2 Avg. income 3088 60,859 200,001 78,916 20,315 
Cluster 4 Avg. income 2126 10,879 39,500 33,518 5,786 
EDUCATTION 
Cluster 1 p_high 4110 0 31.68 17.71 6.81 
 p_asso 4110 0 16.76 5.41 2.66 
 p_ba 4110 11.11 54.35 28.37 6.59 
 p_post 4110 6 74 21.62 10.45 
Cluster 2 p_high 7083 10.64 55.7 36.18 6.76 
 p_asso 7083 0 15.19 6.00 2.42 
 p_ba 7083 0 28.98 13.87 5.62 
 p_post 7083 0 19 5.84 3.51 
OCCUPATION 
Cluster 1 p_manage 3307 10.11 36.4 28.94 4.69 
 p_service 3307 1.46 33.53 13.34 4.03 
 p_sales_of 3307 25.51 48.46 35.64 4.45 
 p_construction 3307 0 18.47 8.03 3.33 
 p_production 3307 0 26.38 13.95 3.64 
Cluster 2 p_manage 3713 33.78 52.12 42.86 4.51 
 p_service 3713 3.15 29.73 11.46 3.89 
 p_sales_of 3713 8.84 42.31 29.46 4.63 
 p_construction 3713 0 15.96 6.19 2.86 
 p_production 3713 0 23.53 9.93 4.06 
Cluster 3 p_manage 2089 51.68 85.8 60.87 7.63 
 p_service 2089 0 18.84 7.71 3.59 
 p_sales_of 2089 7.57 35.99 23.32 5.67 
 p_construction 2089 0 9.52 2.97 2.11 
 p_production 2089 0 15.14 5.10 3.52 
Cluster 4 p_manage 606 12 44 22.33 5.64 
 p_service 606 0 25 13.66 5.28 
 p_sales_of 606 9 38 26.74 4.82 
 p_construction 606 3 30 11.19 4.00 
 p_production 606 18 37 26.19 4.17 
228 
 
APPENDIX 33:  Definition of variables in the National Model 
 
 Descriptive  
P_owner Percentage of homeowner 
P_vacant Percentage of vacant housing units 
P_detached 
percentage of detached housing 
units 
log_income log of median income 
log_age log of housing age 
tax_rate Property tax rate 
Density proxy for housing size 
Ramp 
Standardized comprehensive school 
quality measure 
Salary Teacher's salary 
Spending Expenditure per pupil 
Test 10th grade math test scores  
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APPENDIX 34:  Statistical Results of the National Model 
State Constant P_OWNER P_VACANT P_DETACHED LOG_INCOME LOG_AGE TAX_RATE DENSITY RAMP SALARY SPENDING 
 
R2 
Adj.R 
Square 
Arkansas 
7.5758** 
(4.1847)  
-0.0046  
(-1.6077) 
-0.0020  
(-0.8056 ) 
0.0022  
(0.7967) 
0.4837** 
(3.0992) 
-0.4272**  
(-4.5789) 
0.0033 
(0.9705) 
0.0000**  
(-3.3700) 
0.0432* 
(2.3183) 
0.0001* 
(0.4485) 
0.0000**  
(-0.3328) 79.3% 76.8% 
California 
-2.4559**  
(-3.4366) 
-0.0039  
(-1.8747 ) 
0.0073 
(1.7288) 
-0.0041**  
(-2.8071 ) 
1.2533** 
(18.2156) 
0.2617** 
(5.9422)  
0.0024** 
(2.4929) 
0.0000**  
(-3.6455) 
0.1002** 
(4.3093) 
0.0001  
(1.8779) 
0.0000 
(0.4459) 87.2% 86.7% 
Colorado 
0.5390  
(0.2228) 
-0.0080  
(-1.0837 ) 
0.0019 
(0.3209) 
-0.0053  
(-1.0854 ) 
1.1265** 
(5.4577) 
-0.0243  
(-0.1510) 
0.0049 
(0.9799) 
0.0000  
(-0.9765) 
0.1106** 
(2.7781) 
0.0001  
(0.5330) 
0.0000 
 (-0.1406) 87.8% 82.4% 
Delaware 
1.2598  
(0.3608) 
0.0137 
(1.6360)  
-0.0196  
(-1.8171) 
-0.0051  
(-0.8017) 
0.8029*  
(2.5698) 
0.0608 
(0.5516) 
0.0061 
(0.8855) 
0.0000 
(0.7839) 
0.0580 
(1.6146) 
0.0004  
(1.6029) 
-0.0001 
 (-0.4990) 94.7% 84.0% 
Illinois 
-4.7380** 
 (-6.1841) 
-0.0089**  
(-3.7575 ) 
-0.0024  
(-1.6779 ) 
-0.0045*  
(-2.3029 ) 
1.5740** 
(22.7575) 
0.0803 
(1.6412) 
0.0012* 
(2.4291) 
0.0000 
(0.0555) 
0.0225 
 (1.5018) 
0.0000 
 (-0.6147) 
0.0000 
(1.0076) 92.9% 92.4% 
Indiana 
1.8960** 
(2.6282) 
-0.0120** 
 (-6.5102 ) 
0.0009 
(0.6868) 
0.0027  
(1.6203) 
1.0076** 
(15.5522) 
-0.1438**  
(-4.0338) 
0.0022* 
(2.3118) 
0.0000*  
(-2.1036) 
0.0312** 
(3.3801) 
0.0000  
(-0.0605 ) 
0.0000 
(-0.3988 ) 85.9% 85.1% 
Massachusetts 
0.1132  
(0.1331) 
-0.0141** 
 (-5.2069) 
0.0001 
(0.0457) 
0.0051** 
(3.1286) 
1.1069** 
(13.9249) 
0.0200 
(0.4456) 
0.0003 
(0.6916) 
0.0000*  
(-2.1682 ) 
0.0799** 
(4.1933) 
0.0000  
(-0.3061) 
0.0001** 
(4.5167) 89.1% 88.5% 
Michigan 
-1.3049*  
(-2.4420) 
-0.0089**  
(-6.2101 ) 
0.0027* 
(2.5921) 
0.0013 
 (1.0865) 
1.3008** 
(26.3014) 
-0.1218**  
(-3.5349) 
-0.0012*  
(-2.4442 ) 
0.0000  
(-0.7018) 
0.0374** 
(4.6552) 
-0.0001*  
(-2.0816) 
0.0000 
(1.4853)  90.0% 89.7% 
New Jersey 
-0.2374 
 (-0.3053) 
-0.0094**  
(-5.3267 ) 
0.0036 
(1.0177) 
-0.0014  
(-1.1008 ) 
1.1578** 
(16.7062) 
-0.0109  
(-0.2110) 
0.0006* 
(2.0766) 
0.0000  
(-0.2538 ) 
0.0955** 
(5.2363) 
0.0001  
(1.4792) 
0.0000 
(0.2287) 86.7% 86.0% 
Pennsylvania 
0.2821  
(0.5638) 
-0.0104**  
(-9.3425) 
-0.0025**  
(-2.8149 ) 
0.0022** 
(3.3457) 
1.1681** 
(26.4806) 
-0.1720**  
(-6.1119 ) 
0.0004 
(0.7685) 
0.0000** 
(3.0002) 
0.0433** 
(6.0242)  
0.0001* 
(2.5055) 
0.0000* 
 (-2.0107) 91.3% 91.1% 
Rhode  
Island 
1.8238 
 (0.8129) 
-0.0070  
(-1.3392) 
-0.0139*  
(-1.9692) 
0.0004 
 (0.1031) 
0.8360** 
(3.8486) 
0.2860* 
(2.4293) 
0.0017 
(1.3272) 
0.0000 
(1.6066) 
0.0709* 
(2.0357) 
0.0000  
(-0.0948) 
0.0001 
(1.3324) 92.5% 86.7% 
South 
Carolina 
2.8509 
( 1.6938) 
-0.0101**  
(-3.3610) 
0.0001 
(0.0247) 
0.0032 
 (1.0281) 
0.9400** 
(6.4228) 
-0.3541**  
(-3.3886) 
-0.0026 
 (-0.5865) 
0.0000* 
(-0.5768) 
0.0065  
(0.3250) 
0.0000  
(0.2710) 
0.0000 
(0.5693) 90.4% 88.6% 
Texas 
0.5390  
(0.2228)  
-0.0080  
(-1.0837) 
0.0019 
(0.3209) 
-0.0053 
 (-1.0854) 
1.1265** 
(5.4577) 
-0.0243 
 (-0.1510) 
0.0049 
(0.9799) 
0.0000  
(-0.9765 ) 
0.1106** 
(2.7781) 
0.0001 
(0.5330) 
0.0000  
(-0.1406) 87.8% 82.4% 
Washington 
1.9924 
(1.7691) 
-0.0135**  
(-5.5907 ) 
-0.0016  
(-0.5481) 
0.0064** 
(2.9722) 
1.0102** 
(11.1127) 
-0.1468*  
(-2.3671) 
0.0019* 
(2.0518) 
0.0000 
(0.0623) 
0.0766** 
(4.6844) 
-0.0001  
(-0.4758) 
0.0000 
(0.5289) 80.9% 79.3% 
 
Note:*  =     .10,  **  =    .05, *** =    .01 
 
